本文關(guān)鍵詞： 中小投資者保護(hù) 家族上市公司 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 資金侵占　出處：《山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：中小投資者是我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的主體，對(duì)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生直接影響，其利益保護(hù)問(wèn)題一直是市場(chǎng)關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。家族企業(yè)是我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的“隱形發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)”，對(duì)我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的繁榮發(fā)展有著突出的貢獻(xiàn)。尤其這幾年家族企業(yè)的上市呈現(xiàn)出井噴之勢(shì)，家族上市公司也成為投資者關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)。然而家族上市公司具有股權(quán)高度集中和“金字塔”式兩種典型股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特征，隨著家族企業(yè)上市公司不斷增多，與之相關(guān)的股東利益分配、關(guān)聯(lián)交易、資金侵占、信息披露、治理結(jié)構(gòu)及其代理問(wèn)題也逐漸凸現(xiàn)出來(lái)，這些都可能侵害中小投資者的利益，因此探究家族上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)安排對(duì)中小投資者保護(hù)的影響顯得十分必要。 本文以我國(guó)家族上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)研究為出發(fā)點(diǎn)，通過(guò)論證中小投資者利益在家族上市公司中受到侵害的原因，以中小投資者保護(hù)效果的加強(qiáng)和完善為主線展開(kāi)。文章首先回顧投資者保護(hù)的相關(guān)理論和研究成果，并以家族上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)安排對(duì)中小投資者侵害作為現(xiàn)實(shí)背景，在這些基礎(chǔ)上提出相應(yīng)的研究假設(shè)。從2009-2011年民營(yíng)上市公司中，篩選出符合條件、數(shù)據(jù)完整的372家家族上市公司，利用其三年的截面數(shù)據(jù)，進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性分析以及回歸分析，探究家族上市公司在不同股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)安排下對(duì)中小投資者保護(hù)產(chǎn)生的影響。實(shí)證結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：家族上市公司股權(quán)集中度越高，越不利于中小投資者的保護(hù)；其他大股東的股權(quán)制衡能力對(duì)中小投資者的保護(hù)效果具有顯著性的作用，隨著第二到第十大股東股權(quán)比例增加，越傾向于保護(hù)中小投資者；公司中控制權(quán)和所有權(quán)的分離度越大、股權(quán)控制鏈長(zhǎng)度越長(zhǎng)，越不利于中小投資者。最后根據(jù)研究結(jié)果，并結(jié)合中國(guó)當(dāng)前的現(xiàn)實(shí)背景，，提出對(duì)應(yīng)政策建議，包括優(yōu)化股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、加強(qiáng)公司監(jiān)管、完善信息披露制度以及提高中小投資者自我維權(quán)意識(shí)等。
[Abstract]:Small and medium-sized investors are the main body of China's securities market and have a direct impact on the long-term development of the national economy. The protection of its interests has always been the focus of attention of the market. The family business is the "invisible engine" of our economy and has made outstanding contributions to the prosperity and development of our economy. Especially in recent years, the listing of family enterprises has shown a trend of blowout. However, the family listed companies have the characteristics of high concentration of ownership and "pyramid" type of ownership structure. With the increasing of the number of listed companies in family enterprises, The problems related to the distribution of shareholders' interests, related transactions, capital encroachment, information disclosure, governance structure and their agency issues are also gradually emerging, which may infringe on the interests of small and medium-sized investors. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the influence of ownership structure on the protection of small and medium investors. Based on the research of the ownership structure of the family listed companies in China, this paper demonstrates the reasons why the interests of the small and medium investors are infringed in the family listed companies. Firstly, this paper reviews the relevant theories and research results of investor protection, and takes the ownership structure arrangement of the family listed company as the realistic background. Based on these, the corresponding research hypotheses are put forward. 372 family listed companies that meet the requirements and complete data are selected from the private listed companies in 2009-2011 to carry out descriptive statistical analysis using their cross-section data of three years. Correlation analysis and regression analysis, to explore the impact of family listed companies on the protection of small and medium-sized investors under different ownership structure arrangements. The empirical results show that: the higher the ownership concentration of family listed companies, The more unfavorable to the protection of small and medium investors, the more inclined to protect small and medium investors with the increase of the proportion of the second to tenth shareholders. The greater the degree of separation of control and ownership in the company, the longer the length of the equity control chain, which is more detrimental to the small and medium-sized investors. Finally, according to the research results and combined with the current background of China, the corresponding policy recommendations, including optimizing the ownership structure, are put forward. Strengthen the company supervision, improve the information disclosure system, and improve the awareness of small and medium-sized investors to protect their rights.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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本文編號(hào)：1539712