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  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 管理層薪酬契約 盈余管理 上市公司　出處：《東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來,隨著我國上市公司股權(quán)分置改革的推進(jìn)和完成,資本市場迎來不小的變化。在股權(quán)分置改革的推動(dòng)下,管理層薪酬機(jī)制在年薪制的基礎(chǔ)上引入了股權(quán)激勵(lì)。與此同時(shí),上市公司盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)和行為方式也趨于復(fù)雜化。由于上市公司管理層的盈余管理行為直接影響著上市公司對(duì)外傳遞信息的準(zhǔn)確性,進(jìn)而影響投資人在資本市場中的投資決策。因此,加入股權(quán)激勵(lì)后的管理層薪酬契約怎樣影響以及是否能夠約束趨于復(fù)雜化的上市公司盈余管理行為,對(duì)確保資本市場的健康發(fā)展具有重要意義。為了進(jìn)一步揭示我國上市公司盈余管理行為并為管理層薪酬契約的制定提供理論依據(jù)、完善我國上市公司管理層激勵(lì)制度、促進(jìn)我國資本市場健康發(fā)展,本文在國內(nèi)外有關(guān)管理層薪酬契約與盈余管理研究成果綜述的基礎(chǔ)上,借鑒國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究方法,針對(duì)管理層薪酬契約對(duì)上市公司盈余管理行為的影響進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。 本文在對(duì)以往外研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,采用了理論研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合,在理論研究的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。在理論研究方面采用了規(guī)范分析與定性分析相結(jié)合的方式。在實(shí)證研究方面,使用了多元回歸模型進(jìn)行定量分析。 首先,通過對(duì)研究背景、目的及研究意義的介紹,確立本文研究價(jià)值；并在梳理和總結(jié)國內(nèi)外先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的同時(shí),對(duì)管理層薪酬契約與盈余管理的相關(guān)概念和理論基礎(chǔ)進(jìn)行界定與闡述,以明確本文的研究范圍。其次,在對(duì)我國上市公司管理層薪酬契約與盈余管理現(xiàn)狀描述和分析的基礎(chǔ)上,運(yùn)用EXCEL和SPSS軟件,以深滬兩市2008-2010三年間的上市公司為樣本建立模型,針對(duì)管理層薪酬契約對(duì)盈余管理行為的影響進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。最后,結(jié)合現(xiàn)狀分析和實(shí)證研究的結(jié)果,對(duì)如何完善我國上市公司管理層薪酬契約機(jī)制提出相應(yīng)的對(duì)策建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the promotion and completion of the split share structure reform of listed companies in our country, the capital market is undergoing considerable changes. Under the impetus of the equity split structure reform, the management compensation mechanism has introduced equity incentive on the basis of the annual salary system. The motivation and behavior of earnings management of listed companies also tend to be complicated, because the earnings management behavior of the management of listed companies directly affects the accuracy of the information transmitted by listed companies to the outside. Therefore, how to influence the executive compensation contract after the equity incentive and whether it can restrain the earnings management behavior of the more complicated listed company, and then affect the investment decision of the investor in the capital market. It is of great significance to ensure the healthy development of the capital market. In order to further reveal the earnings management behavior of listed companies in China and provide theoretical basis for the formulation of management compensation contracts, it is necessary to perfect the incentive system of the management of listed companies in China. To promote the healthy development of China's capital market, this paper draws lessons from relevant research methods at home and abroad on the basis of summarizing the research results of management compensation contract and earnings management at home and abroad. This paper makes an empirical study on the effect of management compensation contract on earnings management behavior of listed companies. Based on the previous research results, this paper combines theoretical research with empirical research. On the basis of theoretical research, this paper adopts the combination of normative analysis and qualitative analysis in theoretical research. In empirical research, multiple regression models are used for quantitative analysis. First of all, by introducing the background, purpose and significance of the research, the author establishes the research value of this paper, and at the same time combing and summing up the advanced experience at home and abroad, This paper defines and expounds the related concepts and theoretical basis of management compensation contract and earnings management, in order to clarify the scope of this paper. Secondly, on the basis of describing and analyzing the current situation of management compensation contract and earnings management of listed companies in China. Using the software of EXCEL and SPSS, taking the listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets from 2008 to 2010 as samples, this paper makes an empirical study on the effect of management compensation contracts on earnings management behavior. Finally, combining with the current situation analysis and the results of empirical research. This paper puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions on how to perfect the management compensation contract mechanism of listed companies in our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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