上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量與盈余管理關(guān)系研究
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 信息不對(duì)稱 信息披露質(zhì)量 盈余管理 修正的Jones模型 出處:《哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:我國資本市場(chǎng)經(jīng)過十幾年的發(fā)展,對(duì)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生巨大的作用。但是,由于外部投資者與公司內(nèi)部之間存在信息不對(duì)稱,管理當(dāng)局采取各種盈余管理手段對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的信息進(jìn)行調(diào)整,導(dǎo)致上市公司信息質(zhì)量存在問題。上市公司的盈余管理嚴(yán)重影響信息披露質(zhì)量,影響投資者的決策與相關(guān)各方的利益。如何抑制上市公司盈余管理行為、提高上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量成為目前迫切需要解決的問題。 在研究中借鑒國內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有信息披露質(zhì)量與盈余管理的研究成果,以經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的契約理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、有效市場(chǎng)理論和利益相關(guān)者理論作為理論基礎(chǔ),介紹了上市公司信息披露的概念、動(dòng)機(jī),信息披露質(zhì)量的涵義、特征,并分析了盈余管理的概念、動(dòng)機(jī)、存在的原因、手段。與此同時(shí),對(duì)上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量與盈余管理關(guān)系進(jìn)行理論分析。在此基礎(chǔ)上,提出上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量與盈余管理的相關(guān)假設(shè),選取2007-2010年深圳A股上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),運(yùn)用修正的Jones模型,對(duì)上市公司盈余管理進(jìn)行計(jì)量,根據(jù)上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量與盈余管理的影響因素選擇控制變量,遵循實(shí)證研究原則,構(gòu)建回歸模型。運(yùn)用各變量間的Pearson和Spearman相關(guān)系數(shù)檢驗(yàn)及回歸分析最終得出:(1)我國上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量與盈余管理也存在顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。其中,上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量越高,其向上盈余管理程度越低。上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量越高,其向下盈余管理程度越低。(2)上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量越低,負(fù)債比率越高,盈余管理的程度越高。(3)規(guī)模較大的公司內(nèi)部控制及公司治理情況良好,公司進(jìn)行盈余管理的可能性較小。(4)上市公司不同信息披露質(zhì)量的樣本,企業(yè)特征總體上有顯著性差別。(5)獨(dú)立董事比例與上市公司是否進(jìn)行盈余管理行為沒有統(tǒng)計(jì)上的顯著相關(guān)性。(6)外部審計(jì)變量審計(jì)質(zhì)量與上市公司盈余管理行為負(fù)相關(guān),而審計(jì)意見與盈余管理沒有統(tǒng)計(jì)上的顯著相關(guān)性。 為此,基于我國資本市場(chǎng)制度的經(jīng)濟(jì)背景及實(shí)證研究的結(jié)論,從健全上市公司外部環(huán)境和加強(qiáng)上市公司內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)體系建設(shè)等兩方面提出了提高上市公司信息披露質(zhì)量的建議和對(duì)策,從而為規(guī)范上市公司盈余管理行為提供了理論和實(shí)務(wù)上的支持。
[Abstract]:After more than ten years' development, China's capital market has played a great role in the market economy. However, due to the information asymmetry between external investors and companies, The management authorities adopt various means of earnings management to adjust the information in the financial statements, which leads to problems in the information quality of listed companies. The earnings management of listed companies seriously affects the quality of information disclosure. How to restrain earnings management behavior of listed companies and improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies has become an urgent problem to be solved. In the research, we draw lessons from the existing research results of information disclosure quality and earnings management at home and abroad, take the contract theory of economics, information asymmetry theory, efficient market theory and stakeholder theory as the theoretical basis. This paper introduces the concept, motivation, meaning and characteristics of information disclosure quality of listed companies, and analyzes the concept, motivation, reasons of existence and means of earnings management. Based on the theoretical analysis of the relationship between the quality of information disclosure and earnings management of listed companies, the relevant assumptions of the quality of information disclosure and earnings management of listed companies are put forward, and the data of Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2010 are selected. By using the modified Jones model, this paper measures earnings management of listed companies, selects control variables according to the quality of information disclosure and the influencing factors of earnings management of listed companies, and follows the principle of empirical research. Using Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficient test among variables and regression analysis, it is concluded that there is also a significant negative correlation between the quality of information disclosure and earnings management of listed companies in China. The higher the quality of information disclosure of listed companies, the lower the level of upward earnings management.; the higher the quality of information disclosure of listed companies is, the lower the level of downward earnings management is, the lower the quality of information disclosure of listed companies is, the higher the debt ratio is. The higher the degree of earnings management is, the better the internal control and corporate governance of larger companies are, and the smaller the possibility of earnings management is, the smaller the sample of different information disclosure quality of listed companies is. There is a significant difference in corporate characteristics. 5) there is no statistically significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and whether the listed company carries out earnings management behavior. There is no statistically significant correlation between the audit quality of external audit variables and the earnings management behavior of listed companies. However, there is no statistically significant correlation between audit opinion and earnings management. Therefore, based on the economic background of China's capital market system and the conclusion of empirical research, From the aspects of perfecting the external environment of listed companies and strengthening the construction of internal structure system of listed companies, this paper puts forward some suggestions and countermeasures to improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. It provides theoretical and practical support for standardizing earnings management behavior of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2012
【分類號(hào)】:F233;F832.51;F224
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條
1 王詠梅;楊陽;;股權(quán)分置改革、資產(chǎn)減值準(zhǔn)備與盈余管理[J];財(cái)經(jīng)問題研究;2007年10期
2 鄭金國;劉波;吳成華;;股權(quán)分置改革中的盈余管理研究[J];財(cái)經(jīng)問題研究;2009年11期
3 王軍只;;內(nèi)部控制審核對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)盈余質(zhì)量影響的實(shí)證分析[J];財(cái)會(huì)月刊;2009年12期
4 夏立軍,鹿小楠;上市公司盈余管理與信息披露質(zhì)量相關(guān)性研究[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì)管理;2005年05期
5 雷光勇;劉慧龍;;大股東控制、融資規(guī)模與盈余操縱程度[J];管理世界;2006年01期
6 胡奕明;唐松蓮;;獨(dú)立董事與上市公司盈余信息質(zhì)量[J];管理世界;2008年09期
7 蔡志岳;吳世農(nóng);;基于公司治理的信息披露舞弊預(yù)警研究[J];管理科學(xué);2006年04期
8 張永國;管理者收購盈余管理研究初探[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)經(jīng)緯;2004年02期
9 吳文鋒;吳沖鋒;芮萌;;提高信息披露質(zhì)量真的能降低股權(quán)資本成本嗎?[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(季刊);2007年04期
10 何玉;張?zhí)煳?;信息披露、信息不對(duì)稱和資本成本:研究綜述[J];會(huì)計(jì)研究;2006年06期
相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前3條
1 韓慧博;公司治理、信息披露透明度與盈余管理[D];吉林大學(xué);2007年
2 孫士霞;中國上市公司信息披露與資本成本關(guān)系研究[D];首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2010年
3 高潔;我國上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易與盈余管理的實(shí)證研究[D];暨南大學(xué);2010年
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前3條
1 邱海雅;我國上市公司信息披露制度及其有效性的探討[D];東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2005年
2 張聰;全面收益透明度與盈余管理的關(guān)系研究[D];長沙理工大學(xué);2008年
3 趙茜;我國上市公司盈余管理問題研究[D];大連交通大學(xué);2008年
,本文編號(hào):1526100
本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/zhqtouz/1526100.html