本文關(guān)鍵詞： 基金管理人 治理結(jié)構(gòu) 基金合約 優(yōu)化　出處：《中南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：摘要：自從20世紀(jì)90年代初證券投資基金在我國(guó)正式成立以來,我國(guó)的基金業(yè)取得了迅速的發(fā)展�；鸸芾砉静粩嘣黾�,基金規(guī)模不斷擴(kuò)大,基金品種不斷創(chuàng)新,基金業(yè)在我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)中起著越來越重要的作用。在基金業(yè)取得迅速發(fā)展的同時(shí),一系列的問題也逐漸的暴露出來,其中最重要的問題就是基金管理運(yùn)作中的內(nèi)部激勵(lì)約束問題,這一問題也成為近些年國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者研究的焦點(diǎn)問題。由于基金管理人與基金投資者之間存在信息不對(duì)稱,投資者無法觀察到基金管理人的努力水平,基金管理人與投資者之間的目標(biāo)函數(shù)不一致,容易引發(fā)基金管理人的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),進(jìn)行各種機(jī)會(huì)主義行為,損害投資者的利益。 在傳統(tǒng)的基金治理結(jié)構(gòu)中,對(duì)基民與基金管理人的委托—代理合同進(jìn)行優(yōu)化,重激勵(lì)、輕約束,不能從根本上消除基金管理人的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。持基激勵(lì)的模式在基金管理公司中的內(nèi)部激勵(lì)問題的研究中邁出了重大的一步,基金管理人從不承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)變成與投資者共擔(dān)基金投資運(yùn)作的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。但是持基激勵(lì)模式對(duì)基金管理人的約束也只是部分約束,權(quán)責(zé)不對(duì)等的問題依然存在,也難以遏制基金管理人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為。本文從治理結(jié)構(gòu)視角對(duì)基金合約進(jìn)行優(yōu)化,實(shí)現(xiàn)基金管理人從經(jīng)理型向股東型的徹底轉(zhuǎn)變,將基民與基金管理人的關(guān)系由傳統(tǒng)的基金運(yùn)行模式中的股東與經(jīng)理的關(guān)系改造為優(yōu)先股股東與普通股股東的關(guān)系�；鸸芾砣说墓蓶|化轉(zhuǎn)型,相對(duì)于經(jīng)理型基金管理人而言,至少有兩大功能：對(duì)基金管理人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為的矯治功能；對(duì)基金管理人能力的甄別功能。
[Abstract]:Abstract: since the securities investment fund was formally established in China in 1990s, the fund industry in our country has made rapid development. The fund management company is increasing, the fund scale is expanding, the fund variety is innovating constantly. The fund industry plays a more and more important role in the capital market of our country. With the rapid development of the fund industry, a series of problems are gradually exposed. The most important problem is the problem of internal incentive and restraint in fund management, which has also become the focus of domestic and foreign scholars in recent years, because of the information asymmetry between fund managers and fund investors. The investors can not observe the level of the fund manager's effort, and the objective function between the fund manager and the investor is inconsistent, which can easily lead to the moral hazard of the fund manager, carry out all kinds of opportunistic behavior, and harm the interests of the investor. In the traditional fund governance structure, the principal-agent contract between the people and the fund manager is optimized. The moral hazard of fund managers cannot be fundamentally eliminated. The model of based-incentive has taken a significant step in the study of internal incentives in fund management companies. The fund manager has changed from not taking the risk to sharing the risk with the investor in the investment operation of the fund. However, the restriction on the fund manager by the base incentive mode is only partial, and the problem of unequal power and responsibility still exists. It is also difficult to restrain the opportunistic behavior of fund manager. This paper optimizes the fund contract from the perspective of governance structure and realizes the fund manager's thorough transformation from manager type to shareholder type. The relationship between people and fund managers is transformed from the relationship between shareholders and managers in the traditional fund operation mode to the relationship between preferred stock shareholders and common shareholders. There are at least two functions: correcting the opportunistic behavior of the fund manager and discriminating the fund manager's ability.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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