發(fā)布時間：2018-02-08 15:29

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 創(chuàng)業(yè)板 管理層激勵 會計穩(wěn)健性　出處：《哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場成立于2009年10月30日,是一個新興的資本市場,也是多層次資本市場體系的重要組成部分。創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場上股票的高流通性和對信息披露的強調(diào)性等特征使管理層的自身利益與公司的業(yè)績具有更深的聯(lián)系,這極大的調(diào)動了管理層經(jīng)營管理的積極性。創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司要想有長期穩(wěn)定的發(fā)展,應(yīng)該極力縮小盈余管理行為的操縱空間,提高穩(wěn)健性的觀念。從提升會計穩(wěn)健性的角度對管理層激勵進行研究,探討管理層激勵對會計穩(wěn)健性的作用機理,豐富和細(xì)化相關(guān)研究內(nèi)容；結(jié)合使用多種研究方法,提高研究結(jié)果的可靠性；通過研究提出創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層激勵方面切實可行的建議,提升創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場對穩(wěn)健性的關(guān)注,培育穩(wěn)健性信息的需求,促進創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場長期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展。 管理層在公司經(jīng)營的過程中,直接參與決策制定與執(zhí)行,并且管理層具有動機選擇激進的會計方法從而提高業(yè)績來增加自己的利益,這就影響了會計穩(wěn)健性。因此通過借鑒國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的研究成果,對管理層激勵與會計穩(wěn)健性關(guān)系進行研究,并以信息不對稱理論、公司剩余索取權(quán)理論、委托代理理論、契約理論、激勵—保健雙因素理論作為論文研究的理論基礎(chǔ)。在現(xiàn)有的創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場制度背景下,從管理層薪酬激勵、股權(quán)激勵的兩個角度,來研究對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響,并對此問題進行分析。經(jīng)過前述理論研究和分析之后,選取2009年至2011年三年間的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司為研究樣本,對管理層激勵與會計穩(wěn)健性之間的關(guān)系進行實證分析。主要檢驗分析了創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司會計穩(wěn)健性的存在性,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層薪酬激勵對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層薪酬股權(quán)激勵對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響以及創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層薪酬激勵、股權(quán)激勵對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響程度,通過檢驗分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：所選取的樣本公司具有會計穩(wěn)健性,創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層薪酬激勵與會計穩(wěn)健性呈正相關(guān),創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層股權(quán)激勵與會計穩(wěn)健性呈正相關(guān),并且均為非線性的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,是左低右高的倒U型關(guān)系。 當(dāng)前,我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的會計穩(wěn)健性亟需提高,而管理層激勵對提高會計穩(wěn)健性有著直接而有效地作用,實證研究的結(jié)論為創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司管理層對會計穩(wěn)健性的影響提供了證據(jù)支持,為完善公司治理,提高創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司會計穩(wěn)健性做出貢獻。
[Abstract]:China's growth Enterprise Market (gem), which was established in October 30th 2009, is a new capital market. It is also an important part of the multi-level capital market system. The characteristics of high circulation of stocks and emphasis on information disclosure on the gem market make the self-interest of management more closely related to the performance of the company. This has greatly mobilized the enthusiasm of management management. If the gem listed companies want to have long-term and stable development, they should try their best to reduce the manipulation space of earnings management behavior. To improve the concept of conservatism. From the perspective of improving accounting conservatism, this paper studies management incentive, discusses the mechanism of management incentive on accounting conservatism, enriches and refines the relevant research contents, and uses a variety of research methods. Improve the reliability of the research results, through the study of gem listed companies management incentive practical suggestions, enhance the gem market attention to robustness, cultivate the need for robust information, To promote the growth Enterprise Market long-term and stable development. The management is directly involved in decision-making and execution in the process of operating the company, and the management has the motive to choose radical accounting methods to improve their performance to increase their own interests. Therefore, the relationship between management incentive and accounting conservatism is studied by referring to the research results of domestic and foreign scholars, and the theory of information asymmetry, the theory of corporate residual claim, the principal-agent theory are used to study the relationship between management incentive and accounting conservatism. Under the background of the existing gem market system, the influence on accounting conservatism is studied from the two angles of management compensation incentive and equity incentive. After the above theoretical research and analysis, the gem listed companies from 2009 to 2011 are selected as the research samples. This paper makes an empirical analysis on the relationship between management incentive and accounting conservatism, mainly analyzes the existence of accounting conservatism in gem listed companies, and the influence of management compensation incentive on accounting conservatism in gem listed companies. The influence of management compensation equity incentive on accounting conservatism in gem listed companies, and the influence of gem management compensation incentive and equity incentive on accounting conservatism. It is found that the sample company has the accounting conservatism, the compensation incentive of the gem listed company is positively related to the accounting conservatism, and the equity incentive of the gem listed company is positively related to the accounting conservatism. All of them are nonlinear positive correlations, which are inversely U-type relations with low left and right right height. At present, the accounting conservatism of listed companies in gem needs to be improved, and the incentive of management has a direct and effective effect on improving accounting conservatism. The conclusion of the empirical study provides evidence support for the influence of management on accounting conservatism of gem listed companies and contributes to improving corporate governance and improving accounting conservatism of gem listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F272.91;F832.51

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 梁永帥;;高管薪酬激勵與會計穩(wěn)健性的實證分析——基于創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場的數(shù)據(jù)[J];宜春學(xué)院學(xué)報;2015年10期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 姜鈺羨;管理層激勵對盈余穩(wěn)健性的影響研究[D];齊魯工業(yè)大學(xué);2016年

2 張曉偉;基于股權(quán)集中度的高管激勵對會計謹(jǐn)慎性的影響研究[D];山西財經(jīng)大學(xué);2016年

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本文編號：1495765