本文關(guān)鍵詞： 地方政府性債務(wù) 財政分權(quán) 行政集權(quán) 融資軟約束　出處：《財政部財政科學(xué)研究所》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：本文基于財政分權(quán)的視角研究財政政策擴張背景下的中國地方政府性債務(wù)問題。分權(quán)是本文研究的邏輯起點,并致力于通過“財政分權(quán)-地方政府行為-地方政府性債務(wù)”的邏輯軌跡分析中國地方政府性債務(wù)的制度性根源和對宏觀經(jīng)濟風(fēng)險的影響。 金融危機后,地方政府性債務(wù)風(fēng)險逐漸成為經(jīng)濟學(xué)界和市場關(guān)注的焦點,也是經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)型過程中的重要課題。地方政府性債務(wù)大規(guī)模出現(xiàn)的基本背景是中國的財政分權(quán)改革和經(jīng)濟趕超過程中地方政府承擔(dān)了大量的資本性支出。而其特殊的經(jīng)濟周期背景則是我國為應(yīng)對金融危機而出臺的4萬億經(jīng)濟刺激計劃。針對地方政府性債務(wù)的成因,學(xué)界提出了多種解釋,本文認(rèn)為,地方政府性債務(wù)是多種因素共同作用的結(jié)果。本文嘗試構(gòu)建了“財政分權(quán)-行政集權(quán)-融資軟約束”的三因素框架以解釋地方政府性債務(wù)問題產(chǎn)生的制度性根源。財政分權(quán)是規(guī)范政府間財政關(guān)系的重要制度設(shè)計,但它也造成了地方政府財權(quán)事權(quán)的不匹配,地方政府可支配財政資源長期不足,同時財政分權(quán)還喚醒了地方政府的自我利益意識；行政集權(quán)是中國特色的政治體制,它提供了地方政府競爭的內(nèi)在激勵機制,地方官員為仕途晉升考慮而過分關(guān)注GDP增長,而政府主導(dǎo)的經(jīng)濟增長必然是投資驅(qū)動型；融資軟約束則為地方政府創(chuàng)造了融資擴張的空間,一方面來自中央政府的預(yù)算軟約束使得債權(quán)人相信中央政府會為地方政府背書,另一方面銀行間的競爭壓力和國有銀行本身的軟預(yù)算約束促成了地方政府與銀行的信貸共謀,其結(jié)果就是財政風(fēng)險的金融化。 在詳細研究地方政府性債務(wù)理論的基礎(chǔ)上,本文首先辨析了政府債務(wù)與地方政府性債務(wù)的概念,明確了中國地方政府性債務(wù)的統(tǒng)計口徑,并闡釋了財政分權(quán)與地方政府融資需求的理論機理。隨后本文根據(jù)搜集的相關(guān)資料,估測了當(dāng)前地方政府性債務(wù)的規(guī)模,并對地方政府性債務(wù)的現(xiàn)狀和特點做了說明。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文提出了“財政分權(quán)-行政集權(quán)-融資軟約束”的分析框架,分別分析了以上三因素對地方政府性債務(wù)的影響,并認(rèn)為三因素的共同作用構(gòu)成了地方政府性債務(wù)產(chǎn)生的制度根源。最后,本文分析了地方政府性債務(wù)對宏觀經(jīng)濟風(fēng)險的影響,并針對構(gòu)建規(guī)范的地方政府債務(wù)融資制度提出了相關(guān)政策建議。
[Abstract]:Based on the perspective of fiscal decentralization, this paper studies the problem of Chinese local government debt under the background of fiscal policy expansion. Decentralization is the logical starting point of this paper. It is also committed to analyze the institutional causes of Chinese local government debt and its impact on macroeconomic risks through the logical trajectory of "fiscal decentralization-local government behavior-local government debt". After the financial crisis, the local government debt risk has gradually become the focus of attention of the economic circles and the market. It is also an important subject in the process of economic transformation. The basic background of the large-scale emergence of local government debt is that the local government undertakes a large amount of capital expenditure in the process of fiscal decentralization reform and economic catch-up in China. The background of our country's economic cycle is the 4 tillion economic stimulus package that China issued in response to the financial crisis. It aims at the causes of local government debt. Scholars have put forward a variety of explanations. Local government debt is the result of multiple factors. This paper attempts to construct a three-factor framework of "fiscal decentralization, administrative centralization-soft financing constraint" to explain the institutional root of the local government debt problem. Fiscal decentralization is an important institutional design for regulating intergovernmental fiscal relations. But it also causes the mismatch of the local government's financial power and power, the local government's financial resources are insufficient for a long time, and the fiscal decentralization also awakens the local government's self-interest consciousness, and the administrative centralization is the political system with Chinese characteristics. It provides the internal incentive mechanism of local government competition, local officials pay too much attention to GDP growth for the sake of career promotion, and the government-led economic growth must be investment-driven; Soft financing constraints create space for local governments to expand their financing. On the one hand, soft budgetary constraints from the central government make creditors believe that the central government will endorse local governments. On the other hand, the competitive pressure between banks and the soft budget constraints of state-owned banks promote the collusion of credit between local governments and banks, and the result is the financialization of fiscal risk. Based on the detailed study of the theory of local government debt, this paper first analyzes the concepts of government debt and local government debt, and clarifies the statistical criteria of Chinese local government debt. The paper also explains the theoretical mechanism of fiscal decentralization and local government financing needs. Then, according to the relevant data collected, this paper estimates the scale of current local government debt. On the basis of this, this paper puts forward the analytical framework of "fiscal decentralization-administrative centralization-soft constraint of financing", and analyzes the influence of the above three factors on the local government debt. Finally, this paper analyzes the influence of local government debt on macroeconomic risk. And put forward the relevant policy suggestions to construct the standard local government debt financing system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：財政部財政科學(xué)研究所
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F812.5

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