本文關(guān)鍵詞： 合理控制權(quán)收益 超控制權(quán)收益 中國上市公司　出處：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：委托代理問題一直是公司治理研究的重點問題之一,隨著資本市場的發(fā)展,學(xué)者發(fā)現(xiàn)并非所有的公司股權(quán)都是高度分散的。股權(quán)的相對集中,導(dǎo)致了控股股東的出現(xiàn),由于控制權(quán)與所有權(quán)分離,控股股東就更有動力去謀取不被中小股東分享的那部分專屬收益。中國作為世界的第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體,研究我國控股股東的行為,及其與公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以及財務(wù)狀況的聯(lián)系,將有助于完善我國公司治理理論,并對進(jìn)一步公司治理改革,保護(hù)中小股東權(quán)益提出重要的理論和實踐意義。 本文首先回顧了國內(nèi)外學(xué)者對控制權(quán)收益的研究,并從控制權(quán)收益定義,度量方式以及影響因素等方面進(jìn)行闡述。在文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,本文通過追溯我國一股獨大現(xiàn)象的緣由,研究大股東獲取控制權(quán)收益的動機(jī)、手段,以及部分影響因素。如何合理度量控制權(quán)收益,成為一個難題；如果沿襲原有的思想,將控制權(quán)收益完全定義為非有益的,將對實際中出現(xiàn)的一系列現(xiàn)象無法進(jìn)行合理的解釋。因此有學(xué)者提出將控制權(quán)收益分類,其中合理的控制權(quán)收益在一定程度上有助于企業(yè)的價值,只有超控制權(quán)收益才是大股東對中小股東的侵占,成為對企業(yè)價值有損害的部分。 本文選取2004年至2008年我國A股主板市場上市公司基于市場交易制度進(jìn)行的大宗股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓交易為樣本,采用公司凈資產(chǎn)收益率指標(biāo)(ROE)將樣本數(shù)據(jù)分為合理控制權(quán)收益組和超控制權(quán)收益組。由于控股股東在獲取上市公司控制權(quán)以及維系控制權(quán)的過程中付出了合理的成本,因此合理控制權(quán)收益為對大股東付出的合理補償,這也是被中小股東接受；而當(dāng)大股東索取超過合理部分時,才形成對中小股東的侵占,即超控制權(quán)收益。本文經(jīng)過初步計算,得出我國上市公司侵占程度約為24.26%。之后本文選取了股東制衡度、交易后第一大股東持股比例、企業(yè)規(guī)模、凈資產(chǎn)收益率、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債比以及行業(yè)這六個因素分析其對控制權(quán)收益的影響程度。最后提出政策建議,在不抑制大股東促進(jìn)公司發(fā)展的積極性的同時,減少大股東對中小股東的侵占。 本文的實證結(jié)果表明,凈資產(chǎn)收益率ROE、交易后股東持股比例CR以及資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率LEV.同控制權(quán)收益水平正相關(guān),公司規(guī)模LNSIZE、股東間的制衡度BAL.同控制權(quán)收益水平負(fù)相關(guān)。說明我國上市公司股權(quán)越集中,大股東獲取的控制權(quán)收益隨之增長；同時我國外部債權(quán)人的監(jiān)管有效性較差,因此負(fù)債反而增加了我國上市公司大股東可操作資金；大公司的大股東實施侵占的行為更少,大公司的大股東受到的約束較大；我國上市公司股東間制衡度對控制權(quán)收益水平有一定的抑制作用。 本文豐富了我國控制權(quán)收益的研究,拓寬了研究視角,力求更加全面、綜合的考量我國控制權(quán)收益水平的影響因素。但是,本文選取的樣本為2004年至2008年,對于全流通時代,大股東更加隱蔽的侵占行為,比如股價操縱尚未涉及。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent problem has been one of the key problems of corporate governance, with the development of capital market, equity scholars found that not all companies are highly dispersed. The relative concentration of ownership, led to the emergence of the controlling shareholder, because of the separation of ownership and control rights, the controlling shareholders will not be motivated to seek the exclusive benefits small and medium-sized shareholders share China. As the world's second largest economy, China's research on the behavior of controlling shareholders and the relationship with the company's ownership structure and financial condition, will contribute to the perfection of the corporate governance theory, and the further reform of corporate governance, the protection of the rights and interests of minority shareholders put forward an important theoretical and practical significance.
This paper first reviews the domestic and foreign research on the benefits of control, and from the definition of control benefits, measure mode and influence other aspects. On the basis of literature, this paper traces the reasons of China's dominance phenomenon, of large shareholders to obtain control benefits motive, means, and some influencing factors. How to reasonably measure control benefits, become a problem; if the original idea, control of income completely defined as non beneficial, for a series of phenomena that appear in reality cannot make reasonable explanation. So some scholars proposed to control income classification, the value of reasonable control return to help the enterprises to a certain extent, but excessive benefits of control is the Large Shareholder Expropriation of minority shareholders, a damage to the enterprise value.
In this paper, from 2004 to 2008 China's A shares motherboard market listed companies market trading system in the equity transfer transaction based on the sample, the company net assets yield index (ROE) of the sample data is divided into reasonable benefits of control group and excessive benefits of control group. Due to the controlling shareholder in the process to get control of a listed company and maintain control of pay reasonable cost, so the reasonable control right to pay reasonable compensation for large shareholders, which is the small and medium-sized shareholders accept; when the major shareholders for more than a reasonable part, only the formation of small and medium shareholders embezzlement, namely excessive benefits of control. In this paper, after a preliminary calculation, come to our country the listed company occupy about 24.26%. after the shareholders after the transaction, the proportion of the first shareholder, enterprise size, rate of return on net assets, asset liability ratio and The six factors of industry analyze the degree of its influence on the benefits of control. Finally, policy recommendations are put forward, which will not only inhibit the enthusiasm of large shareholders to promote the development of the company, but also reduce the expropriation of large shareholders to minority shareholders.
The empirical results show that the rate of return on net assets of ROE, after the transaction CR shareholding ratio and asset liability ratio LEV. is positively correlated with the control of income level, the size of the company LNSIZE, the balance between shareholders of BAL. with the yield of control rights is negatively related. China's listed companies are more concentrated, large shareholders to obtain control right income increase; poor effectiveness of supervision at the same time our external creditors, so that debt increased major shareholders of listed companies operating funds; major shareholders of Companies Implementing occupation behavior less, corporate shareholders constraints greatly; listed company shareholders balance on the benefits of control the level of inhibition.
This paper enriches the research on private benefits of control in China, broaden the research perspective, and strive to more comprehensive, comprehensive consideration of effect of the right of income level control in China. This paper selects factors but samples from 2004 to 2008, for the full circulation times, large shareholders more subtle invading behavior, such as stock price manipulation is not involved.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.51;F224

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