本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 股權(quán)分置改革 公司治理 股權(quán)代理成本　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與代理成本一直是公司治理研究的熱點。股權(quán)代理成本可以分為兩類，一類是管理者與股東之間的代理成本；另一類是大股東與中小股東之間的代理成本。在我國，有關(guān)這兩類代理問題的案例層出不窮。股改前，股權(quán)高度集中以及股權(quán)分置的存在，使得非流通股股東能夠輕而易舉攫取小股東的利益；而國有股所有者虛位現(xiàn)象，也為管理層侵占公司資源提供了便利。股改后，非流通股股東取得了流通權(quán)，上市公司的股權(quán)流動性提高，股權(quán)集中度下降，利益制衡機制逐漸完善。基于以上變化，本文試圖分析股改對代理成本的影響機理，并實證檢驗股權(quán)分置改革對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與代理成本的關(guān)系變遷的影響。 本文以代理理論為基礎(chǔ)，首先從理論上分析股權(quán)分置改革對代理成本的影響以及對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與代理成本關(guān)系變遷的影響，然后運用2004-2011年制造業(yè)上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)，實證檢驗了股權(quán)分置改革前后股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與代理成本的關(guān)系變遷。實證結(jié)果表明，，股改對上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和代理成本產(chǎn)生了顯著影響；股改后，兩類代理成本都明顯的降低了；股權(quán)集中度、機構(gòu)投資者持股比例與兩類代理成本的關(guān)系得到優(yōu)化；而在非國有控股公司中，股權(quán)制衡度沒能對降低代理成本產(chǎn)生顯著影響，在國有控股公司中，股權(quán)分散是導(dǎo)致股權(quán)制衡度與代理成本呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系的原因。最后，本文提出了鞏固制度變革后期成果、構(gòu)建適當(dāng)?shù)墓蓹?quán)集中度、繼續(xù)減持國有股份建立制衡結(jié)構(gòu)和逐步加大機構(gòu)投資者比例等政策建議。
[Abstract]:Ownership structure and agency costs has been the study focus of corporate governance. The equity agency cost can be divided into two categories, one is the agent costs between shareholders and managers; the other is the agency cost between large and small shareholders. In our country, the two kinds of agency problems emerge in an endless stream of the case before., ownership concentration and equity division, the non tradable shareholders can be an easy job to do to grab the interests of small shareholders; and state-owned stock owners phantom phenomenon, it also provides convenience for resource management. The occupation of the company after the share reform, the non tradable shareholders have the right to circulate, the liquidity of shares of listed companies, ownership concentration the degree of decline, interest balance mechanism has been gradually perfected. Based on the above changes, this paper tries to analyze the influence mechanism of the reform of the agency cost, and the empirical test of equity division reform on ownership structure and agency cost The influence of the change of the relationship.
This dissertation firstly theoretically influence analysis of equity division reform on the agency cost and the relationship between ownership structure and agency costs of changing, and then listed company with 2004-2011 years of manufacturing data, the empirical test of the non tradable shares the relationship between equity structure and agency cost before and after the reform. The empirical results show that the reform, have a significant influence on the equity structure of listed companies and agency costs; after the reform, the two types of agency costs are significantly reduced; the ownership concentration, the relationship between institutional investors and the two agency to optimize; while in non state-owned holding companies, equity balance degree did not have significant influence on the to reduce the agency cost, in the state-owned holding companies, dispersed ownership is the cause of equity balance degree and agency costs are positively related. Finally, proposed to consolidate In the late stage of institutional reform, we should set up appropriate concentration of ownership, continue to reduce state shareholdings, establish checks and balances and gradually increase the proportion of institutional investors.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

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