發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-31 14:32

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 中小投資者權(quán)益 融資契約 保護(hù)機(jī)制　出處：《江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：中小投資者在我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)上占有重要的位置,他們的投資信心直接關(guān)系到證券市場(chǎng)的興旺和發(fā)展。但目前,我國(guó)中小投資者利益受侵害的情況比較嚴(yán)重。作為證券市場(chǎng)上的弱勢(shì)群體,中小投資者迫切需要一套完善的機(jī)制來(lái)保護(hù)他們的利益。當(dāng)前對(duì)于投資者保護(hù)理論的研究主要強(qiáng)調(diào)了法律制度的影響,然而法律作為一種強(qiáng)制履約方式,其對(duì)投資者的保護(hù)雖然重要,但并不完全。由此,本文提出了一個(gè)基于契約理論的中小投資者權(quán)益保護(hù)框架。 中小投資者的權(quán)益是通過(guò)中小投資者與證券發(fā)行人之間簽訂的融資契約來(lái)界定的。中小投資者的權(quán)益分為自益權(quán)和共益權(quán),經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)上將其對(duì)應(yīng)為剩余控制權(quán)益和剩余索取權(quán)益。首先,對(duì)于對(duì)于剩余控制權(quán)益來(lái)說(shuō),中小投資者保護(hù)的核心在于契約的有效履行。而一個(gè)完善的履約體系包含了自我履約、第三方私人履約和強(qiáng)制性履約三個(gè)層次。其次,對(duì)于剩余索取權(quán)益來(lái)說(shuō),中小投資者保護(hù)的關(guān)鍵在于剩余權(quán)益的合理配置,而影響剩余權(quán)益合理配置的關(guān)鍵又在于平衡契約雙方的談判力。平衡契約當(dāng)事人之間談判力差異的途徑主要來(lái)自于兩個(gè)方面：其一,著眼于公司內(nèi)部治理,完善中小投資者用手投票的上市公司股權(quán)機(jī)制；其二,著眼于公司的外部治理,完善中小投資者用腳投票的證券市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制。 本文首先在介紹契約理論及中小投資者權(quán)益概述的基礎(chǔ)上,聯(lián)系我國(guó)現(xiàn)實(shí)狀況,指出我國(guó)國(guó)有上市公司中小投資者權(quán)益被侵害的現(xiàn)象,并從契約理論的角度分析被侵害的原因。筆者認(rèn)為造成中小投資者權(quán)益被侵害的契約原因在于：證券市場(chǎng)的信譽(yù)缺乏、中小投資者權(quán)益的法律保護(hù)存在不足、國(guó)有上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理及有效管制與市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制缺位。通過(guò)對(duì)美國(guó)、英國(guó)地區(qū)上市公司中小投資者權(quán)益保護(hù)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)借鑒,認(rèn)為我國(guó)應(yīng)該從降低國(guó)有股權(quán)比例,積極推動(dòng)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的作用、完善我國(guó)的監(jiān)管體系、設(shè)立專(zhuān)門(mén)保護(hù)中小投資的機(jī)構(gòu)并對(duì)侵害權(quán)益的行為進(jìn)行懲罰等手段來(lái)保護(hù)我國(guó)國(guó)有上市公司的中小投資者權(quán)益。 最后,在結(jié)合我國(guó)的國(guó)情和國(guó)際經(jīng)驗(yàn)的基礎(chǔ)上。從融資契約不完全的角度出發(fā),把法律、信譽(yù)、市場(chǎng)中介組織、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)等影響中小投資者權(quán)益保護(hù)的因素統(tǒng)一在了契約理論的框架內(nèi)。相對(duì)于目前強(qiáng)調(diào)投資者法律保護(hù)的研究來(lái)說(shuō),本文構(gòu)建了一個(gè)更加完善的中小投資者權(quán)益保護(hù)的契約框架。
[Abstract]:Small and medium investors occupy an important position in the securities market of our country, their investment confidence is directly related to the prosperity and development of the securities market, but at present. The interests of small and medium-sized investors in China are seriously infringed. As a vulnerable group in the securities market. Small and medium-sized investors urgently need a set of perfect mechanism to protect their interests. The current research on investor protection mainly emphasizes the impact of legal system, but the law as a way to enforce performance. Although the protection of investors is important, it is not complete. Therefore, this paper proposes a framework for the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors based on contract theory. The rights and interests of small and medium investors are defined by the financing contract signed between the small and medium investors and the securities issuers. The rights and interests of the small and medium-sized investors are divided into the self-interest right and the co-beneficial right. In economics, it corresponds to residual control rights and residual claims. First, for residual control rights. The core of the protection of small and medium investors lies in the effective performance of the contract, and a perfect performance system includes three levels of self-performance, third-party private performance and mandatory performance. Secondly, for residual claims. The key to the protection of small and medium-sized investors lies in the reasonable allocation of residual rights and interests. The key to the reasonable allocation of residual rights lies in balancing the bargaining power of the parties to the contract. The way to balance the differences between the parties to the contract mainly comes from two aspects: first, focusing on the internal governance of the company. Perfecting the stock right mechanism of the listed company that the medium and small investors vote by hand; Second, focus on the external governance of the company, improve the stock market competition mechanism in which small and medium investors vote with their feet. Based on the introduction of contract theory and the overview of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors, this paper points out the phenomenon that the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors of state-owned listed companies have been infringed in the light of the reality of our country. From the angle of contract theory, the author thinks that the contract cause of the infringement of the rights and interests of small and medium investors lies in: the lack of credibility in the securities market, the lack of legal protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors. The ownership structure of the state-owned listed companies is unreasonable and the effective control and market competition mechanism is absent. Through the experience of protecting the rights and interests of the small and medium-sized investors of the listed companies in the United States and the United Kingdom. We should reduce the proportion of state-owned equity, actively promote the role of institutional investors, and improve our regulatory system. To protect the rights and interests of the state-owned listed companies, we should set up special institutions to protect the small and medium-sized investors and punish the infringement of their rights and interests. Finally, on the basis of China's national conditions and international experience, from the perspective of incomplete financing contracts, the law, credibility, market intermediary organizations, equity structure. Market competition and other factors affecting the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors are unified within the framework of contract theory. This paper constructs a more perfect contractual framework for the protection of the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51

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