本文關(guān)鍵詞： 上市公司 債務(wù)融資 公司治理 治理效應(yīng)　出處：《西安電子科技大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：資本結(jié)構(gòu)是公司治理的基礎(chǔ)，而債務(wù)融資又是資本結(jié)構(gòu)的一個(gè)重要構(gòu)成方面，因而對(duì)債務(wù)融資進(jìn)行研究，對(duì)于完善公司治理，提高公司績(jī)效有著重大的意義。從1958年MM理論的首次提出，到如今一系列關(guān)于企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)的成熟理論體系的形成，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們一直在努力尋求融資結(jié)構(gòu)與企業(yè)價(jià)值、公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系，其結(jié)果如：代理成本理論、融資優(yōu)序理論、信號(hào)傳遞理論和控制權(quán)理論等，這些理論不僅從側(cè)面推動(dòng)了債務(wù)融資研究的發(fā)展，同時(shí)也表明債務(wù)融資對(duì)于降低代理成本，改善公司治理，提高公司績(jī)效有著不可忽視的作用。債務(wù)融資的重要性越來(lái)越被廣大經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)者和企業(yè)主體所重視。 本文回顧了國(guó)外經(jīng)典的資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論，尤其是基于不對(duì)稱(chēng)信息下的新資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論，在代理成本理論、融資優(yōu)序理論、信號(hào)傳遞理論和控制權(quán)理論的基礎(chǔ)上提煉債務(wù)融資作用于公司治理機(jī)制對(duì)企業(yè)價(jià)值最大化的貢獻(xiàn)，梳理成較為系統(tǒng)的債務(wù)融資的治理理論，明確債務(wù)融資在理論上積極的治理效應(yīng)。并根據(jù)我國(guó)上市公司債務(wù)融資的治理效應(yīng)的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了分析，揭示了我國(guó)較低的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率和不平衡的債務(wù)內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)及其債務(wù)融資的治理效應(yīng)的影響因素，為我國(guó)上市公司債務(wù)融資治理效應(yīng)的可能弱化性埋下伏筆。 更為信服的驗(yàn)證是選取我國(guó)滬深兩市A股上市公司2008—2010年的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)為研究對(duì)象，進(jìn)行我國(guó)債務(wù)融資的公司治理效應(yīng)的實(shí)證分析，通過(guò)觀測(cè)數(shù)據(jù)所得到的回歸結(jié)果顯示，我國(guó)的債務(wù)融資，無(wú)論是從存量上入手還是從期限結(jié)構(gòu)上分析，都與代表企業(yè)綜合治理績(jī)效的指標(biāo)形成了顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，說(shuō)明我國(guó)上市公司并不能通過(guò)適度舉債的各方面效應(yīng)提高企業(yè)績(jī)效和治理水平，這與國(guó)外債務(wù)融資公司治理的積極效應(yīng)形成強(qiáng)烈反差，再現(xiàn)了我國(guó)上市公司債務(wù)融資治理弱化的事實(shí)。針對(duì)于此，我們?cè)谔厥獾慕鹑隗w制和具體的國(guó)情下重審了我國(guó)上市公司債務(wù)融資治理效應(yīng)弱化的原因，，并由此提出了后續(xù)的相關(guān)政策，期望通過(guò)一些建議推動(dòng)我國(guó)上市公司債務(wù)融資回歸其高效治理的軌道。
[Abstract]:Capital structure is the foundation of corporate governance, and debt financing is an important component of capital structure. It is of great significance to improve corporate performance. From 1958 MM theory was first put forward to the formation of a series of mature theory system about enterprise capital structure. Economists have been trying to find out the relationship between financing structure and firm value, corporate performance, such as agency cost theory, financing priority theory, signal transmission theory and control theory and so on. These theories not only promote the development of debt financing research, but also show that debt financing can reduce agency costs and improve corporate governance. The importance of debt financing has been paid more and more attention to by economists and enterprises. This paper reviews the classical foreign capital structure theory, especially the new capital structure theory based on asymmetric information, the agency cost theory and the financing priority theory. On the basis of signal transfer theory and control theory, we refine the contribution of debt financing to corporate value maximization, and form a more systematic governance theory of debt financing. This paper clarifies the positive governance effect of debt financing in theory and analyzes the current situation of the governance effect of debt financing of listed companies in China. This paper reveals the low asset-liability ratio, the unbalanced internal structure of debt and the influencing factors of the governance effect of debt financing, which lays the groundwork for the possible weakening of the governance effect of debt financing of listed companies in China. The more convincing verification is to select the financial data of China's A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2010 as the research object to carry on the empirical analysis of the corporate governance effect of debt financing in China. The regression results obtained from the observed data show that the debt financing in China is analyzed either from the stock level or from the term structure. Both of them have a significant negative correlation with the indicators representing the performance of comprehensive governance of enterprises, indicating that the listed companies in China can not improve the performance and governance level of enterprises through various aspects of appropriate debt raising effects. This contrasts strongly with the positive effect of foreign debt financing corporate governance, which reproduces the fact that debt financing governance of listed companies in China is weakened. Under the special financial system and the specific national conditions, we re-examine the reasons for the weakening of the governance effect of debt financing of listed companies in China, and then put forward the related policies. Some suggestions are expected to promote the debt financing of listed companies to return to the track of efficient governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F276.6

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