本文關(guān)鍵詞： 盈余管理 公司治理 外部治理環(huán)境 結(jié)構(gòu)方程模型　出處：《大連理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2006年以來(lái),中國(guó)實(shí)施了以原則導(dǎo)向?yàn)樘卣鞯男聲?huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則,公允價(jià)值、減值測(cè)試、或有事項(xiàng)與商業(yè)實(shí)質(zhì)等的運(yùn)用,留給了管理層更多的自由裁量權(quán),也為盈余管理提供了操作空間。在我國(guó)特殊的制度背景下,政府干預(yù)、市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管等外部治理環(huán)境的發(fā)展不盡完善,上市公司進(jìn)行盈余管理侵害投資者合法權(quán)益的事件時(shí)有發(fā)生,如何有效控制過(guò)度盈余管理、增強(qiáng)投資者保護(hù)已成為社會(huì)關(guān)注的熱點(diǎn)。 影響盈余管理的因素很多,但從制度層面來(lái)講,包括法律制度等外部治理環(huán)境和公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制。本文基于結(jié)構(gòu)方程模型,選用2007-2009年間2413個(gè)觀察樣本,對(duì)上市公司內(nèi)外部治理機(jī)制中的各子機(jī)制對(duì)盈余管理的影響路徑進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究。 研究結(jié)果顯示,外部治理環(huán)境、股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司特征以及高管薪酬對(duì)盈余管理均起著顯著的影響作用。其中,高管薪酬是觸發(fā)盈余管理的主要誘因,管理人員為了追求自身利益最大化有動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行操縱盈余從而降低盈余質(zhì)量；股權(quán)過(guò)度集中也是誘發(fā)盈余管理的重要因素,控股股東可能為了獲得更多的控制權(quán)收益從而進(jìn)行盈余管理；目前,我國(guó)的外部治理環(huán)境尚未能有效發(fā)揮度對(duì)盈余管理的抑制作用,需進(jìn)一步建立公平、成熟、完善的外部環(huán)境,為公司治理提供良好的環(huán)境基礎(chǔ)。同時(shí),外部治理環(huán)境與股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)盈余管理的影響通過(guò)高管薪酬這一中介變量得到分離：一方面,外部治理環(huán)境和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)直接影響盈余管理程度；另一方面,外部治理環(huán)境和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)通過(guò)高管薪酬對(duì)盈余管理起著間接的抑制作用。
[Abstract]:Since 2006, China has implemented new accounting standards characterized by principle orientation, fair value, impairment testing, and the use of matter and business substance, leaving more discretion to management. It also provides the operating space for earnings management. Under the special system background of our country, the development of external governance environment such as government intervention, market supervision and so on is not perfect. How to effectively control excessive earnings management and enhance the protection of investors has become a hot topic in the society, because the listed companies' earnings management encroaches on the legitimate rights and interests of investors from time to time. There are many factors affecting earnings management, but from the institutional level, including the legal system and other external governance environment and corporate governance mechanism. This paper is based on the structural equation model. This paper selects 2413 observation samples from 2007 to 2009 to make an empirical study on the influence of each sub-mechanism in the internal and external governance mechanism of listed companies on earnings management. The results show that the external governance environment, equity structure, corporate characteristics and executive compensation play a significant role in earnings management. Among them, executive compensation is the main incentive to trigger earnings management. In order to maximize their own interests, managers manipulate earnings in order to reduce the quality of earnings; Excessive concentration of equity is also an important factor to induce earnings management. Controlling shareholders may manage earnings in order to gain more income of control. At present, China's external governance environment has not been able to play an effective role in restraining earnings management, need to further establish a fair, mature and perfect external environment to provide a good environmental basis for corporate governance. The influence of external governance environment and equity structure on earnings management is separated by the intermediary variable of executive compensation: on the one hand, external governance environment and equity structure directly affect earnings management degree; On the other hand, external governance environment and equity structure indirectly restrain earnings management through executive compensation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F271;F832.51;F224

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