本文關(guān)鍵詞：股權(quán)激勵(lì)條件下的管理者信息披露博弈模型研究　出處：《遼寧師范大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 信息披露 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好 不完全信息靜態(tài)博弈 演化博弈

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)就是一種通過讓管理者獲得企業(yè)的股權(quán)，使管理者具有獲得一定股權(quán)利益的權(quán)利，從而能夠同股東一樣分享到企業(yè)的利益，承擔(dān)企業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，使員工利益與企業(yè)利益更大程度的保持一致，進(jìn)而能更加勤勉的為企業(yè)的發(fā)展考慮�，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)的所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)相分離的現(xiàn)象，使企業(yè)管理者成為具有信息優(yōu)勢的一方，出于自身利益最大化的動(dòng)機(jī)，管理者可能會(huì)進(jìn)行虛假企業(yè)信息披露，從而會(huì)對企業(yè)本身以及投資者、股東的利益產(chǎn)生危害。企業(yè)管理者的這種信息欺詐現(xiàn)象已有很多，例如安然、施樂、世通、安達(dá)信等公司，都是因這種問題而最終導(dǎo)致破產(chǎn)。因此對在股權(quán)激勵(lì)條件下企業(yè)管理者的信息披露行為進(jìn)行研究是非常必要的。 為此，，本文就管理者信息披露問題的國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了論述，并結(jié)合當(dāng)今市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的現(xiàn)實(shí)狀況，就股權(quán)激勵(lì)條件下管理者信息披露的問題從以下兩方面進(jìn)行了研究。 （1）研究了股權(quán)激勵(lì)條件下管理者與股東之間監(jiān)督的博弈模型。首先引入管理者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好，使完全理性的博弈參與人更貼近實(shí)際，運(yùn)用不完全信息靜態(tài)博弈的理論進(jìn)行研究，建立了基于不同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好條件下的管理者與股東監(jiān)督靜態(tài)博弈模型，得出相應(yīng)的貝葉斯納什均衡，經(jīng)過分析得出具有不同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的管理者進(jìn)行信息披露策略的選擇不同。其次，運(yùn)用演化博弈的相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行研究，建立了管理者與股東監(jiān)督演化博弈模型，經(jīng)過分析得出管理者與股東之間策略選擇的關(guān)系，并對影響博弈參與者策略選擇的因素加以說明，得出一些控制與減少企業(yè)管理者信息欺詐的措施。 （2）研究了股權(quán)激勵(lì)條件下管理者與股東之間再投資的博弈模型。首先引入管理者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好，使完全理性的博弈參與人更貼近實(shí)際，運(yùn)用不完全信息靜態(tài)博弈的理論進(jìn)行研究，建立了基于不同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好條件下的管理者與股東再投資靜態(tài)博弈模型，得出相應(yīng)的貝葉斯納什均衡，經(jīng)過分析得出具有不同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的管理者進(jìn)行信息披露策略的選擇不同。其次，運(yùn)用演化博弈的相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行研究，建立了管理者與股東再投資的演化博弈模型，經(jīng)過分析得出管理者與股東之間策略選擇的關(guān)系，并對影響博弈參與者策略選擇的因素加以說明，得出一些控制與減少企業(yè)管理者信息欺詐的措施。 文章的最后就本文研究的不足之處加以說明，并結(jié)合國內(nèi)外的研究現(xiàn)狀與當(dāng)今市場經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況，提出對管理者信息披露問題研究的一些展望。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive is a kind of enterprise equity through the managers to obtain a certain share of the right of interest, so as to be able to share the interests of the enterprise like shareholders, bear the risks of the enterprise. So that the interests of employees and enterprises to a greater extent consistent, and then more industrious consideration for the development of enterprises. Modern enterprise ownership and management rights separated phenomenon. In order to maximize their own interests, managers may make false information disclosure to the enterprises themselves and investors. The interests of shareholders are harmful. There have been many cases of information fraud among corporate managers, such as Enron, Xerox, WorldCom, Andersen and so on. Therefore, it is necessary to study the behavior of information disclosure of enterprise managers under the condition of equity incentive. Therefore, this paper discusses the current situation of managers' information disclosure at home and abroad, and combined with the reality of the current market economy. The problem of manager information disclosure under equity incentive condition is studied from the following two aspects. Firstly, the risk preference of managers is introduced to make the fully rational game participants closer to the reality. 1) the paper studies the game model of supervision between managers and shareholders under the condition of equity incentive. First, the risk preference of managers is introduced to make the fully rational game participants closer to reality. Based on the theory of incomplete information static game, this paper establishes the static game model of manager and shareholder supervision based on different risk preference conditions, and obtains the corresponding Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It is concluded that managers with different risk preferences choose different information disclosure strategies. Secondly, the evolutionary game model of managers and shareholders supervision is established by using the evolutionary game theory. Through the analysis of the relationship between managers and shareholders, this paper explains the factors that affect the strategy selection of participants in the game, and puts forward some measures to control and reduce the information fraud of managers. (2) this paper studies the game model of reinvestment between managers and shareholders under the condition of equity incentive. Firstly, the risk preference of managers is introduced to make the fully rational game participants closer to reality. Based on the theory of incomplete information static game, the static game model of manager and shareholder reinvestment based on different risk preference is established, and the corresponding Bayesian Nash equilibrium is obtained. It is concluded that managers with different risk preferences choose different information disclosure strategies. Secondly, the evolutionary game theory is used to study. The evolutionary game model of reinvestment between managers and shareholders is established, and the relationship between managers and shareholders is obtained through analysis, and the factors that affect the strategy selection of participants are explained. Come up with some measures to control and reduce the information fraud of enterprise managers. At the end of this paper, the shortcomings of this study are explained, and combined with the current research situation at home and abroad and the current market economy situation, some prospects for the study of managers' information disclosure are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：遼寧師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F272;F830.91

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