本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于公司治理的上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易與盈余管理研究　出處：《浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 上市公司 關(guān)聯(lián)交易 盈余管理 公司治理

【摘要】：本文首先回顧了關(guān)聯(lián)交易、盈余管理、公司治理的概念和特征,系統(tǒng)地梳理了盈余管理的計(jì)量模型和關(guān)聯(lián)交易與盈余管理關(guān)系的研究文獻(xiàn)。其次,對(duì)我國(guó)上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,總結(jié)出我國(guó)上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易現(xiàn)有的特征。并根據(jù)關(guān)聯(lián)交易現(xiàn)狀分析了關(guān)聯(lián)交易與盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)。再次,全面論述公司內(nèi)外治理機(jī)制對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易及盈余管理的影響,在此基礎(chǔ)上提出了本文的5個(gè)研究假設(shè)。最后,參考前人的研究成果,采用橫截面修正的Jones模型作為盈余管理的度量,建立了以可控應(yīng)計(jì)數(shù)為被解釋變量的多元回歸模型以進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。在實(shí)證研究中,選取了2009-2011年滬市和深市主板共計(jì)668家A股制造業(yè)上市公司為研究樣本,先分別對(duì)各變量進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析,初步得出制造業(yè)上市公司各關(guān)聯(lián)交易方式和盈余管理的特征。接著,借助spss19.0統(tǒng)計(jì)分析軟件進(jìn)行多元回歸分析來(lái)驗(yàn)證本文提出的5個(gè)研究假設(shè)。 實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明：1、上市公司中明顯存在利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行盈余管理的行為；2、對(duì)高層管理人員實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司存在較大利用關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行盈余管理的可能性；3、第一大股東股權(quán)超過(guò)50%的上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行盈余管理的可能性不一定更大；4、第一大股東股權(quán)小于15%的上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行盈余管理的可能性較小；5、治理層未履行相關(guān)責(zé)任而遭到證監(jiān)委公開(kāi)譴責(zé)或行政懲罰的上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易進(jìn)行盈余管理的可能性較大。最后,本文根據(jù)實(shí)證分析結(jié)果,從公司治理機(jī)制對(duì)關(guān)聯(lián)交易盈余管理的治理提出若干對(duì)策。
[Abstract]:This paper reviews the concepts and characteristics of related party transactions earnings management and corporate governance systematically combs the measurement model of earnings management and the research literature on the relationship between related party transactions and earnings management. Secondly. This paper makes a descriptive statistical analysis on the current situation of related party transactions of listed companies in China. Summarizes the existing characteristics of related party transactions of listed companies in China, and analyzes the motivation of related party transactions and earnings management according to the current situation of related party transactions. This paper comprehensively discusses the influence of internal and external governance mechanism on related party transactions and earnings management, and then puts forward five hypotheses of this paper. Finally, referring to the previous research results. Using cross-section modified Jones model as the measure of earnings management, a multivariate regression model with controllable due count as the explanatory variable is established to carry out empirical research. A total of 668 A-share manufacturing listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2009 to 2011 were selected as the research samples. First, descriptive statistical analysis of each variable was carried out. The characteristics of each related party transaction mode and earnings management of listed companies in manufacturing industry are preliminarily obtained. Then, the five research hypotheses proposed in this paper are verified by multivariate regression analysis with the help of spss19.0 statistical analysis software. The empirical results show that the behavior of earnings management in listed companies is obvious by using related party transactions. (2) there is a great possibility of earnings management by using related party transactions in listed companies that implement equity incentive plans for senior managers; (3) the possibility of earnings management in related party transactions of listed companies with the largest shareholder more than 50% is not necessarily greater; (4) the possibility of earnings management in related party transactions of listed companies with the largest shareholder less than 15% is small; 5. The possibility of earnings management in affiliated transactions of listed companies which have been publicly condemned or punished by the CSB for failing to fulfill the relevant responsibilities. Finally, according to the results of empirical analysis. From the corporate governance mechanism to the related party transaction earnings management governance put forward a number of countermeasures.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F224

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