本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司高管薪酬激勵對經(jīng)營績效影響的實證研究　出處：《沈陽理工大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

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【摘要】：隨著21世紀知識經(jīng)濟時代的到來，股份制公司和有限責任制公司在我國企業(yè)組織形式占據(jù)了最主要的地位。我國現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度最顯著的特征是所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離，基于所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)分離即“委托-代理”關(guān)系而產(chǎn)生的高管薪酬激勵的治理作用一直是國內(nèi)外學術(shù)界和企業(yè)界最關(guān)注的話題。 2008年金融危機之后，相比全球，中國經(jīng)濟率先顯露復蘇跡象，2009年上市公司一季度報告顯示，上市公司共實現(xiàn)凈利潤2037.6億元，保險、化工、電力、民航、有色等11個行業(yè)扭虧為盈，雖然日用品、鋼鐵等4個行業(yè)出現(xiàn)虧損，但是上市公司業(yè)績好轉(zhuǎn)跡象漸顯。本文正是基于這樣的背景，從理論和實證兩個方面探討了上市公司高管薪酬激勵對其業(yè)績影響問題。研究結(jié)果顯示：上市公司高管貨幣薪酬、高管持股與經(jīng)營績效存在線性正相關(guān)；高管貨幣薪酬、高管持股對經(jīng)營績效的影響程度受國有持股比例、行業(yè)競爭程度的影響。 在結(jié)構(gòu)安排上，，本文首先回顧了國內(nèi)外相關(guān)實證研究，立足于委托代理理論、動機理論、人力資本價值貢獻論，對上市公司高管薪酬激勵對績效的影響進行了理論分析，并提出了一系列假設(shè)。隨后，選取我國滬深兩市670家符合要求的上市公司2008-2010年連續(xù)3年共2010個樣本為研究對象，運用統(tǒng)計軟件SPSS17.0進行了實證研究，先整體研究了上市公司高管薪酬對經(jīng)營績效的一般影響，然后從實際控制人性質(zhì)、行業(yè)競爭形態(tài)兩個方面對樣本分組，研究不同情況下高管薪酬對績效的影響程度。最后，針對實證研究結(jié)果為完善上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)提出對策建議。
[Abstract]:With the arrival of the era of knowledge economy in 21th century. The joint-stock company and the limited responsibility company occupy the most important position in the enterprise organization form of our country. The most remarkable characteristic of the modern enterprise system of our country is the separation of the ownership and the management right. Based on the separation of ownership and management, that is, "principal-agent" relationship, the governance role of executive compensation incentive has always been the most concerned topic of academic and business circles at home and abroad. After the financial crisis in 2008, compared with the global economy, the Chinese economy took the lead in showing signs of recovery. In 2009, the first quarter report of listed companies showed that the listed companies achieved a total net profit of 203.76 billion yuan, insurance. Chemical industry, electricity, civil aviation, non-ferrous industry and other 11 industries turn into profit, although the daily necessities, steel and other four industries show losses, but the performance of listed companies is gradually showing signs of improvement. This paper is based on this background. This paper discusses the influence of executive compensation incentive on the performance of listed companies from both theoretical and empirical aspects. The results show that there is a linear positive correlation between executive monetary compensation, executive stock ownership and operating performance of listed companies; Executive monetary compensation, executive stock ownership on the degree of operational performance is affected by the proportion of state-owned shares, the degree of competition in the industry. In terms of structure arrangement, this paper first reviews the relevant empirical studies at home and abroad, based on the principal-agent theory, motivation theory, human capital value contribution theory. This paper makes a theoretical analysis on the effect of executive compensation incentive on performance of listed companies and puts forward a series of hypotheses. Selected 670 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2008 to 2010 to meet the requirements of a total of three consecutive years of 2010 samples as the research object. Using the statistical software SPSS17.0 to conduct an empirical study, first the overall study of the executive compensation of listed companies on the general impact of operating performance, and then from the actual nature of the controller. The paper studies the influence of executive compensation on performance in different situations from two aspects of industry competition. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions for improving the governance structure of listed companies.
【學位授予單位】：沈陽理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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