本文關(guān)鍵詞：大股東控制下的定向增發(fā)與長期業(yè)績研究　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 定向增發(fā) 利益輸送 長期業(yè)績 大股東

【摘要】：自頒布《上市公司證券發(fā)行管理辦法》以來，定向增發(fā)已經(jīng)成為中國資本市場上股權(quán)再融資方式的“新寵”。雖然從表面上看，定向增發(fā)是上市公司和認(rèn)購對象之間自愿選擇的結(jié)果，但發(fā)行門檻低，定價(jià)基準(zhǔn)日的模糊規(guī)范、增發(fā)價(jià)格的“九折規(guī)定”等都給大股東的利益輸送提供了操作空間。大股東是否利用定向增發(fā)進(jìn)行利益輸送也成為了理論研宄的焦點(diǎn)，本文旨在對這個問題尋找理論及實(shí)證依據(jù)。 以往的研宄多從短期市場層面來探討大股東是否存在利益輸送行為，其結(jié)論往往存在爭議。而本文在既往研宄的基礎(chǔ)上，，探索性的從長期業(yè)績的視角來探討定向增發(fā)中是否存在大股東的侵權(quán)行為，既具有創(chuàng)新性也具有更強(qiáng)的說服力。同時對此問題的研宄也為規(guī)范定向增發(fā)行為，保護(hù)中小投資者的利益，促進(jìn)市場公正、公平等提供決策參考。 本文首先從委托代理理論與信息不對稱理論出發(fā)，分析了大股東利用定向增發(fā)掏空上市公司的動機(jī)與條件。其次基于隧道挖掘，分析了大股東利用定向增發(fā)掏空上市公司的主要途徑。接著在前文理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上，我們推導(dǎo)出本文的假設(shè)，然后通過描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、單因素分析，回歸分析等實(shí)證方法來檢驗(yàn)認(rèn)購對象以及認(rèn)購比例與上市公司定向增發(fā)后長期業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系，并得出了如下結(jié)論：(1)大股東參與認(rèn)購，會對上市公司的長期業(yè)績產(chǎn)生負(fù)面的影響，包括上市公司的長期市場表現(xiàn)以及長期經(jīng)營業(yè)績表現(xiàn)，這說明大股東極有可能利用定向增發(fā)對上市公司進(jìn)行了掏空。（2)大股東認(rèn)購比例與定向增發(fā)前持股比例之差越大，上市公司定向增發(fā)后的長期業(yè)績越差。這說明定向增發(fā)過程中大股東與中小股東利益分離程度越大，即大股東掏空動機(jī)越強(qiáng)，上市公司定向增發(fā)后的長期業(yè)績越差，進(jìn)一步證明了大股東利用定向增發(fā)掏空上市公司的行為。
[Abstract]:Since the promulgation of the "Management measures on Securities issuance of listed companies", directional additional issuance has become the "new favorite" of equity refinancing in China's capital market, although on the surface. Directional additional offering is the result of voluntary choice between listed company and subscription object, but the threshold of issuance is low, and the fuzzy standard of pricing benchmark date. The "10% stipulation" of the additional offering price provides the operating space for the benefit transmission of the major shareholders. Whether the large shareholders use the directional additional issue to carry out the transfer of benefits has also become the focus of theoretical research. The purpose of this paper is to find a theoretical and empirical basis for this problem. In the past, most of the studies discussed whether the major shareholders had the behavior of conveying interests from the short-term market level, and the conclusions were often controversial. However, this paper is based on the previous studies. Exploratory from the long-term performance of the perspective to explore whether there is a major shareholder in the private placement of tort, is not only innovative but also more persuasive. At the same time, the study of this issue is also to regulate the behavior of targeted placement. To protect the interests of small and medium investors, to promote market justice, fairness and so on to provide decision-making reference. Based on the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper analyzes the motivation and conditions of large shareholders using directional placement to empty the listed company. Secondly, it is based on tunneling. This paper analyzes the main ways for large shareholders to use directional placement to empty the listed companies. Then on the basis of the previous theoretical analysis, we derive the hypothesis of this paper, and then through descriptive statistical analysis, single-factor analysis. Regression analysis and other empirical methods to test the relationship between the target and the proportion of subscription and the long-term performance of the listed companies after the placement, and draw the following conclusion: 1) the majority shareholders participate in the subscription. Will have a negative impact on the long-term performance of listed companies, including the long-term market performance of listed companies and long-term operating performance. This shows that it is very likely that the large shareholders use the private placement to empty the listed company.) the bigger the difference between the subscription ratio of the large shareholders and the proportion of the shares before the directional additional offering. The worse the long-term performance of the listed company after the private placement, which indicates that the greater the degree of separation between the interests of the large shareholder and the minority shareholder, the stronger the motivation of tunneling. The worse the long-term performance of the listed company after the private placement, further proves the behavior of the large shareholders using the directional additional offering to empty the listed company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F276.6;F832.51

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 張力上;黃冕;;我國A股市場定向增發(fā)定價(jià)的實(shí)證研究[J];財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué);2009年09期

2 徐斌;俞靜;;究竟是大股東利益輸送抑或投資者樂觀情緒推高了定向增發(fā)折扣——來自中國證券市場的證據(jù)[J];財(cái)貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì);2010年04期

3 朱紅軍;何賢杰;陳信元;;定向增發(fā)“盛宴”背后的利益輸送:現(xiàn)象、理論根源與制度成因——基于馳宏鋅鍺的案例研究[J];管理世界;2008年06期

4 張鳴;郭思永;;大股東控制下的定向增發(fā)和財(cái)富轉(zhuǎn)移——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];會計(jì)研究;2009年05期

5 章衛(wèi)東;李海川;;定向增發(fā)新股、資產(chǎn)注入類型與上市公司績效的關(guān)系——來自中國證券市場的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];會計(jì)研究;2010年03期

6 王志強(qiáng);張瑋婷;林麗芳;;上市公司定向增發(fā)中的利益輸送行為研究[J];南開管理評論;2010年03期

7 耿建新;呂躍金;鄒小平;;我國上市公司定向增發(fā)的長期業(yè)績實(shí)證研究[J];審計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2011年06期

8 姜來;羅黨論;賴媚媚;;掏空、支持與定向增發(fā)折價(jià)——來自我國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)[J];山西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2010年04期

9 黃建中;;警惕定向增發(fā)中的關(guān)聯(lián)交易[J];新財(cái)經(jīng);2006年06期

10 鄭琦;;定向增發(fā)對象對發(fā)行定價(jià)影響的實(shí)證研究[J];證券市場導(dǎo)報(bào);2008年04期

本文編號：1402050