本文關(guān)鍵詞：并購融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)視角下的掏空與支持行為研究　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：國內(nèi)外涉及并購融資的理論文獻(xiàn),主要是從公司治理的角度出發(fā),研究并購融資方式的的選擇和融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的產(chǎn)生。此類研究大部分以代理問題為核心,卻很少涉及大股東和小股東之間的利益關(guān)系。而并購交易很可能是大股東實(shí)現(xiàn)掏空上市公司的途徑。大股東也可能在上市公司陷入困境時(shí)施以援手,這種支持行為又使公司所有股東受益。國外一些文獻(xiàn)探討了掏空行為存在的法律環(huán)境和實(shí)施途徑,另一些研究則通過分析大量數(shù)據(jù)資料,在發(fā)現(xiàn)掏空行為規(guī)律的同時(shí)也找到了大股東支持行為的證據(jù)。國內(nèi)對掏空行為的研究則主要圍繞大股東圈錢、關(guān)聯(lián)交易和操縱股價(jià)等方面展開,對支持行為的研究則集中于對上市公司進(jìn)行資產(chǎn)注入、債務(wù)擔(dān)保等“保全”上市公司的行為�？傊�,國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)將并購融資和掏空、支持行為分割開來,形成兩個(gè)不同的研究方向。即使同時(shí)涉及并購和掏空的文獻(xiàn),也只是將并購作為掏空的一種形式來研究,或者將掏空作為并購的一個(gè)目的來加以說明。本文則試圖從并購融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的視角,研究控股股東對上市公司的掏空與支持行為,從而將并購融資和掏空與支持行為的研究融為一體。 上市公司并購融資本身是為并購交易的一部分,并購融資和并購交易卻又都涉及掏空和支持行為。我國的上市公司并購融資的方式主要有債務(wù)融資、信托融資和定向增發(fā)融資。這些融資方式會(huì)產(chǎn)生相應(yīng)的融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)恰好是并購價(jià)值天然的指示器,它們可以顯示并購交易背后的掏空和支持行為對企業(yè)價(jià)值變動(dòng)的影響。正是看到了上市公司并購融資所表現(xiàn)出來的這些融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn),才引發(fā)探究這些融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)背后“元兇”——掏空和支持行為的興趣。因此本文的研究思路是按照企業(yè)并購融資的金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、發(fā)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),揭示風(fēng)險(xiǎn)背后的掏空與支持行為。通過對比國內(nèi)掏空、支持行為與西方發(fā)達(dá)國家的不同,得出國內(nèi)掏空、支持行為還處于原始階段的結(jié)論。 股價(jià)的信號作用,能迅速對并購融資做出不同的反應(yīng)。一般而言,債務(wù)融資使得股價(jià)上揚(yáng),股權(quán)融資引致股價(jià)下跌。然而若是并購本是涉及內(nèi)幕交易等掏空上市公司的行為時(shí),增發(fā)融資導(dǎo)致股價(jià)下跌越是明顯。通過分析我國上市公司并購定向增發(fā)的例子卻發(fā)現(xiàn),普遍存在新增股份發(fā)行時(shí)的價(jià)格較增發(fā)價(jià)格有明顯的上揚(yáng),這種“公告效應(yīng)”容易讓人產(chǎn)生困惑。在對定向增發(fā)的股價(jià)效應(yīng)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析后發(fā)現(xiàn),增發(fā)價(jià)格實(shí)際上較首次公告前股價(jià)明顯下跌了很多,此效應(yīng)與“公告效應(yīng)”相悖,故稱作定向增發(fā)的“逆公告效應(yīng)”。國內(nèi)2008-2010年上市公司為并購定向增發(fā)的90個(gè)案例中83%存在“逆公告效應(yīng)”,從而證實(shí)了關(guān)聯(lián)交易等掏空行為可以被股價(jià)下跌所反映。 企業(yè)為并購發(fā)行證券,必須考慮市場的接受度。證券價(jià)格、利率水平、融資規(guī)模和市場環(huán)境都是影響發(fā)行的因素。投資者抵制、市場容量有限、監(jiān)管嚴(yán)苛等則可能導(dǎo)致并購融資發(fā)行失敗。然而發(fā)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的決定性因素還在于企業(yè)本身。并購融資的發(fā)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)決定于并購交易的性質(zhì)和價(jià)值。如果并購交易是掏空上市公司,或者侵占中小股東利益,那么并購融資就會(huì)遭到投資者的抵制。結(jié)果不僅是增發(fā)的證券無人認(rèn)購,現(xiàn)有股東也會(huì)選擇“用腳投票”,以至于股價(jià)大跌。監(jiān)管當(dāng)局對并購融資的從嚴(yán)審批也會(huì)導(dǎo)致發(fā)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。無論是出于穩(wěn)定市場的考慮,還是為保護(hù)中小投資者利益,監(jiān)管嚴(yán)苛可能是遏制掏空行為最有效的方式。 并購融資可能使企業(yè)因資金緊張而積聚財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此并購融資使得上市公司陷入一場“保級”之戰(zhàn)�？毓晒蓶|是上市公司“保級”的最大受益者,也最有動(dòng)力對上市公司提供支持。無論是提供貸款擔(dān)保,還是內(nèi)部貸款,都能夠解決上市公司的資金鏈緊張的問題。陷入財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)中的上市公司猶如“驚弓之鳥”,稍有風(fēng)吹草動(dòng)都能將危機(jī)效應(yīng)放大,所以這在很大程度上限制了大股東繼續(xù)掏空上市公司,轉(zhuǎn)而在適當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)機(jī)對上市公司施以援手,如提供流動(dòng)性支持和重新注入優(yōu)質(zhì)資產(chǎn)。 掏空和支持行為不僅存在于國內(nèi)證券市場,在西方發(fā)達(dá)國家也廣泛存在。但由于法律原則和法律框架的不一致,造成掏空行為的表現(xiàn)形式各不相同。普通法系國家以維護(hù)市場公平為基點(diǎn),建立以“公平原則”為核心的判例法律體系,使得上市公司的實(shí)際控制人負(fù)有“勤勉義務(wù)”和“忠實(shí)義務(wù)”,而一旦沒有履行義務(wù),就被視同“違約”,其后果是巨額的罰款、甚至牢獄之災(zāi)。嚴(yán)刑峻法為維護(hù)證券市場公平保駕護(hù)航,專門的投資者利益保護(hù)機(jī)制也增強(qiáng)了投資者的維權(quán)力量。所以,普通法系國家的掏空行為在表面上至少需要具備合理的商業(yè)目的,且符合“公平原則”。 相比而言,國內(nèi)的掏空行為顯得比較“原始”,既有赤裸裸的關(guān)聯(lián)交易,也有直接低價(jià)向大股東增發(fā)新股轉(zhuǎn)移利益的行為。由于沒有相應(yīng)的法律條款加以懲罰和禁止,許多掏空行為都披上了“合法的外衣”,這與普通法系國家就有了很大的不同。成文法強(qiáng)調(diào)法的可預(yù)測性,卻不能最大限度的保證“公平”；加之國內(nèi)對于掏空行為的處罰又不能落到實(shí)處,使得監(jiān)管的效用大打折扣。此外,投資者的維權(quán)意識(shí)薄弱,且缺乏相應(yīng)的投資者保護(hù)機(jī)制,使得掏空等侵占中小股東利益的行為肆意橫行。 本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)：首先,在國內(nèi)外研究的基礎(chǔ)上,從并購融資的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)角度,研究上市公司的掏空與支持行為,可以彌補(bǔ)這一塊理論的空缺。其次,針對我國上市公司普遍存在關(guān)聯(lián)交易現(xiàn)象和定向增發(fā)偏好,分析上市公司并購交易背后的真實(shí)動(dòng)機(jī),從而揭露控股股東掏空上市公司的本質(zhì)。再次,并購融資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和掏空、支持行為可以有機(jī)統(tǒng)一,通過分析外部表現(xiàn)揭示內(nèi)在原因,通過假設(shè)內(nèi)部行為推斷外部反應(yīng),這是本文的一大創(chuàng)新。最后,從西方發(fā)達(dá)國家治理掏空行為的經(jīng)驗(yàn)中,得出對遏制國內(nèi)證券市場掏空行為的一些政策建議。本文的不足在于實(shí)證數(shù)據(jù)樣本容量還不夠大、案例還不夠豐富,因此其佐證作用有限；由于學(xué)識(shí)有限,政策建議還不夠完善。
[Abstract]:The domestic and foreign literature relates to the theory of financing, mainly starting from the perspective of corporate governance, research on financing ways and the choice of financing risk. Most of such studies to the agency problem as the core, but seldom between large shareholders and small shareholders. The deal is probably the way emptied of listed companies large shareholders. Large shareholders may also help in the listed companies in trouble, this kind of behavior and support to the benefit of all shareholders of the company. Some foreign literature discusses the legal environment of the tunneling behavior exist and the implementation approach, other research is through the analysis of a large number of data, found in the tunneling behavior rules also found the propping behavior evidence. Domestic research on tunneling behavior is mainly around the large shareholders quanqian, related transactions and stock price manipulation and other aspects of support for. The research is focused on the listed company asset injection, debt guarantees and other "security" of the listed companies. In short, the domestic and foreign literature will be financing and tunneling, support is divided into two different research directions. Even at the same time involved in mergers and acquisitions and tunneling literature, will be the only merger as a kind of the form of hollowed out to study, or will be emptied as a mergers and acquisitions to illustrate this. This article attempts from the financing risk from the perspective of research on controlling shareholders of listed companies of tunneling and supporting behavior, which will integrate financing and mergers and acquisitions of propping and tunneling behavior.
The mergers and acquisitions of listed companies financing itself is a part of mergers and acquisitions, mergers and acquisitions financing but are involved in tunneling and propping behavior. China's listed companies merger financing of the main mode of debt financing, trust financing and private placement financing. The financing will have corresponding financing risk financing risk is just the value of the acquisition. The influence of natural indicator, they can display deals behind the tunneling and propping behavior of enterprise value. It is to see the mergers and acquisitions of listed companies financing has shown the financing risk, to explore the reasons behind these financing risk causing culprit - the interest of tunneling and propping behavior. Therefore this study is in accordance with the enterprise the financing of financial risk, financial risk, risk issue, reveal the tunneling and propping behavior behind the risk. Through comparing the tunneling, support The behavior is different from the western developed countries, and the conclusion is that the behavior of domestic hollowing is still in the original stage.
The price signal, can quickly respond differently to financing. In general, the price of debt financing, equity financing. However, if the stock fell caused by mergers and acquisitions is involved in insider trading and tunneling behavior of listed companies, resulting in additional financing of stock prices fall more obvious. Through the analysis of the listed company mergers and acquisitions orientation additional examples have found widespread issue of new shares when the price is the issuance price was rising, this "announcement effect" makes people confused. By empirical analysis on stock price effect on private placement after the discovery, the issuance price is actually for the first time before the announcement of stock price was down a lot, and contrary to this effect the "announcement effect", so called "inverse placement announcement effect. The existence of" inverse 90 case studies of domestic listed companies in 2008-2010 for the acquisition of private placement in 83% The announcement effect, which confirms that the hollowing of related transactions can be reflected by the fall of the stock price.
Enterprise merger issue securities, must consider the acceptance of the market. The price of securities, interest rates, financing scale and market environment factors are issued. Investors boycott, the market capacity is limited, it may lead to severe regulatory financing issue failed. However the decisive factor issue risk lies in the corporate nature and value itself. The issue of financing risk in mergers and acquisitions decision. If the transaction is emptied of listed companies, or occupy the interests of minority shareholders, so the financing will be resisted by the investors. It is not only the issuance of securities no subscription, existing shareholders will choose to vote with their feet, so that the share price fell. The regulatory authorities of the financing. Strict examination and approval will lead to the issue of risk. Whether for stable market considerations, or for the protection of the interests of small investors, regulators may be harsh. The most effective way to make a hollowing out.
The financing may make enterprises due to financial constraints and the accumulation of financial risk. Therefore the financing of the listed companies involved in a relegation battle ". The controlling shareholders are the biggest beneficiaries of listed companies" Echelon ", but also the most dynamic support for listed companies. It is to provide loan guarantees or internal loans, can solve the listed the company's capital chain tension problems. In the financial crisis of the listed companies" like a badly frightened person, can be slightly wind sways grass so the amplification effect of crisis, largely restricted to large shareholders of listed companies emptied, and at the appropriate time for listed companies to help, such as providing liquidity support and re injection high quality assets.
Tunneling and propping behavior not only exists in the domestic stock market, is also widespread in western developed countries. But due to different legal principles and legal framework, form caused by tunneling behavior varies. Common law countries to maintain fair market as the starting point, to establish the "fair principle" as the core of the legal precedent system, the the actual controller of the listed company has a "duty of diligence" and "duty of loyalty", and once did not fulfill their obligations, it was regarded as a "default", the consequences are huge fines or even jail. Severe law in order to maintain the securities market fair escort, a special mechanism to protect the interests of investors and enhance investor rights strength. So, the tunneling behavior of the common law countries at least on the surface has a reasonable business purpose, and in accordance with the principles of "fairness".
In contrast, domestic tunneling behavior appears more "original", both transactions naked, also have a direct transfer of interest to the issuance of new shares at the behavior of large shareholders. Because of the lack of appropriate legal provisions to punish and ban, many tunneling behavior were covered with a "legitimate coat", and the common law countries there is a big difference. The statute law emphasized the law of predictability, but can not guarantee the maximum "fairness"; and domestic for tunneling behavior punishment is not implemented, the effectiveness of supervision. In addition, the investor rights awareness is weak, and lack of investor protection mechanism, the tunneling and other occupation the interests of the small shareholders wantonly.
The main contribution of this paper: first, based on the research at home and abroad, from the perspective of risk financing, tunneling and propping behavior of Chinese listed companies, can make up for this one theory vacancy. Secondly, according to the listed companies in China the phenomenon of related transactions and private placement preference, real motivation analysis of Listed Companies in mergers and acquisitions behind, thus revealing the nature of the controlling shareholders' tunneling of listed companies. Thirdly, financing risk and tunneling, support behavior can be unified through the analysis of the external reveals the intrinsic reason, through the Department of behavioral assumptions in that external reaction, which is a major innovation of this paper. Finally, from the western developed country governance experience in tunneling and give some policy suggestions to curb domestic securities market tunneling behavior. This article is the lack of empirical data sample size is not big enough, the case is not rich enough, because The evidence is limited; the policy recommendations are not perfect because of the limited knowledge.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F271;F832.51

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