中國上市銀行公司治理機制對信息披露質(zhì)量影響的實證研究
本文關(guān)鍵詞:中國上市銀行公司治理機制對信息披露質(zhì)量影響的實證研究 出處:《重慶大學》2012年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文
更多相關(guān)文章: 上市銀行 公司治理 公司治理機制 信息披露質(zhì)量
【摘要】:公司治理問題和信息披露問題是現(xiàn)代企業(yè)研究的重點,也在學術(shù)界引起了廣泛關(guān)注。國內(nèi)外對于公司治理和信息披露問題的研究都比較多,但是把二者結(jié)合起來,就二者的相互影響關(guān)系進行的研究比較少。就研究領(lǐng)域而言,多數(shù)研究更傾向于關(guān)注于一般企業(yè),這使得相關(guān)研究結(jié)論是否適用金融行業(yè),特別是商業(yè)銀行值得商榷。商業(yè)銀行作為一類特殊的公司,既有一般公司的普遍性,也有其特殊性,而銀行市場又是一個典型的信息不對稱的市場,因此信息披露問題對商業(yè)銀行的影響相比對其他行業(yè)而言就顯得更為重要。特別是我國商業(yè)銀行發(fā)展歷程較短,且配套制度和相關(guān)法規(guī)尚未完善,其信息披露質(zhì)量存在著許多不足,加之2007年后9家商業(yè)銀行相繼成功上市A股,將來也會有越來越多的商業(yè)銀行上市,,這就更加引發(fā)了人們對商業(yè)銀行特別是上市銀行信息披露質(zhì)量的關(guān)注。 由于公司治理機制與信息披露制度都是基于委托代理理論產(chǎn)生的,作為現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的兩種核心制度安排,兩者之間是相互影響、相互制約的。其中公司治理機制對信息披露質(zhì)量的影響在于:通過在委托代理關(guān)系中建立一系列的制度安排,即有效的公司治理機制,為高質(zhì)量的信息披露提供制度保證。國內(nèi)外眾多學者也通過理論分析和實證分析的方法得出了公司治理機制對信息披露質(zhì)量有著重要影響的結(jié)論。具體到上市銀行,從完善公司治理機制的角度來探討如何提高上市銀行信息披露質(zhì)量的問題,是可行且有現(xiàn)實意義的。 本文通過收集我國上市的國有大型股份制商業(yè)銀行及其他已上市銀行的數(shù)據(jù),實證分析了銀行公司治理機制與信息披露質(zhì)量之間的關(guān)系。實證研究表明,一般公司治理的研究結(jié)論不適用于銀行業(yè)。中國上市銀行內(nèi)部控制機制對會計信息披露質(zhì)量的影響較小,僅發(fā)現(xiàn)兩職分離的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以及分散的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)能夠提高會計信息披露質(zhì)量,沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)董事會、債權(quán)人以及經(jīng)理人激勵合約等治理機制對會計信息披露質(zhì)量的影響。在產(chǎn)品市場的強烈競爭對公司治理控制機制形成約束之后的統(tǒng)計結(jié)果顯示,對于內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善的中國上市銀行,產(chǎn)品市場的強烈競爭會進一步降低內(nèi)部控制機制對會計信息披露質(zhì)量的提高。 最后根據(jù)已有研究成果和本文實證研究,文章從完善銀行業(yè)公司治理機制和促進銀行業(yè)信息披露質(zhì)量兩個方面提出建議。鼓勵國有股減持,優(yōu)化銀行業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),真正做到銀行董事長和總經(jīng)理兩職分任,建立和完善審計委員會制度,加強外部監(jiān)控力量,健全市場立法機制,促進信息中介行業(yè)的發(fā)展。同時,鼓勵銀行業(yè)上市公司進行自愿性信息披露,規(guī)范公司報告流程,培育產(chǎn)品市場競爭體系。
[Abstract]:Corporate governance and information disclosure issues are the focus of modern enterprise research, but also aroused widespread concern in the academic community. Domestic and foreign research on corporate governance and information disclosure issues are more. However, the combination of the two on the relationship between the two little research. In terms of research, most of the research tend to focus on the general enterprise. This makes the relevant research conclusions applicable to the financial industry, especially commercial banks. As a special kind of companies, commercial banks have not only the universality of general companies, but also their particularity. And the banking market is a typical asymmetric information market, so the impact of information disclosure on commercial banks is more important than on other industries, especially in China's commercial banks have a short history of development. And the supporting system and related laws and regulations are not perfect, its information disclosure quality has many deficiencies, coupled with the 9 commercial banks have successfully listed A shares since 2007, there will be more and more commercial banks listed in the future. This has aroused people's concern about the quality of information disclosure of commercial banks, especially listed banks. As corporate governance mechanism and information disclosure system are based on the principal-agent theory, as two core institutional arrangements of modern enterprise system, the two systems affect each other. The influence of corporate governance mechanism on the quality of information disclosure lies in the establishment of a series of institutional arrangements in the principal-agent relationship, that is, effective corporate governance mechanism. Many scholars at home and abroad have also reached the conclusion that the corporate governance mechanism has an important impact on the quality of information disclosure through theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. Yes. It is feasible and meaningful to discuss how to improve the information disclosure quality of listed banks from the angle of perfecting the corporate governance mechanism. By collecting the data of large state-owned joint-stock commercial banks and other listed banks in China, this paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the corporate governance mechanism and the quality of information disclosure. The conclusion of general corporate governance is not applicable to the banking industry. The internal control mechanism of listed banks in China has little effect on the quality of accounting information disclosure. Only two separate leadership structure and decentralized equity structure can improve the quality of accounting information disclosure, not the board of directors. The impact of governance mechanisms such as creditor and manager incentive contract on the quality of accounting information disclosure. The statistical results show that the strong competition in the product market restricts the corporate governance control mechanism. For the Chinese listed banks with imperfect internal governance structure, the strong competition in the product market will further reduce the internal control mechanism to improve the quality of accounting information disclosure. Finally, according to the existing research results and empirical research in this paper, the article from the improvement of the banking corporate governance mechanism and promote the quality of banking information disclosure two aspects of the recommendations to encourage the reduction of state-owned shares. Optimize the banking equity structure, truly achieve the bank chairman and general manager, establish and improve the audit committee system, strengthen the external monitoring force, improve the market legislative mechanism. At the same time, we should encourage banking listed companies to make voluntary disclosure of information, standardize the reporting process of companies, and foster a competitive system in the product market.
【學位授予單位】:重慶大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2012
【分類號】:F832.3;F832.51;F224
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