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  本文關(guān)鍵詞：中小企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司價值的實證研究　出處：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 中小企業(yè) 股權(quán)集中 股權(quán)制衡 公司價值

【摘要】：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是公司治理組織結(jié)構(gòu)的產(chǎn)權(quán)基礎(chǔ),作為契約結(jié)合體的公司,大股東行為會直接影響公司治理機制的形成、運作及其績效最后影響公司價值。2004年,深圳中小企業(yè)板設(shè)置,截止2010年底上市公司數(shù)量已達(dá)到537家,但是我國的證券市場各種機制與體制都不盡完善,特別是對中小股東缺乏有效的保護機制,非常不利于中小企業(yè)的長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展,所以股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的大股東控制(股權(quán)集中與股權(quán)制衡)與公司價值的關(guān)系問題就成為了現(xiàn)代公司治理領(lǐng)域中最值得研究的核心問題。 本文閱讀現(xiàn)有國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn),對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司價值的基本理論做出充分分析,探討在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)中占有優(yōu)勢地位的大股東們對公司治理機制的影響以及對公司價值的激勵和壁壘效應(yīng),在分析對比我國A股全部上市公司和中小板上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)上,尋找中小企業(yè)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的特殊性,并就其對公司價值的影響進(jìn)行了實證研究。 本文從理論分析及實證檢驗兩個角度分別對股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司價值的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究,從定性和定量的角度對我國中小上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司價值的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。本文緊緊圍繞“中小企業(yè)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)——大股東控制(大股東行為)——公司價值”這個分析框架,首先是從理論上探討了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司價值之間的關(guān)系,理清了大股東控制通過對公司治理因素的影響(經(jīng)營激勵、監(jiān)督管理、投資行為、代理權(quán)競爭)進(jìn)而對公司價值產(chǎn)生影響的邏輯順序；然后利用我國中小上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),實證分析了其股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司價值的關(guān)系,主要從股權(quán)集中度、股權(quán)制衡度兩個角度對大股東控制——公司價值的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了關(guān)注與探討。
[Abstract]:The ownership structure of property rights is the basis of corporate governance structure, as the combination of contract of the company, the behavior of large shareholders will directly affect the formation of corporate governance mechanism, the operation and the performance finally affect the value of the company.2004 years, the Shenzhen SME board set up by the end of 2010, the number of listed companies has reached 537, but the stock market mechanism and system our country is not perfect, especially the lack of effective protection mechanisms for small and medium-sized shareholders, is not conducive to the long-term development of small and medium-sized enterprises, so the control of large shareholder equity structure (ownership concentration and equity balance) relationship with the value of the company has become the most worthy of the core issues in the field of modern corporate governance.
In this paper, reading existing literature at home and abroad, make a full analysis of the basic theory of ownership structure and corporate value, to explore the influence of dominance in the ownership structure of large shareholders on corporate governance and the value of the company incentive and entrenchment effect, in the comparative analysis of China A shares of all listed companies and small and medium-sized board based on ownership structure listed companies, looking for the special ownership structure of small and medium-sized enterprises, and make an empirical study on the influence on the value of the company.
This paper makes a research on the theoretical analysis and empirical test from two aspects on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate value, the study on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate value of Listed SMEs in China from the perspective of qualitative and quantitative. This paper focus on the ownership structure of small and medium-sized enterprises -- the control of large shareholders (large shareholders behaviors) - company "the value analysis framework, the first is to discuss the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in theory, clarifies the controlling shareholder through the influence of corporate governance factors (management incentive, supervision and management, investment behavior, agency competition) logical order and influence corporate value; then I use small and medium sized listed companies in the empirical data, analyzes the relation between ownership structure and firm value, mainly from ownership concentration, equity balance degree two aspects of controlling shareholders- The relationship between the value of the company has been paid attention to and discussed.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F276.3;F224;F832.51

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