發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-03 07:07

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：審計(jì)失敗的股票市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)與長期經(jīng)濟(jì)后果　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 審計(jì)失敗 審計(jì)師聲譽(yù) CAR值 審計(jì)收費(fèi) 審計(jì)質(zhì)量

【摘要】：本文研究了中國證券市場(chǎng)對(duì)審計(jì)失敗的反應(yīng),并且從審計(jì)費(fèi)用和審計(jì)質(zhì)量兩個(gè)角度研究了審計(jì)失敗導(dǎo)致的審計(jì)師聲譽(yù)損失產(chǎn)生的長期經(jīng)濟(jì)后果。文中收集了2004年-2008年期間所有審計(jì)師因其上市公司客戶財(cái)務(wù)舞弊受到證監(jiān)會(huì)行政處罰的案例,并將此處罰視為監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)其審計(jì)失敗的認(rèn)定。剔除了會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所被處罰時(shí)已被合并或不存在的案例,共得到12個(gè)審計(jì)師受到處罰的案例作為研究對(duì)象。 一方面,針對(duì)每一個(gè)案例采用了事件研究的方法,考察在證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)審計(jì)師行政處罰進(jìn)行公告的一系列事件窗口內(nèi),被處罰審計(jì)師的其他上市公司客戶的累積異常報(bào)酬率是否顯著為負(fù)。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)在多數(shù)案例中,審計(jì)師被處罰公告日前后的窗口內(nèi),股票市場(chǎng)上其他客戶的CAR值(累積異常報(bào)酬率)顯著為負(fù),市場(chǎng)對(duì)該事件產(chǎn)生了負(fù)面反應(yīng)。在其中一些案例中,CAR值顯著為負(fù)表現(xiàn)在審計(jì)師受到證監(jiān)會(huì)處罰公告前后,而另一些案例中,由于市場(chǎng)對(duì)審計(jì)師被處罰信息的提前察覺和提前反應(yīng),CAR值顯著為負(fù)表現(xiàn)在事件發(fā)生前30天范圍內(nèi)。 另一方面,以每一個(gè)審計(jì)失敗案例前兩年、當(dāng)年和后兩年的數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本,檢驗(yàn)審計(jì)師受到處罰前和受到處罰后審計(jì)收費(fèi)是否有顯著降低,以及審計(jì)質(zhì)量是否有顯著提高來考察審計(jì)失敗的長期經(jīng)濟(jì)后果。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)師受到處罰后審計(jì)收費(fèi)并沒有下降,審計(jì)師受到處罰的當(dāng)年審計(jì)收費(fèi)有下降的趨勢(shì),但從處罰后第一年開始反而有上升的趨勢(shì)；并且發(fā)現(xiàn)與處罰前相比,處罰后審計(jì)師上市公司的操控性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤下降,審計(jì)師的審計(jì)質(zhì)量提高,尤其是在被處罰的當(dāng)年,審計(jì)質(zhì)量的提高是顯著的,但是持續(xù)的時(shí)間并不長久,處罰后的第一年審計(jì)質(zhì)量的提高就開始不顯著了。 通過上述研究,本文從理論上對(duì)審計(jì)師聲譽(yù)機(jī)制在我國市場(chǎng)上的有效性,以及我國審計(jì)需求是否存在逆向選擇兩方面提供了更為完善的依據(jù)。同時(shí)在實(shí)踐方面,考察了市場(chǎng)作為一種隱性的手段是否能夠?qū)徲?jì)失敗起到懲戒的作用。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the response of Chinese securities market to audit failure. The long-term economic consequences of auditor reputation loss caused by audit failure are studied from two angles of audit cost and audit quality. In this paper, all auditors are collected from 2004 to 2008 because of their listing. Corporate customer financial fraud by the CSRC administrative punishment cases. The punishment is regarded as the recognition of the audit failure of the regulator, and 12 cases of auditors being punished are taken as the object of study by excluding the cases in which the accounting firm has been merged or does not exist when the accounting firm was penalized. On the one hand, for each case, the method of event study is used to investigate a series of events window in which the CSRC announces the auditor's administrative punishment. Whether the accumulated abnormal rate of return of the other listed company customers is significantly negative. The results show that in most cases, the auditor was punished before and after the announcement of the window. The CAR value (cumulative abnormal rate of return) of other clients in the stock market was significantly negative and the market reacted negatively to the event. In some of these cases. The CAR value was significantly negative before and after the auditor was punished by the CSRC notice, while in other cases, due to the early detection and early response of the market to the auditor punishment information. CAR was significantly negative within 30 days before the event. On the other hand, the data of the first two years, the current year and the last two years of each audit failure case were used as samples to test whether the audit fees before and after the auditor's punishment had significantly decreased. And whether there is a significant improvement in audit quality to examine the long-term economic consequences of audit failure. The audit fees of auditors in the year of punishment have a downward trend, but from the first year after the punishment there is an upward trend; And found that compared with the punishment before, the auditor listed companies after the punishment of the operating accrual profits decreased, auditor audit quality improved, especially in the year of punishment, the audit quality improvement is significant. But the duration is not long, the first year after the penalty audit quality improvement began to be insignificant. Through the above research, this paper theoretically analyzes the effectiveness of auditor reputation mechanism in Chinese market. And whether there are two aspects of adverse selection in audit demand in China provides a more perfect basis. At the same time, in practice, it examines whether the market as a recessive means can play a disciplinary role in audit failure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4;F832.51;F224

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