本文關(guān)鍵詞：實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)對(duì)高管薪酬契約有效性的影響研究　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 高管薪酬契約 激勵(lì) 實(shí)際控制人 公司業(yè)績(jī)

【摘要】：近年來(lái),隨著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展,上市公司數(shù)量迅速增多,高管薪酬快速增長(zhǎng),伴隨出現(xiàn)的一些公司高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效不掛鉤的現(xiàn)象也越來(lái)越引起人們的關(guān)注,引發(fā)了人們對(duì)高管薪酬契約有效性的懷疑。因此,高管薪酬契約究竟能否提升公司業(yè)績(jī)這一課題,再一次地?cái)[在了人們的面前。以往對(duì)高管薪酬契約的研究大多局限于貨幣薪酬、持股激勵(lì)等顯性薪酬方式,但是卻忽略了重要的一點(diǎn)：顯性薪酬并非高管薪酬的全部,以在職消費(fèi)為主要形式的隱性薪酬同樣是高管薪酬的重要組成部分。 高管薪酬契約制定的初衷和最終目的是促進(jìn)公司業(yè)績(jī)的提升,但是制定之后,公司內(nèi)在或外在的各種因素都會(huì)影響其激勵(lì)效果的發(fā)揮,這其中既有提高其有效性的正面影響,又有降低其有效性的負(fù)面影響。以往的研究先后考察過(guò)公司規(guī)模、公司成長(zhǎng)性、行業(yè)、地區(qū)等很多方面的因素,但是在公司實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)對(duì)高管薪酬契約有效性的影響方面,涉及的較少。本文正是希望從這一角度入手,為高管薪酬領(lǐng)域的研究增添一個(gè)新的視角。 本文主要對(duì)下面幾個(gè)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究：第一,探討高管薪酬契約(包括顯性薪酬契約和隱性薪酬契約)能否有效地激勵(lì)管理者提升公司業(yè)績(jī),即高管薪酬契約是否是有效的。特別是隱性薪酬契約,我國(guó)目前的研究較少,僅有的文獻(xiàn)研究大多認(rèn)為隱性薪酬契約與公司業(yè)績(jī)負(fù)相關(guān),事實(shí)果真如此嗎?第二,考察實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)對(duì)高管薪酬契約有效性的影響,即：政府作為公司的實(shí)際控制人是否會(huì)影響高管的薪酬水平與薪酬契約的激勵(lì)有效性；中央政府與地方政府分別控制的公司,其高管的薪酬水平與薪酬契約有效性有何不同。 為了解決以上問(wèn)題,本文的寫(xiě)作(除第一章引言外)主要包括以下幾個(gè)部分： 第二章：文獻(xiàn)綜述。主要是回顧相關(guān)領(lǐng)域的國(guó)內(nèi)外研究,主要包括高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效關(guān)系的研究、高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的影響因素研究、實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)對(duì)公司治理的影響研究。 第三章：理論基礎(chǔ)與制度背景。理論基礎(chǔ)部分主要包括委托代理理論、激勵(lì)理論、人力資本理論等。制度背景部分主要包括我國(guó)的國(guó)企改革與薪酬管制、我國(guó)的財(cái)政分權(quán)制度與國(guó)有資產(chǎn)分級(jí)管理體制。 第四章：高管薪酬激勵(lì)現(xiàn)狀的分析,主要是根據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)資料,觀察近幾年我國(guó)非國(guó)有企業(yè)、地方國(guó)有企業(yè)、中央企業(yè)在高管貨幣性薪酬、持股情況、在職消費(fèi)、企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)方面存在的差異。 第五章：研究設(shè)計(jì)。主要包括在前文理論分析與文獻(xiàn)回顧的基礎(chǔ)上提出研究假設(shè)、進(jìn)行樣本選擇與變量定義、構(gòu)建相應(yīng)的檢驗(yàn)?zāi)Ｐ?共構(gòu)建了四個(gè)模型,分別對(duì)薪酬與業(yè)績(jī)的相關(guān)性、實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)對(duì)高管顯性薪酬契約有效性的影響、實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)對(duì)高管隱性薪酬契約有效性的影響進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn)。 第六章：實(shí)證研究。包括描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、模型回歸分析結(jié)果和對(duì)模型的檢驗(yàn)。 第七章：研究結(jié)論與建議。包括對(duì)研究結(jié)論的總結(jié)、研究啟示、本文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)與不足。 通過(guò)理論分析與實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),本文得出了以下結(jié)論： 首先,在對(duì)高管顯性薪酬契約有效性進(jìn)行的檢驗(yàn)中,高管貨幣薪酬契約有效得到了實(shí)證支持,但是高管持股激勵(lì)有效性并未得到實(shí)證支持。為此,本文把全體樣本分為兩部分：政府控制公司與非政府控制公司,對(duì)高管持股激勵(lì)有效性重新進(jìn)行檢驗(yàn),結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)非政府控制公司高管持股激勵(lì)契約具有有效性,政府控制公司高管持股激勵(lì)作用不明顯。本文認(rèn)為,政府控制公司的高管持股比例偏低,只有1%左右,過(guò)低的持股比例致使激勵(lì)作用難以有效發(fā)揮,雖然非政府控制公司的持股激勵(lì)有效性通過(guò)了顯著性檢驗(yàn),但是受到政府控制公司較低的持股比例和較大的樣本量的影響,全樣本檢驗(yàn)才沒(méi)有支持“高管持股具有激勵(lì)有效性”這一結(jié)論。 其次,對(duì)高管隱性薪酬契約有效性的檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果顯示：高管隱性薪酬契約具有激勵(lì)有效性,即高管隱性薪酬契約能夠提升公司業(yè)績(jī),這與以往的研究結(jié)論不同。本文認(rèn)為,信息不對(duì)稱導(dǎo)致所有者與經(jīng)營(yíng)者簽訂完全契約成為不可能,隱性薪酬契約作為顯性薪酬契約的有效補(bǔ)充,能夠有效提升高管人員效用水平,起到良好的激勵(lì)效果。此外,公司允許高管人員享用的在職消費(fèi)大多是規(guī)定了具體用途的(如辦公費(fèi)、業(yè)務(wù)招待費(fèi)等),這些規(guī)定的用途與公司利益的實(shí)現(xiàn)基本是一致的。 再次,本文考察了政府作為實(shí)際控制人對(duì)高管薪酬契約有效性的影響,研究表明：對(duì)于高管顯性薪酬契約,非政府控制的公司有效性好于政府控制的公司;而對(duì)于隱性薪酬契約,非政府控制的公司有效性差于政府控制的公司。這表明政府作為公司實(shí)際控制人對(duì)公司施加的直接干預(yù),削弱了高管顯性薪酬契約的有效性。 最后,本文考察了中央和地方政府作為實(shí)際控制人對(duì)高管薪酬契約有效性的影響,研究結(jié)果顯示：中央政府控制公司的高管貨幣薪酬契約有效性顯著好于地方政府控制公司,隱性薪酬契約有效性差于地方政府控制公司,持股激勵(lì)在兩類公司中不存在顯著差異,激勵(lì)效果都不顯著。 本文的研究貢獻(xiàn)主要在于： 首先,本文在研究中采用了廣義高管薪酬的概念,即把高管薪酬界定為包含貨幣薪酬、高管持股與在職消費(fèi)的薪酬體系,拓寬了以往研究中把高管薪酬局限于貨幣性年薪的研究思路,不僅考察了高管顯性薪酬契約的有效性,而且考察了高管隱性薪酬契約的有效性,并得出“高管隱性薪酬契約具有激勵(lì)有效性”的結(jié)論,這有助于改變?nèi)藗儗?duì)于在職消費(fèi)的消極印象,只要能夠提供適當(dāng)?shù)谋O(jiān)督與引導(dǎo),在職消費(fèi)等隱性薪酬契約能夠?qū)μ嵘緲I(yè)績(jī)產(chǎn)生積極效果。 其次,本文考察了政府控制與否對(duì)高管薪酬契約有效性的影響,證明了政府干預(yù)影響了公司高管薪酬機(jī)制的激勵(lì)效率,并進(jìn)一步考察了公司實(shí)際控制人的政府層級(jí)對(duì)高管薪酬契約有效性的影響,證明了控制人所屬政府層級(jí)不同也會(huì)影響公司高管薪酬機(jī)制的激勵(lì)效率。這為我國(guó)高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的研究提供了一個(gè)新的視角,并能在一定程度上幫助提高對(duì)我國(guó)政府經(jīng)濟(jì)職能的認(rèn)識(shí)。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of China's capital market, the rapid increase in the number of listed companies, executives of rapid growth, with the emergence of some company executive compensation and corporate performance is not linked to the phenomenon is more and more concerned by people, has sparked the effectiveness of suspicion of executive compensation contract. Therefore, whether the executive compensation contract to enhance the performance of the company this issue, once again placed in front of people. Previous research on executive compensation contracts are mostly limited to the monetary compensation, stock incentive and other dominant compensation, but it ignores an important point: the explicit compensation of executive compensation is not full, with implicit compensation on-the-job consumption as the main form of the same is an important part of executive compensation.
Executive compensation contract purpose and ultimate purpose is to promote the company to enhance performance, but after the development, all kinds of factors inside and outside the company will affect the incentive effect, both of which enhance its positive impact on the effectiveness, and reduce the negative influence of effectiveness. Previous research has examined the the size of the company, the company's growth, industry, region and other factors in many aspects, but in the actual controller of the company's properties impact on executive compensation contract validity, involving less. It is hoped that from this point into the hand, adding a new perspective for the study of executive compensation field.
This paper mainly focuses on the following questions: first, to investigate the executive compensation contract (explicit compensation contract and implicit compensation contract) can effectively motivate managers to enhance the performance of the company, namely the executive compensation contract is effective. Especially the implicit compensation contract, our country's present research literature research less, only most of that negative implicit compensation and the performance of the company, really? Second, examine the nature of the actual controller to influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts, namely: the government as the actual control of the company's incentive effectiveness not only affects the level of executive compensation and compensation contract; the central government and the local government respectively control the company, its executives the compensation level and compensation contracts of difference.
In order to solve the above problems, the writing of this article (except the first chapter) mainly includes the following parts:
The second chapter: literature review. It mainly reviews the domestic and foreign research in related fields, including the research on the relationship between executive compensation and company performance, the influencing factors of executive compensation incentive mechanism, and the influence of the nature of actual controller on corporate governance.
The third chapter: the theoretical basis and system background. The theoretical basis includes the principal-agent theory, incentive theory, human capital theory and so on. The system mainly includes the background of the reform of state-owned enterprises and compensation control in our country, China's fiscal decentralization system and the classification of state-owned assets management system.
The fourth chapter: the analysis of executive compensation incentive status, mainly based on statistical data, to observe the differences in executive monetary compensation, shareholding, on-the-job consumption and business performance in recent years in China's non state owned enterprises, local state-owned enterprises and central enterprises.
The fifth chapter mainly includes: research design. Put forward the research hypothesis based on the previous theoretical analysis and literature review, sample selection and variable definition, construct the corresponding model test, a total of four models were constructed, respectively. The correlation of pay and performance, influence the nature of the actual controller on the effectiveness of executive compensation contract explicit, inspection influence of the nature of the actual controller on the validity of the implicit salary contract.
The sixth chapter: empirical research, including descriptive statistics, model regression analysis and test of the model.
The seventh chapter: the conclusions and suggestions of the research, including the conclusion of the research, the inspiration of the research, the innovation and the deficiency of this article.
Through theoretical analysis and empirical test, the following conclusions are drawn.
First of all, in the test on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts in the dominant currency, executive compensation contracts are effective empirical support, but the executive stock ownership incentive effectiveness has not been empirically supported. Therefore, the whole sample is divided into two parts: the government controlled companies and non government controlled companies, the executive stock ownership incentive effectiveness again test results found with the effectiveness of non government controlled companies executive stock ownership incentive contract, government control company executive stock ownership incentive effect is not obvious. This paper argues that the government control of the company's executives shareholding ratio is low, only about 1% of the shareholding ratio is too low that incentives can not effectively play the role, although the stock incentive effectiveness of non government controlled companies through a significant test, but influenced by the ownership of government controlled companies is low and large quantity of samples, the whole sample test before There is a conclusion that "executive stock ownership has incentive effectiveness".
Secondly, the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts implicit test results showed that: implicit salary incentive contract has validity, namely the implicit salary contract can improve the performance of the company, which is different from the previous research result. This paper argues that the information asymmetry in the owners and operators signed a complete contract has become impossible, the implicit compensation contract as an effective complement for the dominant the salary contract, can effectively enhance the level of utility executives, play a good incentive effect. In addition, the company allowed executives to enjoy on-the-job consumption is mostly provided with Applications (such as office expenses, hospitality business, etc.) to achieve these provisions and the purpose of the interests of the company is basically the same.
Again, this paper examines the impact of the government as the actual control, executive compensation in the effectiveness of the research showed: for the executive compensation contract explicit, non government controlled company effectiveness better than the government controlled companies; for the implicit compensation contract, non government controlled company effectiveness for the control of the government. This shows that the company the direct intervention of the government as the actual control of the company to the company applied, weakened the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts dominant.
Finally, this paper examines the central and local governments as the actual control effect of executive compensation in the effectiveness of the research results show that: the central government control effectiveness of the company's executives monetary compensation contract is better than the local government control companies, the effectiveness of compensation contracts for implicit local government control companies, shareholding motivation has no significant difference between the two the company, the incentive effect is not significant.
The main contributions of this study are as follows:
First, this paper uses the concept of generalized executive compensation in the study, namely the executive compensation should include monetary compensation, managerial ownership and on-the-job consumption the salary system, broaden the previous research in the research of executive compensation is limited to monetary salary, not only examines the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts and the dominant effects of the effective. Of implicit salary contract, and the contract is implicit salary incentive effectiveness "conclusion, it is helpful to change people for on-the-job consumption negative impression, as long as they can provide appropriate guidance and supervision, serving consumer implicit compensation contract can have a positive effect to improve the performance of the company.
Secondly, this paper examines the government control and not to influence the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts, that government intervention affects the incentive efficiency of executive compensation mechanism, and further investigated the impact of the company's actual control of the government level of executive compensation in the effectiveness of the controller is proved that the incentive efficiency will also affect the government level the company executive compensation mechanism. Provide a new perspective for the incentive mechanism of executive compensation research in China, and can help to improve the understanding of the economic function of Chinese government in a certain extent.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F272.92;F832.51

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