本文關鍵詞：低迷時期IPO核準管制的選擇性執(zhí)行　出處：《安徽工業(yè)大學》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

  更多相關文章： 選擇性執(zhí)行 核準制 證券市場狀況 所在轄區(qū)的政治地位

【摘要】：在法律體系已經相對比較完備的情況下，法律執(zhí)行問題成了學者們關注的焦點�，F實中的法律執(zhí)行問題，經常是執(zhí)法者在不同時期，針對具體情形有選擇性地采取不同的執(zhí)行強度，即選擇性執(zhí)行。 本文研究的問題主要有兩個：一是立足于我國IPO市場新股發(fā)行特殊的的制度安排特點，從市場環(huán)境低迷階段這個角度出發(fā)，探索在低迷時期證監(jiān)會是如何進行核準管制的選擇性執(zhí)行的；二是對發(fā)行核準管制的選擇性執(zhí)行對企業(yè)融資的影響進行了實證分析，探索證監(jiān)會管制選擇性執(zhí)行的經濟后果。 本文以2006至2011年通過發(fā)審委審核會議的IPO申請為樣本，對低迷時期證監(jiān)會發(fā)行核準管制的選擇性執(zhí)行進行了經驗研究。結果發(fā)現：在市場狀況處于低迷階段,證監(jiān)會會放慢發(fā)行核準速度以維護市場的穩(wěn)定。進一步的研究發(fā)現，當市場狀況處于低迷階段時，證監(jiān)會會放慢所在轄區(qū)政治地位較高企業(yè)的發(fā)行核準速度，即企業(yè)所在轄區(qū)政治地位較高，獲得發(fā)行核準的速度越慢。同時發(fā)現，低迷時期IPO發(fā)行核準的選擇性執(zhí)行對企業(yè)融資有一定的影響，即當證券市場比較低迷時，獲得發(fā)行核準越慢企業(yè)的發(fā)行市盈率越低，進一步的研究發(fā)現，在證券市場低迷階段，所在轄區(qū)的政治地位較高的企業(yè)獲得發(fā)行核準的速度越慢，企業(yè)發(fā)行市盈率越高。 本文的分析和結論為理解轉型經濟中政府管制選擇性執(zhí)行的狀況和后果提供了一個有益的視角，，豐富和推進了證券發(fā)行核準管制的選擇性執(zhí)行的相關文獻。
[Abstract]:With the relatively complete legal system, the issue of law enforcement has become the focus of scholars' attention. In reality, law enforcement is often implemented by law enforcers in different periods according to specific circumstances, namely selective execution.
There are two main problems: one is based on the new IPO market in China issued special characteristics of institutional arrangements, from the perspective of the market downturn in the exploration stage, the downturn in the Commission is how to control the execution of selective approval; two is to control the examined selective impact on the implementation of the enterprise the financing of the empirical analysis, to explore the Commission regulation of selective enforcement of the economic consequences.
This paper from 2006 to 2011 by the issuance examination committee for the IPO meeting for sample selectivity to downturn the Commission issued the approval regulation execution carried out empirical research. The results showed that in the doldrums stage in the market situation, the Commission will slow down the speed to maintain the issuance market stability. Further research shows that when the market situation in the doldrums stage, the Commission will slow down the area where the political status of higher corporate issuance rate, namely the enterprise is in the area of high political status, have approved the issuance of more slowly. At the same time, selective IPO slump issued executive has a certain impact on enterprise financing, that is when the stock market downturn. Get slower enterprise approved the issuance of the price earnings ratio is low, further study found that, in the stock market downturn, the higher the area where the political status of the enterprises The slower the industry's approval of the issue, the higher the price earnings ratio of the enterprises.
The analysis and conclusion provide a useful perspective for understanding the status and consequences of selective implementation of government regulation in transitional economies, and enrich and promote relevant literature on selective implementation of securities issuance control.

【學位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.51

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本文編號：1365067