城市經(jīng)營的地方政府因素研究——基于動態(tài)控制論的理論構(gòu)建
發(fā)布時間：2019-06-28 14:59
【摘要】：在政府作用研究中,縱向的央地關(guān)系構(gòu)成了地方政府面對的最重要制度環(huán)境。運用動態(tài)經(jīng)濟分析方法,對中國地方政府在發(fā)展中存在的困境進行全新解釋:在理論狀態(tài)下,地方政府在發(fā)展中的資源投入,隨著時間的推移呈現(xiàn)規(guī)律性變化;在現(xiàn)實狀態(tài)下,對地方政府資源投入起關(guān)鍵性約束的因素,卻是中央政府的選拔機制。對以上兩種狀態(tài),本文分別構(gòu)建了地方政府經(jīng)營模型。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):在現(xiàn)實中,地方政府的資源投入逐步遞減是一個正常現(xiàn)象,但當(dāng)對地方官員投入的激勵不足并致使參數(shù)θ較小時,不僅地方政府致力于長期發(fā)展的動力過小,而且動力降低的速率加快;尤其是在一個社會評價機制邊界過大、體制內(nèi)收益明顯小于體制外收益的條件下,地方政府愿意投入的資源減少,以至趨近于零。
[Abstract]:In the study of the role of government, the vertical relationship between central and local governments constitutes the most important institutional environment faced by local governments. By using the method of dynamic economic analysis, this paper makes a new explanation for the difficulties existing in the development of local government in China: in the theoretical state, the resource investment of local government in development changes regularly with the passage of time; in the realistic state, the key constraint factor on the input of local government resources is the selection mechanism of the central government. For the above two states, this paper constructs the local government management model. It is found that in reality, the gradual decline of local government resource investment is a normal phenomenon, but when the incentive to local officials is insufficient and the parameter theta is small, not only the motivation of local government to devote itself to long-term development is too small, but also the rate of power decline is accelerated. Especially under the condition that the boundary of a social evaluation mechanism is too large and the income within the system is obviously smaller than that outside the system, the resources that local governments are willing to invest are reduced to zero.
【作者單位】： 上海社會科學(xué)院應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟研究所;上海社會科學(xué)院世界經(jīng)濟研究所;
【基金】：國家社科基金重點項目(15AGL004);國家社科基金一般項目(16BJY072)
【分類號】：D630
本文編號：2507385
[Abstract]:In the study of the role of government, the vertical relationship between central and local governments constitutes the most important institutional environment faced by local governments. By using the method of dynamic economic analysis, this paper makes a new explanation for the difficulties existing in the development of local government in China: in the theoretical state, the resource investment of local government in development changes regularly with the passage of time; in the realistic state, the key constraint factor on the input of local government resources is the selection mechanism of the central government. For the above two states, this paper constructs the local government management model. It is found that in reality, the gradual decline of local government resource investment is a normal phenomenon, but when the incentive to local officials is insufficient and the parameter theta is small, not only the motivation of local government to devote itself to long-term development is too small, but also the rate of power decline is accelerated. Especially under the condition that the boundary of a social evaluation mechanism is too large and the income within the system is obviously smaller than that outside the system, the resources that local governments are willing to invest are reduced to zero.
【作者單位】： 上海社會科學(xué)院應(yīng)用經(jīng)濟研究所;上海社會科學(xué)院世界經(jīng)濟研究所;
【基金】：國家社科基金重點項目(15AGL004);國家社科基金一般項目(16BJY072)
【分類號】：D630
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