本文選題：公私合作制 + 政府監(jiān)管　； 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：公私合作制,即PPP模式,是公共部門和私營部門共同供給公共產(chǎn)品的一種合作模式,其核心是以“合作”的方式將私營部門引入至公共產(chǎn)品領(lǐng)域,從而緩解政府的財政壓力,提高公共產(chǎn)品供給的效率和質(zhì)量。在通過公私合作制引入私營部門的過程中,政府承擔(dān)者監(jiān)管者、規(guī)則制定者和項目參與者的三重角色,其中,政府監(jiān)管者的身份要求政府必須對整個項目進(jìn)行謹(jǐn)慎的監(jiān)管。綜合現(xiàn)有的文獻(xiàn)資料,針對公私合作制項目的討論一般側(cè)重于項目整體的風(fēng)險管理,對政府監(jiān)管的討論則存在空缺。本文即旨在基于現(xiàn)有的國內(nèi)外成功及失敗案例,以及國內(nèi)外PPP政府監(jiān)管實踐經(jīng)驗,對公私合作制中政府監(jiān)管的問題作深入探討,以期獲得完善我國未來公私合作制中政府監(jiān)管機(jī)制的啟示。本文共有四章,其主要內(nèi)容和邏輯結(jié)構(gòu)如下:第一章從政府對供給公共產(chǎn)品之社會性、經(jīng)濟(jì)性職能展開討論,第一節(jié)分析了政府對調(diào)控市場經(jīng)濟(jì)并維護(hù)社會公益的訴求,重點討論了當(dāng)前政府重視公共產(chǎn)品的供給正是為了矯正政府原本對經(jīng)濟(jì)建設(shè)的決策偏好,以及市場失靈的客觀存在要求政府通過有形的手加以調(diào)控,從而取得政府依其職能供給公共產(chǎn)品的正當(dāng)性。第二節(jié)從現(xiàn)實情況出發(fā),討論政府財政、管理能力與社會對公共產(chǎn)品之需求的矛盾,以及公共產(chǎn)品市場對于適度競爭的需求,從而得出社會資本參與公共產(chǎn)品供給的比較性;再從制度的角度和法經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的視角分析社會資本進(jìn)入公共領(lǐng)域的可行性,并通過外部性內(nèi)在化、有機(jī)會選擇等理論,探討如何在具有公益性的社會產(chǎn)品領(lǐng)域有機(jī)包容社會資本的逐利性。第三節(jié)基于上述兩節(jié)之基礎(chǔ),提出公私合作制實質(zhì)是政府職能與社會資本的契合,在此制度下社會公眾和私營部門的利益訴求得到了有機(jī)的結(jié)合。第二章主要探討公司合作制中政府監(jiān)管的正當(dāng)性。第一節(jié)首先從公私合作制中政府監(jiān)管之必要性開始展開,分別就政府監(jiān)管對公私部門之間目標(biāo)沖突的矯正、彌補(bǔ)在公私合作制的框架下公共利益的話語權(quán)喪失所導(dǎo)致的制度缺陷進(jìn)行探討。第二節(jié)則主要從公私合作制中政府監(jiān)管的法律和合同依據(jù)進(jìn)行研究。其中法律依據(jù)的梳理分為早期政策文件、十八屆三中全會以后的相關(guān)規(guī)定兩個階段;合同依據(jù)主要從公私合作制合同的定性、行政性合同的“行政性”、“契約性”的雙重屬性的方面進(jìn)行探討。第三節(jié)順著上文的思路,對公私合作制中政府監(jiān)管的主要內(nèi)容進(jìn)行分析,從監(jiān)管手段加以區(qū)分,分別討論了準(zhǔn)入監(jiān)管和績效監(jiān)管在政府監(jiān)管中的具體實施。其中,績效監(jiān)管中又區(qū)分了價格監(jiān)管和質(zhì)量監(jiān)管兩個較為重要的監(jiān)管類別。第三章圍繞公私合作制中政府監(jiān)管失靈展開。以“監(jiān)管無效果但有效率”、“監(jiān)管無效果且無效率”作為分類,第一節(jié)討論政府監(jiān)管失靈的外部表現(xiàn):信息披露不透明,即政府因采用間接監(jiān)管而無法直接去的監(jiān)管信息,監(jiān)管因而可能被滯后;價格監(jiān)管存在誤區(qū),即在決定監(jiān)管標(biāo)準(zhǔn)時,政府容易錯誤地以價格高低作為唯一的衡量標(biāo)準(zhǔn);質(zhì)量監(jiān)管存在監(jiān)管缺位,即政府運用自由裁量權(quán)不當(dāng)、監(jiān)管標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定不清等情況會導(dǎo)致政府在監(jiān)管時存在放權(quán)即等同于不監(jiān)管的錯誤認(rèn)識。第二節(jié)則通過對上述問題進(jìn)行剖析后歸納出政府監(jiān)管失靈的內(nèi)在原因,從政府內(nèi)部看,監(jiān)管失靈主要由于政府多頭監(jiān)管所導(dǎo)致的協(xié)調(diào)性差、相互口徑不一、政府多重角色(監(jiān)管者、參與者、規(guī)則制定者)之間存在角色沖突、政府缺乏自我監(jiān)管的內(nèi)控體系等問題,而從政府外部看,政府因采用間接監(jiān)管的方式而必須承擔(dān)其監(jiān)管滯后的效果,同時公共產(chǎn)品市場的公益性和公私合作的較長周期的特點會造成“二次壟斷”的非競爭效果。上述因素共同作用導(dǎo)致了政府監(jiān)管的失靈。第四章意圖為公私合作制中政府監(jiān)管制度提出完善建議。第一節(jié)從政府監(jiān)管的基本理念的討論展開,首先提出了“柔性監(jiān)管”的理念,即在公私合作制的合作框架下,政府監(jiān)管應(yīng)當(dāng)擯棄強(qiáng)制性、行政性的監(jiān)管手段,轉(zhuǎn)而以協(xié)商性、市場性的方式進(jìn)行監(jiān)管;其次提出了“激勵性監(jiān)管”的理念,即在柔性監(jiān)管的理論基礎(chǔ)之上,通過“激勵相容”的手段,鼓勵私營部門自主自發(fā)地提高項目運行效率。第二節(jié)討論了確認(rèn)政府監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)獨立地位的重要性。第三節(jié)為加強(qiáng)政府監(jiān)管提出了兩項具體措施,包括信息披露體系的構(gòu)建和第三方爭議解決機(jī)制作為輔助手段的實施。
[Abstract]:The public and private cooperative system, the PPP model, is a cooperative model for the common supply of public goods by the public and the private sector. The core is to introduce the private sector into the public product field in a "cooperative" way, thus alleviating the government's financial pressure, improving the efficiency and quality of the supply of public goods. In the process of the Department, the government is responsible for the three roles of the supervisor, the rule maker and the project participants. Among them, the government supervisor's identity requires the government to supervise the whole project carefully. On the basis of the existing domestic and foreign success and failure cases, and the practical experience of PPP government supervision both at home and abroad, this paper makes an in-depth discussion on the government supervision in the public and private cooperative system, in order to obtain the inspiration for improving the government supervision and management mechanism in the future public and private cooperative system in China. There are four chapters in this paper. In the first chapter, the government has discussed the social and economic functions of the supply of public goods. The first section analyzes the government's demands for the regulation of the market economy and the maintenance of social public welfare. The emphasis is on the government's importance of the supply of public products to correct the government's original decision preference for economic construction. And the objective existence of market failure requires the government to regulate and control through the tangible hand, thus obtaining the legitimacy of the government to supply the public products according to its functions. In the second section, we discuss the contradiction between the government finance, the management ability and the social demand for public products, and the demand for moderate competition in the public product market from the reality. From the angle of system and the perspective of law and economics, the feasibility of social capital into the public domain is analyzed from the angle of system and the perspective of law and economics. And through the internalization of the externality and the choice of opportunity, this paper discusses how to contain the profit of social capital in the field of social products with public welfare. Third section. Based on the above two sections, it is proposed that the public and private cooperative system is essentially a combination of government functions and social capital. Under this system, the interests of the public and the private sector are organically combined. The second chapter mainly discusses the legitimacy of the government supervision in the company's cooperative system. In the second section, the second section mainly studies the law and the conformity basis of the government supervision in the public and private cooperative system. The legal basis is combed. It is divided into two stages: the early policy documents and the relevant provisions after the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee; the contract basis is mainly discussed in the aspects of the quality of the contract of public and private cooperative system, the "administrative" of the administrative contract and the dual attribute of the contract. The third section is the main content of the government supervision in the public and private cooperative system. Through the analysis, the specific implementation of supervision and performance supervision in government supervision is discussed from the supervision means. In the performance supervision, two more important regulatory categories are classified in the performance supervision. The third chapter focuses on the malfunction of the government and the government in the public and private cooperative system. The first section discusses the external performance of government regulatory failure: information disclosure is not transparent, that is, the government is unable to direct supervision information because of the use of indirect supervision. Supervision may be lagged behind; there is a misunderstanding of price regulation, that is, when the regulatory standards are determined, the government is prone to erroneous prices. The quality supervision is the only standard of measurement; there is a lack of supervision in the supervision of the quality supervision, that is, the government's improper use of discretion, the unclear supervision standards will lead to the government's wrong understanding of the government's decentralization in supervision. The second section, through the analysis of the above problems, concludes the internal control failure of the government. The reason, from the government inside, is that the regulatory failure is mainly due to the poor coordination caused by the government's multiple supervision, the different mutual caliber, the role conflict between the multiple roles of the government (supervisors, the participants, the rulers), the lack of the internal control system of the government, and the external supervision of the government from the outside of the government. And we must bear the effect of the lag of supervision. At the same time, the public goods market's public welfare and the long cycle of public and private cooperation will result in the non competitive effect of "two monopolies". The joint effect of the above factors leads to the failure of government supervision. The fourth chapter is intended to put forward a perfect proposal for the government supervision system in the public and private cooperative system. From the discussion of the basic concept of government supervision, the concept of "flexible supervision" is first put forward, that is, under the cooperation framework of public and private cooperation, government supervision should abandon compulsory and administrative supervision means, and transfer the supervision in a negotiable and marketable way, and it puts forward the idea of "incentive supervision", that is, in flexible supervision. The second section discusses the importance of identifying the independent status of the government regulators. The third section puts forward two specific measures for strengthening government supervision, including the construction of information disclosure system and the settlement of the third party disputes. The mechanism is implemented as an auxiliary means.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D630.9

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本文編號：1822678