本文選題：移動對等網絡 + 自私性��； 參考：《計算機科學與探索》2017年08期

【摘要】：內容由于移動對等網絡的自組織、開放性以及節(jié)點資源受限等特點,一些節(jié)點表現出其自私性或惡意性。針對該問題,給出了一種基于討價還價動態(tài)博弈的節(jié)點激勵策略DGBIS(incentive strategy based on dynamic game of bargaining in mobile P2P network)。該激勵策略采用虛擬貨幣的支付方式,節(jié)點先根據其擁有的虛擬貨幣量、自身資源狀態(tài)和消息屬性對每次消息轉發(fā)進行估價,然后交易雙方基于估價通過三次討價還價動態(tài)博弈以合理的報價進行交易。通過博弈分析給出了DGBIS策略的納什均衡解,使理性的自私節(jié)點為最大化其自身利益而積極參與消息轉發(fā)合作,同時能抑制惡意節(jié)點的虛假報價。分析與實驗結果表明,該激勵策略能提高整個系統(tǒng)的消息轉發(fā)成功率,降低系統(tǒng)的能量消耗,達到了預期的設計目標。
[Abstract]:Some nodes show selfishness or malice due to the characteristics of self-organization, openness and resource limitation of mobile peer-to-peer networks. In order to solve this problem, a node incentive strategy based on bargaining dynamic game (DGBISincentive strategy based on dynamic game of bargaining in mobile P2P network) is presented. The incentive strategy adopts the payment method of virtual currency. The node evaluates each message forwarding according to the amount of virtual currency, the status of its own resources and message attributes. Then the two parties trade on the basis of valuation through three bargaining dynamic games. The Nash equilibrium solution of the DGBIS strategy is given by game analysis, which makes the rational selfish node participate in the message forwarding cooperation in order to maximize its own interests, and at the same time it can restrain the false quotation of the malicious node. The analysis and experimental results show that the strategy can improve the success rate of message forwarding, reduce the energy consumption of the system and achieve the desired design goal.
【作者單位】： 湖南人文科技學院信息學院;中南大學信息科學與工程學院;湖南師范大學物理與信息科學學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金Nos.61572191,61571188 湖南省自然科學基金No.2017JJ2124 湖南省計算機應用技術重點建設學科資助項目~~
【分類號】：TP393.02
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本文編號：2040622