本文選題：互聯(lián)網(wǎng)監(jiān)管 + 路由器重定向　； 參考：《通信學(xué)報》2014年09期

【摘要】：Telex作為典型的路由器重定向型反監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)給互聯(lián)網(wǎng)監(jiān)管者帶來了新的挑戰(zhàn)。為幫助用戶逃避監(jiān)管,Telex利用路由器而非終端主機將用戶的網(wǎng)絡(luò)通信重定向到被屏蔽的目標(biāo)站點。從審查者角度分析了Telex系統(tǒng)的安全性,提出了2類利用主動攻擊破壞用戶隱私的新方法。第一類為DoS攻擊,利用了Telex握手協(xié)議的安全漏洞,在破壞系統(tǒng)可用性的同時還可能檢出用戶是否在使用Telex代理。同時給出了彌補該漏洞的改進協(xié)議。第二類稱為TCP分組旁路攻擊,利用非對稱路由或IP隧道技術(shù)令客戶端的部分TCP分組繞過路由器直達掩護站點,然后通過觀察上行數(shù)據(jù)流的重傳反應(yīng)判斷用戶是否在使用Telex代理。通過一系列原型系統(tǒng)實驗驗證了旁路攻擊的可行性。TCP分組旁路攻擊也適用于其他路由器重定向型反監(jiān)管系統(tǒng)。
[Abstract]:As a typical router redirected anti-regulation system, Telex brings new challenges to Internet regulators. To help users escape regulation Telex uses routers rather than terminal hosts to redirect users' network traffic to blocked target sites. This paper analyzes the security of Telex system from the perspective of censors, and proposes two new methods to destroy user privacy by active attack. The first is a DoS attack, which exploits the security vulnerability of the Telex handshake protocol and may detect whether the user is using the Telex proxy while destroying the system availability. At the same time, an improved protocol is given to remedy this loophole. The second is called TCP packet bypass attack, which uses asymmetric routing or IP tunneling technology to make part of the TCP packet bypass the router to the cover station, and then determines whether the user is using the Telex proxy by observing the retransmission reaction of the upstream data stream. The feasibility of bypass attack is verified by a series of prototype system experiments. TCP packet bypass attack is also suitable for other router redirected anti-supervision systems.
【作者單位】： 西安電子科技大學(xué)計算機學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項目(61101142) 中央高�；究蒲谢鹳Y助項目(K50510030012)~~
【分類號】：TP393.08

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1 王萬興;誘捕路由型的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)反審查系統(tǒng)安全性研究[D];西安電子科技大學(xué);2013年

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