本文選題：零售商驅(qū)動(dòng) + Stackelberg博弈　； 參考：《山東理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái),隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展,行業(yè)間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)愈加激烈,人們對(duì)社會(huì)環(huán)境保護(hù)意識(shí)的不斷提高,以及對(duì)社會(huì)資源可持續(xù)發(fā)展認(rèn)識(shí)的不斷深入,制造型企業(yè)越來(lái)越重視對(duì)于廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收及再制造。然而,由于客戶需求變化多樣及市場(chǎng)需求極不穩(wěn)定,市場(chǎng)供需關(guān)系由賣方市場(chǎng)不斷向買方市場(chǎng)轉(zhuǎn)移,使得零售商在閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中占據(jù)越來(lái)越重要的地位,閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中的主導(dǎo)權(quán)開(kāi)始由制造商向零售商轉(zhuǎn)移,因此零售商驅(qū)動(dòng)型閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈越來(lái)越受到大家的重視,逐漸成為研究熱點(diǎn)。由于閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈各成員之間通常獨(dú)立決策自己的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng),相互之間有著各自不同的利益,同時(shí)在相互合作過(guò)程中有著不同的運(yùn)作目標(biāo)。因此閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈在運(yùn)作過(guò)程中效率低下,整體利潤(rùn)偏低,處于失調(diào)狀態(tài),那么引入收入共享契約對(duì)于零售商處于驅(qū)動(dòng)地位的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈能夠起到良好的協(xié)調(diào)作用。本文在此思想的基礎(chǔ)上,從由零售商、制造商、專業(yè)第三方回收物流企業(yè)(3P)及消費(fèi)者組成的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈入手,針對(duì)如何合理使用相關(guān)契約使得第三方回收再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)的問(wèn)題,應(yīng)用博弈論等相關(guān)理論研究在確定性市場(chǎng)需求(市場(chǎng)需求是產(chǎn)品銷售價(jià)的線性函數(shù))下零售商驅(qū)動(dòng)型閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作模型,對(duì)于閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈各成員的決策行為用收益共享契約進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào),得出該契約的適用范圍。通過(guò)研究,對(duì)各種情況下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈參與主體的決策行為、運(yùn)行規(guī)律進(jìn)行歸納總結(jié);同時(shí)對(duì)如何有效進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈,提高閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈整體競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)提供理論指導(dǎo),因此具有一定的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, the competition between industries is becoming more and more fierce, people's awareness of social environmental protection has been improved, and the understanding of the sustainable development of social resources has been deepened. Manufacturing enterprises pay more and more attention to recycling and remanufacturing of used products. However, due to the variety of customer demand and the instability of market demand, the relationship between supply and demand in the market is constantly transferred from the seller's market to the buyer's market, which makes retailers play a more and more important role in the closed-loop supply chain. The leading power in the closed-loop supply chain begins to shift from manufacturer to retailer, so the retailer driven closed-loop supply chain is paid more and more attention to, and gradually becomes the research hotspot. Because the members of the closed-loop supply chain usually make independent decisions on their own economic activities, they have different interests and different operational objectives in the process of mutual cooperation. Therefore, the closed-loop supply chain is inefficient, the whole profit is on the low side, and it is in the state of imbalance, so the introduction of revenue-sharing contract can play a good coordinating role in the closed-loop supply chain, which is driven by retailers. Based on this idea, this paper starts with the closed-loop supply chain composed of retailers, manufacturers, professional third-party recycling logistics enterprises and consumers. In order to solve the problem of how to make use of the relevant contracts reasonably to coordinate the third party recycling and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, Based on the game theory and other relevant theories, this paper studies the retailer driven closed-loop supply chain operation model under deterministic market demand (which is a linear function of product sales price). The decision behavior of the members of the closed-loop supply chain is coordinated by the revenue-sharing contract, and the applicable scope of the contract is obtained. Through the research, the decision-making behavior and operation law of the participants in the closed-loop supply chain under various circumstances are summarized, and the theoretical guidance on how to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain effectively and improve the overall competitive advantage of the closed-loop supply chain is provided. Therefore, it has certain theoretical and practical significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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本文編號(hào)：1910053