發(fā)布時間：2018-01-18 16:04

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：電子商務(wù)環(huán)境下的最優(yōu)雙渠道設(shè)計及協(xié)調(diào)　出處：《青島大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 消費者選擇理論 Stackalberg博弈理論 委托代理理論 渠道選擇及協(xié)調(diào) 契約設(shè)計

【摘要】：互聯(lián)網(wǎng)及物流產(chǎn)業(yè)的迅速升溫,不斷的改變著社會的經(jīng)營管理模式,大量的傳統(tǒng)型企業(yè)開始緊跟時代的步伐,探索開辟網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道,而這一渠道的開辟,一方面拓寬了消費者范圍,另一方面也給傳統(tǒng)渠道帶來了極大的沖擊。機遇與挑戰(zhàn)并存,如何抓住機遇,在競爭激烈的社會環(huán)境中存活,獲得自身乃至整個供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找娴淖畲蠡?成為了現(xiàn)實企業(yè)與學(xué)術(shù)界共同關(guān)注的熱點。本文概括了國內(nèi)外學(xué)者關(guān)于以下三個方面的研究現(xiàn)狀:渠道選擇及定價,渠道沖突及協(xié)調(diào),信息不對稱下的突變,從而分析了在Stackalberg博弈模式下,主導(dǎo)型制造商與零售商在不同情況下的渠道選擇策略,并針對其中的零售商雙渠道模式設(shè)計了相應(yīng)的收益共享契約,以實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找孀畲蠡?同時,針對主導(dǎo)型零售商與小型制造商在合作過程中經(jīng)常出現(xiàn)的,生產(chǎn)成本突變的情況,設(shè)計出最優(yōu)雙渠道銷售價格及需求量契約,從而激勵制造商更好的配合自身活動,獲得更高收益。具體的研究內(nèi)容及結(jié)論列示如下:(1)針對四種不同的渠道模式:傳統(tǒng)零售單渠道模式、制造商雙渠道模式、零售商雙渠道一致定價與單獨定價模式,建立了博弈模型,通過對所建模型的分析,比較了各參與主體及整個供應(yīng)鏈的收益,給出了制造商與零售商開辟網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷渠道的條件。同時,針對其中的零售商雙渠道模式,研究了制造商與零售商的均衡策略,并設(shè)計了收益共享合同,即制造商以較低的批發(fā)價格給零售商提供商品,而作為補償,零售商將自身收益按一定比例分享給制造商。研究表明,該收益共享合同能夠充分的協(xié)調(diào)各分銷渠道,從而使供應(yīng)鏈上的各參與方收益增加。(2)針對由單一制造商與單一零售商組成的大型零售商為主導(dǎo)的零售商雙渠道模式,利用委托代理模型,分別研究了無生產(chǎn)成本變動、制造商生產(chǎn)成本變動且信息對稱與信息不對稱三種情況下的最優(yōu)渠道策略,從而分析了生產(chǎn)成本信息對于整個供應(yīng)鏈績效的價值。研究結(jié)果表明,零售商制定的渠道策略具有魯棒性,只有當(dāng)生產(chǎn)成本變動幅度較大的情況下,才會引起零售商渠道策略的變化;同時制造商的生產(chǎn)成本信息私有,一定會導(dǎo)致零售商收益的降低,但是未必會引起整個供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)收益的變化。
[Abstract]:The rapid warming of the Internet and logistics industry, constantly changing the social management model, a large number of traditional enterprises began to follow the pace of the times, explore the development of network direct marketing channels, and the opening of this channel. On the one hand, it widens the scope of consumers, on the other hand, it brings great impact to the traditional channels. Opportunities and challenges coexist, how to seize the opportunities and survive in the competitive social environment. To maximize the profit of the supply chain itself and the whole supply chain has become a common concern of real enterprises and academia. This paper summarizes the domestic and foreign scholars on the following three aspects of research: Channel selection and pricing. The channel conflict and coordination, the abrupt change under the information asymmetry, thus analyzed under the Stackalberg game pattern, the dominant manufacturer and the retailer in the different situation channel choice strategy. In order to maximize the profit of the supply chain, the corresponding revenue sharing contract is designed for the retailers' dual-channel mode. At the same time, aiming at the situation that the leading retailer and the small manufacturer often appear in the process of cooperation, and the production cost changes, we design the optimal double-channel sales price and demand contract. In order to encourage manufacturers to better cooperate with their own activities to achieve higher returns. Specific research content and conclusions are listed below: 1) aiming at four different channels: the traditional retail single channel model. Based on the model of manufacturer double channel, retailer double channel consistent pricing and individual pricing, the game model is established. Through the analysis of the established model, the profit of each participant and the whole supply chain is compared. At the same time, the equilibrium strategy between manufacturer and retailer is studied, and the profit sharing contract is designed. In other words, the manufacturer supplies the goods to the retailer at a lower wholesale price, and as a compensation, the retailer shares their income to the manufacturer in a certain proportion. The revenue-sharing contract can fully coordinate the distribution channels. In order to increase the income of each participant in the supply chain, we use the principal-agent model to solve the double-channel model of retailers, which is dominated by a large retailer composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The optimal channel strategy is studied under the condition of no change of production cost, change of manufacturer's production cost and information symmetry and information asymmetry. The results show that the channel strategy made by retailers is robust only if the range of production costs is large. Only then will the retailer channel strategy change; At the same time, the private production cost information of the manufacturer will definitely lead to the decrease of the retailer's income, but it will not necessarily lead to the change of the whole supply chain system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：青島大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274;F721

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