本文關(guān)鍵詞：需求不確定環(huán)境下制造企業(yè)與零售商的供應(yīng)鏈契約研究　出處：《中國海洋大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) 契約協(xié)調(diào)機制 利潤共享契約 需求不確定

【摘要】：在當(dāng)今時代,科技的進(jìn)步和經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展使企業(yè)擁有了更多機遇的同時,也感受到了前所未有的競爭壓力,快節(jié)奏的市場變化和多樣化的用戶需求都使得企業(yè)需要對市場迅速做出響應(yīng)。在這個過程中,人們?nèi)諠u認(rèn)識到供應(yīng)鏈管理的重要性,只依靠單個企業(yè)的力量難以在競爭環(huán)境中生存,越來越多的企業(yè)把目光放在了供應(yīng)鏈上,企業(yè)之間的競爭已經(jīng)演變成了供應(yīng)鏈之間的競爭,良好的供應(yīng)鏈管理可以通過整合和優(yōu)化物流、信息流、資金流等方式使信息被供應(yīng)鏈上的成員企業(yè)共享,供應(yīng)鏈管理強調(diào)的是合作而非競爭。但是供應(yīng)鏈在運作的過程中會遇到一些問題,一方面,供應(yīng)鏈上的成員企業(yè)是不同的經(jīng)濟(jì)實體,都想要追求自身利益的最大化,往往會與供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的整體目標(biāo)產(chǎn)生沖突；另一方面,供應(yīng)鏈本身是一個復(fù)雜的網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu),而且具有動態(tài)性。所以供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題成為了研究的重點,人們希望在供應(yīng)鏈運作的過程中,通過有效的協(xié)調(diào)機制來為供應(yīng)鏈創(chuàng)造競爭優(yōu)勢。在各種協(xié)調(diào)機制中,供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)機制是一種能夠有效協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈的方法,契約對每位成員企業(yè)的行為做出規(guī)定,對從訂貨到交貨這個流程中的每一個環(huán)節(jié)都進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格的管理,約束成員的行為,保證供應(yīng)鏈在良好有效運作的同時,能夠提升競爭優(yōu)勢,創(chuàng)造更多的收益。本文正是基于這種背景,運用斯坦克爾伯格博弈理論等方法對制造企業(yè)和零售商的利潤共享契約進(jìn)行了研究。首先,在需求不確定的環(huán)境下,構(gòu)建了一個由單一制造商和單一零售商組成的二級供應(yīng)鏈,制造商是主導(dǎo)企業(yè),零售商占從屬地位,先研究普通契約下的各方收益等情況,然后引入利潤分配系數(shù),研究在利潤共享契約下的各方收益等情況,同時進(jìn)行數(shù)值模擬,進(jìn)而將兩種情況進(jìn)行對比,得出在此情況下,合理的利潤共享契約設(shè)計可以提高各方收益、增強供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)性的結(jié)論。隨即為了更貼近實際情況,把單一零售商擴(kuò)展到多零售商的情況,研究普通契約和利潤共享契約兩種情況下的各方收益等情況,進(jìn)行數(shù)值模擬,將兩種契約的情況進(jìn)行比較分析,得出在多零售商的情況下,合理的利潤共享契約設(shè)計同樣可以有效增加各方收益、協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈的結(jié)論。最后,描述了利潤共享契約如何在實際的企業(yè)中應(yīng)用。本文的創(chuàng)新之處有兩點,一是設(shè)計了需求不確定環(huán)境下的利潤共享契約模型,研究契約實施后產(chǎn)品訂購量、銷售價格以及供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)和各成員企業(yè)的收益等情況,二是構(gòu)建了以制造商為主導(dǎo)企業(yè)的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu),把與制造企業(yè)合作的零售商數(shù)量從單個擴(kuò)展到多個,引入“零售商數(shù)量”這個變量,研究零售商數(shù)量的變化對供應(yīng)鏈及成員企業(yè)收益等情況的影響。
[Abstract]:In today's era, the progress of science and technology and economic development make enterprises have more opportunities, but also feel the unprecedented competitive pressure. Rapid market changes and diverse user needs make enterprises need to respond to the market quickly. In this process, people increasingly realize the importance of supply chain management. Relying on the strength of a single enterprise, it is difficult to survive in the competitive environment. More and more enterprises focus on the supply chain, the competition between enterprises has evolved into the competition between the supply chain. Good supply chain management can integrate and optimize logistics, information flow, capital flow and other ways to enable information to be shared by member enterprises in the supply chain. Supply chain management emphasizes cooperation rather than competition, but the supply chain will encounter some problems in the process of operation. On the one hand, the member enterprises in the supply chain are different economic entities. All want to pursue the maximization of their own interests, often conflict with the overall goal of the supply chain system; On the other hand, supply chain itself is a complex network structure and dynamic, so supply chain coordination has become the focus of research, people hope in the process of supply chain operation. Through effective coordination mechanism to create a competitive advantage for the supply chain. Among all kinds of coordination mechanisms, supply chain contract coordination mechanism is a method to effectively coordinate the supply chain. The contract provides for the behavior of each member enterprise, and strictly manages every link in the process from ordering to delivery, constraining the behavior of the member, and ensuring the supply chain to operate well and effectively at the same time. Based on this background, this paper studies the profit sharing contract between manufacturing enterprises and retailers by using the method of Steinkerberg game theory. In the environment of uncertain demand, a two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is constructed. The manufacturer is the leading enterprise and the retailer plays a subordinate role. This paper first studies the situation of the parties' income under the ordinary contract, then introduces the profit distribution coefficient, studies the situation of the parties' income under the profit-sharing contract, and carries on the numerical simulation at the same time, and then compares the two kinds of situations. In this case, reasonable profit sharing contract design can improve the income of all parties, enhance the coordination of the supply chain. Then in order to be closer to the actual situation, the single retailer will be extended to the situation of multiple retailers. Study the general contract and profit sharing contract under the two circumstances of the income of the parties and other situations, numerical simulation, the two contracts are compared and analyzed, the case in the case of multiple retailers. Reasonable design of profit-sharing contract can also effectively increase the benefit of all parties and coordinate the conclusion of supply chain. Finally, it describes how the profit-sharing contract is applied in practical enterprises. There are two innovations in this paper. The first is to design a profit-sharing contract model under uncertain demand environment, and to study the quantity of products ordered, the sales price and the income of the supply chain system and each member enterprise after the implementation of the contract. The second is to construct the supply chain structure with manufacturer as the leading enterprise, expand the number of retailers cooperating with manufacturing enterprise from single to multiple, and introduce the variable of "the number of retailers". To study the influence of retailer number on supply chain and profit of member enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F274

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