地方政府財政競爭的生產(chǎn)要素空間配置效應(yīng)研究
發(fā)布時間：2019-01-28 20:44
【摘要】：中國的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長奇跡令世界矚目,然而在高速增長背后卻始終無法找到與之相匹配的生產(chǎn)效率的提高。對這一問題的解答,勢必要深入到中國經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革的本質(zhì)以及與之相伴的政治制度中進(jìn)行探討。在中國的政府主導(dǎo)型市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體制中,地方政府被賦予了干預(yù)經(jīng)濟(jì)的巨大能力和空間。同時,在中國政治集權(quán)與財政分權(quán)共存的特殊治理結(jié)構(gòu)下,對于政治利益和經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的激烈競爭又激發(fā)了地方政府干預(yù)市場經(jīng)濟(jì)運行的強烈動機。在這種情況下,地方政府利用財政政策工具和行政管理手段持續(xù)干預(yù)生產(chǎn)要素配置,已成為生產(chǎn)要素配置的準(zhǔn)市場主體。然而,目前學(xué)術(shù)界對于中國地方政府競爭行為對生產(chǎn)要素流動及配置的影響尚未給予充分關(guān)注,對于地方政府財政競爭的相關(guān)研究仍舊停留在其存在性檢驗及其經(jīng)濟(jì)增長效應(yīng)方面。這一研究現(xiàn)狀嚴(yán)重脫離了中國地方政府干預(yù)要素配置進(jìn)而主導(dǎo)市場經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的現(xiàn)實特征。本文針對中國持續(xù)存在的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長高速低效的實際問題和現(xiàn)有地方政府財政競爭相關(guān)研究中的不足,理論與實證相結(jié)合的探討了地方政府財政競爭對于資本和勞動兩種流動性生產(chǎn)要素空間配置的影響,為解釋中國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長高速低效問題的成因、并為在體制改革和制度優(yōu)化的視角下尋找高效經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的途徑提供一定的理論支持和現(xiàn)實指導(dǎo)。本文首先分析了資本和勞動力流動的特點,探討了區(qū)域要素稟賦差異、要素價格差異、要素聚集與區(qū)位優(yōu)勢等市場因素以及政府宏觀調(diào)控對這兩種基本生產(chǎn)要素空間流動與配置的影響機制。在此基礎(chǔ)上,以中國231個地級市28年間的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)面板數(shù)據(jù)為基礎(chǔ),本文利用空間面板計量模型,對中國市級地方政府稅收競爭和財政支出競爭的行為特征及時空差異進(jìn)行了實證分析和量化描述,并借鑒Jeffrey Wurgler思想對中國各省的資本和勞動力的空間配置效率進(jìn)行合理測算。在此基礎(chǔ)上,從生產(chǎn)要素空間配置數(shù)量和空間配置效率兩個角度實證分析了中國市級地方政府在增值稅、企業(yè)所得稅、經(jīng)濟(jì)性支出和社會性支出等主要財政項目上的財政競爭行為對資本和勞動力的空間配置產(chǎn)生的影響,揭示了這一影響在改革開放初期和近年間呈現(xiàn)的顯著差異,并結(jié)合中國政治治理特征和財政體制改革背景深入剖析這一影響及其演化的形成機制。最后,結(jié)合中國地方政府財政競爭的行為特征,分析了近年來中國地方政府財政競爭對資本和勞動力空間配置效率產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響的制度性根源。并針對性的提出建立過度競爭的懲罰機制、建立服務(wù)型政府績效考核機制和加強地方政府合作三個方面的政策建議。
[Abstract]:The miracle of China's economic growth has attracted the attention of the world, but it has never been possible to find a corresponding increase in production efficiency behind the rapid growth. The answer to this question is bound to go deep into the nature of China's economic system reform and the accompanying political system. In China's government-oriented market economy system, local governments have been given a huge capacity and space to intervene in the economy. At the same time, under the special governance structure of the coexistence of political centralization and fiscal decentralization, the fierce competition for political and economic interests arouses the strong motivation of local government to intervene in the operation of market economy. In this case, the local government continuously interferes with the allocation of production factors by means of fiscal policy tools and administrative means, and has become the quasi-market subject of the allocation of production factors. However, at present, the academic circles have not paid enough attention to the influence of the competitive behavior of Chinese local governments on the flow and allocation of factors of production. The research on local government financial competition is still focused on its existence test and its economic growth effect. The present situation of this study is seriously divorced from the realistic characteristics of local government intervention in China and then dominating the development of market economy. This paper aims at the existing problems of high speed and low efficiency of economic growth in China and the deficiency of the existing research on the financial competition of local governments. This paper discusses the influence of local government financial competition on the spatial allocation of two kinds of liquidity production factors, capital and labor, in order to explain the causes of the problem of high speed and low efficiency of China's economic growth. It also provides some theoretical support and practical guidance for finding the way of efficient economic growth from the perspective of system reform and system optimization. This paper first analyzes the characteristics of capital and labor flow, discusses the regional factor endowment differences, factor price differences, The market factors such as factor agglomeration and location advantage, and the influence mechanism of government macro-control on the spatial flow and allocation of these two basic factors of production. On this basis, based on the macroeconomic panel data of 231 prefecture-level cities in China for 28 years, this paper uses the spatial panel metrological model. This paper makes an empirical analysis and quantitative description of the behavioral characteristics and space-time differences of tax and fiscal expenditure competition among local governments in China, and calculates reasonably the spatial allocation efficiency of capital and labor force in all provinces of China by using the idea of Jeffrey Wurgler. On this basis, this paper empirically analyzes the value added tax (VAT) and enterprise income tax (EIT) of local governments in China from the aspects of the quantity of spatial allocation of factors of production and the efficiency of spatial allocation. The influence of financial competition behavior on capital and labor force allocation in the main financial items, such as economic expenditure and social expenditure, reveals the significant differences between the initial and recent years of reform and opening up. Combined with the characteristics of Chinese political governance and the background of financial system reform, this influence and its evolution mechanism are deeply analyzed. Finally, based on the behavioral characteristics of local government financial competition in China, this paper analyzes the institutional causes of the negative effects of local government financial competition on the efficiency of capital and labor spatial allocation in recent years. It also puts forward three policy suggestions: establishing excessive competition punishment mechanism, establishing service-oriented government performance appraisal mechanism and strengthening local government cooperation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D630;F812.2
本文編號：2417302
[Abstract]:The miracle of China's economic growth has attracted the attention of the world, but it has never been possible to find a corresponding increase in production efficiency behind the rapid growth. The answer to this question is bound to go deep into the nature of China's economic system reform and the accompanying political system. In China's government-oriented market economy system, local governments have been given a huge capacity and space to intervene in the economy. At the same time, under the special governance structure of the coexistence of political centralization and fiscal decentralization, the fierce competition for political and economic interests arouses the strong motivation of local government to intervene in the operation of market economy. In this case, the local government continuously interferes with the allocation of production factors by means of fiscal policy tools and administrative means, and has become the quasi-market subject of the allocation of production factors. However, at present, the academic circles have not paid enough attention to the influence of the competitive behavior of Chinese local governments on the flow and allocation of factors of production. The research on local government financial competition is still focused on its existence test and its economic growth effect. The present situation of this study is seriously divorced from the realistic characteristics of local government intervention in China and then dominating the development of market economy. This paper aims at the existing problems of high speed and low efficiency of economic growth in China and the deficiency of the existing research on the financial competition of local governments. This paper discusses the influence of local government financial competition on the spatial allocation of two kinds of liquidity production factors, capital and labor, in order to explain the causes of the problem of high speed and low efficiency of China's economic growth. It also provides some theoretical support and practical guidance for finding the way of efficient economic growth from the perspective of system reform and system optimization. This paper first analyzes the characteristics of capital and labor flow, discusses the regional factor endowment differences, factor price differences, The market factors such as factor agglomeration and location advantage, and the influence mechanism of government macro-control on the spatial flow and allocation of these two basic factors of production. On this basis, based on the macroeconomic panel data of 231 prefecture-level cities in China for 28 years, this paper uses the spatial panel metrological model. This paper makes an empirical analysis and quantitative description of the behavioral characteristics and space-time differences of tax and fiscal expenditure competition among local governments in China, and calculates reasonably the spatial allocation efficiency of capital and labor force in all provinces of China by using the idea of Jeffrey Wurgler. On this basis, this paper empirically analyzes the value added tax (VAT) and enterprise income tax (EIT) of local governments in China from the aspects of the quantity of spatial allocation of factors of production and the efficiency of spatial allocation. The influence of financial competition behavior on capital and labor force allocation in the main financial items, such as economic expenditure and social expenditure, reveals the significant differences between the initial and recent years of reform and opening up. Combined with the characteristics of Chinese political governance and the background of financial system reform, this influence and its evolution mechanism are deeply analyzed. Finally, based on the behavioral characteristics of local government financial competition in China, this paper analyzes the institutional causes of the negative effects of local government financial competition on the efficiency of capital and labor spatial allocation in recent years. It also puts forward three policy suggestions: establishing excessive competition punishment mechanism, establishing service-oriented government performance appraisal mechanism and strengthening local government cooperation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D630;F812.2
【相似文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條
1 王瑋,薛彥萍;現(xiàn)代化進(jìn)程與人力資源空間配置的優(yōu)化[J];山東省青年管理干部學(xué)院學(xué)報;1999年05期
相關(guān)重要報紙文章 前1條
1 川報集團(tuán)特派記者 李旭;時間空間配置更科學(xué)更合理[N];四川日報;2013年
相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前2條
1 陳艷華;丘陵山區(qū)耕作層剝離再利用空間配置研究[D];南京大學(xué);2015年
2 梁河;地方政府財政競爭的生產(chǎn)要素空間配置效應(yīng)研究[D];哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué);2015年
相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條
1 拜靜雅;北京城六區(qū)中小學(xué)校空間配置及其優(yōu)化研究[D];首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2015年
，本文編號：2417302
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/shuishoucaizhenglunwen/2417302.html
最近更新
教材專著
