鄰里競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、財(cái)政分權(quán)與政府財(cái)政支出偏向研究——基于三層分權(quán)框架的角度
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-26 07:26
【摘要】：通過(guò)利用空間面板Durbi n模型,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了中國(guó)省及省以下財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)財(cái)政支出偏向政策的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),總體上,省級(jí)財(cái)政分權(quán)促使地方政府增加了基本建設(shè)性支出比重,而減少了社會(huì)發(fā)展性支出的比重,省以下財(cái)政分權(quán)對(duì)財(cái)政支出結(jié)構(gòu)效應(yīng)則正好相反。相鄰地區(qū)GDP增長(zhǎng)率的提高,促使地方政府增加基本建設(shè)性支出比重,而降低社會(huì)發(fā)展性支出比重。地方政府在財(cái)政支出競(jìng)爭(zhēng)上同時(shí)出現(xiàn)了攀比效應(yīng)和逐底競(jìng)爭(zhēng)效應(yīng)。因此,糾正地方政府支出偏向政策,必須推動(dòng)政府績(jī)效考評(píng)體系改革和財(cái)政體制改革。
[Abstract]:By using the spatial panel Durbi n model, this paper empirically examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on the policy of fiscal expenditure bias in China. It is found that, on the whole, provincial fiscal decentralization promotes the local government to increase the proportion of capital construction expenditure, but reduces the proportion of social development expenditure, but the effect of fiscal decentralization on the structure of fiscal expenditure is just the opposite. The increase of GDP growth rate in neighboring regions urges local governments to increase the proportion of capital construction expenditure and reduce the proportion of social development expenditure. At the same time, the local government in the financial expenditure competition has the effect of comparison and bottom-down competition. Therefore, to correct the policy of local government expenditure bias, we must promote the reform of government performance appraisal system and fiscal system.
【作者單位】： 華南理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目“空間統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)在中國(guó)城市和區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展格局及演變規(guī)律研究中的應(yīng)用”(12CTJ009) 教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“省管縣財(cái)政體制背景下省以下財(cái)政分權(quán)、轉(zhuǎn)移支付對(duì)縣域政府行為影響實(shí)證研究”(12YJC790125)
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45
[Abstract]:By using the spatial panel Durbi n model, this paper empirically examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on the policy of fiscal expenditure bias in China. It is found that, on the whole, provincial fiscal decentralization promotes the local government to increase the proportion of capital construction expenditure, but reduces the proportion of social development expenditure, but the effect of fiscal decentralization on the structure of fiscal expenditure is just the opposite. The increase of GDP growth rate in neighboring regions urges local governments to increase the proportion of capital construction expenditure and reduce the proportion of social development expenditure. At the same time, the local government in the financial expenditure competition has the effect of comparison and bottom-down competition. Therefore, to correct the policy of local government expenditure bias, we must promote the reform of government performance appraisal system and fiscal system.
【作者單位】： 華南理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目“空間統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)在中國(guó)城市和區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展格局及演變規(guī)律研究中的應(yīng)用”(12CTJ009) 教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“省管縣財(cái)政體制背景下省以下財(cái)政分權(quán)、轉(zhuǎn)移支付對(duì)縣域政府行為影響實(shí)證研究”(12YJC790125)
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
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