基于BOOST模式的已建社區(qū)養(yǎng)老設(shè)施補貼定價機制研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-10-16 21:13
【摘要】：隨著中國老齡化問題的凸顯,養(yǎng)老設(shè)施供給嚴重不足,但由政府投資進行養(yǎng)老設(shè)施開發(fā)會帶給政府巨大的財政壓力,政府亟需引入社會資本參與其開發(fā),政企合作進行養(yǎng)老設(shè)施開發(fā)已成為趨勢。在已建社區(qū)配套開發(fā)養(yǎng)老設(shè)施是解決社區(qū)養(yǎng)老問題的有效途徑,其依托社區(qū)資源并直接服務于社區(qū)老年群體的開發(fā)方式針對性強。然而,由于養(yǎng)老設(shè)施的低收益性,私營機構(gòu)不一定能通過運營養(yǎng)老設(shè)施獲取目標利潤,政府的補貼就成為了影響?zhàn)B老設(shè)施持續(xù)供給的關(guān)鍵。在此基礎(chǔ)上,本文立足于公共政策視角,深入分析了基于BOOST的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施開發(fā)模式,構(gòu)建了養(yǎng)老設(shè)施補貼定價模型,以實現(xiàn)各參與方的利益均衡,保障養(yǎng)老設(shè)施社會福利性的同時保持其供給的穩(wěn)定性,推動養(yǎng)老設(shè)施開發(fā)的持續(xù)健康發(fā)展。首先,分析了養(yǎng)老設(shè)施BOOST模式的融資結(jié)構(gòu)及其開發(fā)流程,并從政府財政、社會資本投資和私營機構(gòu)融資的角度出發(fā),對BOOST開發(fā)動因及開發(fā)效用進行闡述。同時,對作為“管制者”的政府及由開發(fā)商、投資商和運營商組成的私營機構(gòu)進行職能分析。在此基礎(chǔ)上,分析了BOOST模式的運作條件及運作思路,設(shè)計了“改造+新建”的運作模式,該模式有效降低了私營機構(gòu)開發(fā)成本,進而降低養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價格。其次,基于市場供需理論、社會保障理論和“帕累托最優(yōu)”理論對養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價值形成進行分析,梳理了基于項目成本、項目期望收益和項目實際收益的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價格構(gòu)成,厘清了政府對養(yǎng)老設(shè)施項目的補貼構(gòu)成。在此基礎(chǔ)上,采用以二部定價法為主的成本導向定價法和支付能力導向定價法,結(jié)合養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價格構(gòu)成中的補償性收益,構(gòu)建了養(yǎng)老設(shè)施BOOST模式綜合定價模型。在養(yǎng)老設(shè)施定價的基礎(chǔ)上,分別構(gòu)建政府對私營機構(gòu)的一次性床位補貼、基于公正報酬率定價的運營補貼及經(jīng)營性養(yǎng)老服務補貼模型,結(jié)合政府對老年用戶補貼模型,綜合構(gòu)建了政府對養(yǎng)老設(shè)施項目補貼定價模型。再次,養(yǎng)老設(shè)施以保障老年用戶基本養(yǎng)老權(quán)益為根本目的,為了避免私營機構(gòu)提高養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價格,設(shè)定了養(yǎng)老設(shè)施低價規(guī)制策略及補貼修正模型;基于不完全信息靜態(tài)博弈理論,分別對私營機構(gòu)和政府進行低價規(guī)制策略分析,厘清了低價規(guī)制的實施手段和激勵作用;基于低價規(guī)制建立私營機構(gòu)三級成本績效評估體系,構(gòu)建以成本績效規(guī)制為導向的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施補貼修正模型。最后,以徐州市奎園社區(qū)養(yǎng)老服務項目為原型,結(jié)合研究中的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施定價模型及補貼定價模型進行實證了分析。實證研究得出BOOST模式下運作的養(yǎng)老設(shè)施價格處于徐州市養(yǎng)老市場的較低水平,能有效保障養(yǎng)老用戶的基本養(yǎng)老權(quán)益。政府對私營機構(gòu)的經(jīng)濟補貼使其能獲取目標利潤,政府對老年用戶的補貼進一步保障其養(yǎng)老權(quán)益。
[Abstract]:With the aging problem in China, the supply of pension facilities is seriously insufficient, but the development of pension facilities invested by the government will bring huge financial pressure to the government. The government urgently needs to introduce social capital to participate in its development. Government-enterprise cooperation in the development of pension facilities has become a trend. Developing endowment facilities in established communities is an effective way to solve the problem of providing for the aged in the community, which relies on the resources of the community and serves the elderly groups in the community directly. However, due to the low profitability of pension facilities, private institutions may not be able to obtain the target profits through the operation of pension facilities. Government subsidies have become the key to the sustainable supply of pension facilities. On this basis, based on the perspective of public policy, this paper deeply analyzes the development model of pension facilities based on BOOST, and constructs the pricing model of pension facilities subsidies, in order to achieve the benefit balance of the participants. To ensure the social welfare of pension facilities and maintain the stability of their supply, promote the sustainable and healthy development of pension facilities. Firstly, this paper analyzes the financing structure and development process of BOOST model, and expounds the development motivation and utility of BOOST from the perspectives of government finance, social capital investment and private sector financing. At the same time, the government as a "regulator" and the private sector, composed of developers, investors and operators, are analyzed. On this basis, the operating conditions and operation ideas of BOOST mode are analyzed, and the operation mode of "reform and new construction" is designed, which effectively reduces the development cost of private institutions and then reduces the price of old-age facilities. Secondly, based on the theory of market supply and demand, social security theory and Pareto optimal theory, this paper analyzes the formation of the value of old-age facilities, combing the price structure of pension facilities based on project cost, project expected income and project actual income. It clarifies the composition of the government's subsidy to pension facilities. On this basis, a comprehensive pricing model of old-age facilities based on BOOST model is constructed by adopting the cost-oriented pricing method and the pay-ability oriented pricing method, which are mainly based on the two-part pricing method, and combined with the compensatory income in the price composition of the old-age facilities. On the basis of the pricing of old-age facilities, the one-off bed subsidy, the operating subsidy based on fair rate of return and the operating pension service subsidy model are constructed, respectively, and combined with the government subsidy model for the elderly users. The model of government subsidy pricing for pension facilities is constructed. Thirdly, the basic purpose of the old-age facilities is to protect the basic rights and interests of the elderly users. In order to avoid the private sector to raise the price of pension facilities, the paper sets up the low-price regulation strategy and the subsidy revision model of the old-age facilities. Based on the static game theory of incomplete information, this paper analyzes the low price regulation strategy of private sector and government, and clarifies the implementation means and incentive function of low price regulation. Based on the low price regulation, the third level cost performance evaluation system of private sector is established. This paper constructs a revised model of pension facility subsidy based on cost performance regulation. Finally, based on the prototype of the community pension service project in Kuiyuan, Xuzhou City, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the pricing model of pension facilities and subsidy pricing model. Empirical research shows that the price of pension facilities operating under the BOOST model is at a low level of the pension market in Xuzhou, which can effectively protect the basic pension rights and interests of the aged users. Government subsidies to the private sector enable them to obtain targeted profits, and government subsidies to elderly users further protect their pension rights and interests.
【學位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F812.45;D669.6
本文編號：2275641
[Abstract]:With the aging problem in China, the supply of pension facilities is seriously insufficient, but the development of pension facilities invested by the government will bring huge financial pressure to the government. The government urgently needs to introduce social capital to participate in its development. Government-enterprise cooperation in the development of pension facilities has become a trend. Developing endowment facilities in established communities is an effective way to solve the problem of providing for the aged in the community, which relies on the resources of the community and serves the elderly groups in the community directly. However, due to the low profitability of pension facilities, private institutions may not be able to obtain the target profits through the operation of pension facilities. Government subsidies have become the key to the sustainable supply of pension facilities. On this basis, based on the perspective of public policy, this paper deeply analyzes the development model of pension facilities based on BOOST, and constructs the pricing model of pension facilities subsidies, in order to achieve the benefit balance of the participants. To ensure the social welfare of pension facilities and maintain the stability of their supply, promote the sustainable and healthy development of pension facilities. Firstly, this paper analyzes the financing structure and development process of BOOST model, and expounds the development motivation and utility of BOOST from the perspectives of government finance, social capital investment and private sector financing. At the same time, the government as a "regulator" and the private sector, composed of developers, investors and operators, are analyzed. On this basis, the operating conditions and operation ideas of BOOST mode are analyzed, and the operation mode of "reform and new construction" is designed, which effectively reduces the development cost of private institutions and then reduces the price of old-age facilities. Secondly, based on the theory of market supply and demand, social security theory and Pareto optimal theory, this paper analyzes the formation of the value of old-age facilities, combing the price structure of pension facilities based on project cost, project expected income and project actual income. It clarifies the composition of the government's subsidy to pension facilities. On this basis, a comprehensive pricing model of old-age facilities based on BOOST model is constructed by adopting the cost-oriented pricing method and the pay-ability oriented pricing method, which are mainly based on the two-part pricing method, and combined with the compensatory income in the price composition of the old-age facilities. On the basis of the pricing of old-age facilities, the one-off bed subsidy, the operating subsidy based on fair rate of return and the operating pension service subsidy model are constructed, respectively, and combined with the government subsidy model for the elderly users. The model of government subsidy pricing for pension facilities is constructed. Thirdly, the basic purpose of the old-age facilities is to protect the basic rights and interests of the elderly users. In order to avoid the private sector to raise the price of pension facilities, the paper sets up the low-price regulation strategy and the subsidy revision model of the old-age facilities. Based on the static game theory of incomplete information, this paper analyzes the low price regulation strategy of private sector and government, and clarifies the implementation means and incentive function of low price regulation. Based on the low price regulation, the third level cost performance evaluation system of private sector is established. This paper constructs a revised model of pension facility subsidy based on cost performance regulation. Finally, based on the prototype of the community pension service project in Kuiyuan, Xuzhou City, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the pricing model of pension facilities and subsidy pricing model. Empirical research shows that the price of pension facilities operating under the BOOST model is at a low level of the pension market in Xuzhou, which can effectively protect the basic pension rights and interests of the aged users. Government subsidies to the private sector enable them to obtain targeted profits, and government subsidies to elderly users further protect their pension rights and interests.
【學位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F812.45;D669.6
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