中央政府和地方政府生產(chǎn)性公共支出職責(zé)劃分的博弈分析
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-02-09 08:22
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 生產(chǎn)性公共支出 中央和地方政府公共支出職責(zé)劃分 動(dòng)態(tài)面板回歸 出處:《上海經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》2017年04期 論文類型:期刊論文
【摘要】:該文認(rèn)為,生產(chǎn)性公共支出與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率存在倒"U"型關(guān)系,雖然生產(chǎn)性公共服務(wù)有助于提高產(chǎn)出水平,但是當(dāng)支出過(guò)高時(shí),又會(huì)引起稅率提高,從而對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響,因此生產(chǎn)性公共支出存在最優(yōu)規(guī)模。不同經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)主體以及不同層級(jí)的政府有不同的目標(biāo)及行為模式,并且不同層級(jí)的政府在提供公共服務(wù)方面又各有利弊,中央政府需要在準(zhǔn)確預(yù)期這些行為模式及權(quán)衡利弊的基礎(chǔ)上劃分兩級(jí)政府提供生產(chǎn)性公共服務(wù)職責(zé),使其趨近于最優(yōu)規(guī)模。該文基于我國(guó)1995-2015年的涵蓋31個(gè)省份的面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析后發(fā)現(xiàn)我國(guó)的生產(chǎn)性公共支出與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)率呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,這啟示我們目前我國(guó)過(guò)度依賴GDP的官員政績(jī)考核指標(biāo)強(qiáng)化了地方政府?dāng)U大生產(chǎn)性開(kāi)支的內(nèi)在動(dòng)力,使之超越了最優(yōu)規(guī)模,也為進(jìn)一步劃分中央和地方政府的生產(chǎn)性公共服務(wù)供給職責(zé)提供了借鑒。
[Abstract]:The paper holds that productive public expenditure has an inverted "U" type relationship with economic growth rate. Although productive public services can help to improve the level of output, when the expenditure is too high, it will lead to higher tax rates, which will have a negative impact on economic growth. Therefore, there is an optimal scale of productive public expenditure. Different economic activity entities and different levels of government have different objectives and behavior patterns, and different levels of government have their own advantages and disadvantages in the provision of public services. The central government needs to divide the responsibilities of two levels of government to provide productive public services on the basis of accurately anticipating these patterns of behaviour and weighing the advantages and disadvantages. Based on the panel data of 31 provinces from 1995 to 2015 in China, we find that there is a negative correlation between the productive public expenditure and the economic growth rate. This enlightens us that the official performance assessment index, which is excessively dependent on GDP, has strengthened the internal power of local government to expand productive expenditure, and made it exceed the optimal scale. Also for the further division of central and local government responsibility for the supply of productive public services to provide reference.
【作者單位】: 北京大學(xué)中國(guó)公共財(cái)政研究中心;
【分類號(hào)】:F812.45;F224.32
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本文編號(hào):1497499
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