本文關(guān)鍵詞： 政府采購(gòu) 尋租 權(quán)利 個(gè)人利益　出處：《山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：尋租理論是二十世紀(jì)中期以后國(guó)外經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)術(shù)界內(nèi)討論非常激烈的話題之一，也是現(xiàn)今世界學(xué)者們極難以挑戰(zhàn)的一個(gè)學(xué)術(shù)領(lǐng)域，尋租活動(dòng)是普遍存在于以市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)為主的國(guó)家和轉(zhuǎn)軌期國(guó)家的一種經(jīng)濟(jì)行為及現(xiàn)象。由于當(dāng)前我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)正處于一個(gè)特殊的時(shí)期，因此尋租現(xiàn)象不可避免，尤其是權(quán)力尋租更是難以防范。其中，以公共資金進(jìn)行公共購(gòu)買(mǎi)的政府采購(gòu)領(lǐng)域中的尋租行為最為泛濫。 尋租行為是對(duì)現(xiàn)存利益再次分配的一種非生產(chǎn)性活動(dòng)，屬于經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中的負(fù)和博弈，它會(huì)扭曲市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的正常運(yùn)行、浪費(fèi)社會(huì)資源以及造成等等之類的后果。如果政府采購(gòu)中存在尋租行為，不僅會(huì)滋生腐敗，有損政府的良好形象，還可能導(dǎo)致政府采購(gòu)質(zhì)量的下降，甚至引發(fā)嚴(yán)重的安全事故。而政府采購(gòu)作為國(guó)家財(cái)政支出的一個(gè)重要分支，在一個(gè)國(guó)家社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)中的地位舉足輕重。因此，為了提高公共資金的使用效率、加強(qiáng)政府采購(gòu)的社會(huì)效益及完善政府采購(gòu)制度，有必要深入剖析政府采購(gòu)領(lǐng)域?qū)ぷ庑袨榈陌l(fā)生機(jī)制及研究抑制對(duì)策。 本文綜合了實(shí)證性分析方法和規(guī)范性研究方法，研究了我國(guó)政府采購(gòu)領(lǐng)域?qū)ぷ庑袨榈谋憩F(xiàn)形式及產(chǎn)生原因，并提出了具有針對(duì)性的防范對(duì)策。本文從政府采購(gòu)尋租的概念入手，對(duì)尋租及政府采購(gòu)的相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行了界定，并闡述了“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”假設(shè)理論、委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論及博弈理論，為政府采購(gòu)尋租問(wèn)題的深入研究做好了鋪墊。然后利用博弈模型對(duì)政府采購(gòu)中尋租行為的過(guò)程進(jìn)行了深層次的剖析，接著詳細(xì)分析了我國(guó)政府采購(gòu)的尋租現(xiàn)狀，并通過(guò)典型案例對(duì)上述分析進(jìn)行了論證及在此基礎(chǔ)上論述了政府采購(gòu)尋租行為的產(chǎn)生原因，最后結(jié)合全文分析，提出來(lái)防范我國(guó)政府采購(gòu)尋租行為的基本措施。
[Abstract]:Since the middle of 20th century, rent-seeking theory has been one of the most heated topics in foreign economic and academic circles, and it is also a very difficult academic field for scholars in the world to challenge. The rent-seeking activity is a kind of economic behavior and phenomenon which exists generally in the countries with market economy and transition period. Because our country's economy and society are in a special period at present, rent-seeking phenomenon is inevitable. Especially the power rent-seeking is more difficult to prevent, among which, the rent-seeking behavior is most widespread in the field of public purchase with public funds. Rent-seeking is a kind of non-productive activity which redistributes the existing benefits. It belongs to the negative sum game in the economic activities, and it will distort the normal operation of the market mechanism. If there is rent-seeking behavior in government procurement, it will not only breed corruption, damage the good image of the government, but also lead to the decline of the quality of government procurement. Government procurement, as an important branch of national financial expenditure, plays an important role in the social economy of a country. Therefore, in order to improve the efficiency of the use of public funds. It is necessary to analyze the mechanism of rent-seeking behavior in the field of government procurement and to study the countermeasures to restrain the social benefits of government procurement and to perfect the system of government procurement. This article synthesizes the positive analysis method and the normative research method, has studied our country government procurement domain rent-seeking behavior manifestation and the reason. This paper starts with the concept of rent-seeking in government procurement, defines the related concepts of rent-seeking and government procurement, and expounds the hypothesis of "economic man" and the principal-agent theory. Information asymmetry theory and game theory, for the government procurement rent-seeking problem to do a good job of in-depth research, and then the use of game model in government procurement rent-seeking behavior in-depth analysis. Then it analyzes the rent-seeking situation of our government procurement in detail, and through typical cases to demonstrate the above analysis and on this basis discusses the causes of rent-seeking behavior of government procurement, finally combined with the full text analysis. Put forward to prevent our government procurement rent-seeking behavior of the basic measures.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F812.45

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本文編號(hào)：1456772