本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國多級政府間財(cái)政不均衡性研究，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

        1994年我國實(shí)行了分稅制體制改革,國家對政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系重新進(jìn)行了調(diào)整,在政府間支出責(zé)任分配維持原有格局的的情況下,中央政府重新集中大部分財(cái)政收入,中國政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系由分稅制前的“收入分權(quán),支出分權(quán)”模式轉(zhuǎn)變成了“收入集權(quán),支出分權(quán)”模式。雖然分稅制改革有效的提高了財(cái)政收入“兩個比重”,增強(qiáng)了中央政府的宏觀調(diào)控能力,但是與此同時(shí),社會經(jīng)濟(jì)中也開始出現(xiàn)很多負(fù)面問題,如地方政府亂收費(fèi)現(xiàn)象趨于嚴(yán)重,農(nóng)民稅費(fèi)負(fù)擔(dān)不斷加重;縣鄉(xiāng)財(cái)政困難問題涌現(xiàn);地區(qū)差距和城鄉(xiāng)差距持續(xù)擴(kuò)大。認(rèn)清1994年的我國分稅制體制改革所產(chǎn)生的效應(yīng)以及現(xiàn)存體制中存在的問題,既關(guān)系到上述負(fù)面問題的有效解決,也關(guān)系到我國政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系的進(jìn)一步改革�；诖�,本文對1994年以來的中國政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系及其所產(chǎn)生的不均衡效應(yīng)進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)分析。論文通過對中國多級政府間財(cái)政收支結(jié)構(gòu)與發(fā)展趨勢的比較分析發(fā)現(xiàn),分稅制改革中央政府集中了大部分原本屬于基層政府的財(cái)政收入,并且省級財(cái)政也有收入集中趨勢,中央和省級財(cái)政收入的集中趨勢直接導(dǎo)致了地(市)和縣鄉(xiāng)財(cái)政的收入占有比例的下降。支出責(zé)任上維持原有格局,使得分稅制改革后我國中央與地方政府出現(xiàn)縱向財(cái)政不平衡現(xiàn)象,本文在縱向財(cái)政不平衡的傳統(tǒng)理論框架內(nèi)對我國縱向財(cái)政不平衡進(jìn)行了論證�；诳v向財(cái)政不平衡的傳統(tǒng)定義和漢特(Hunter)提出的測量方法,本文構(gòu)建了三個縱向財(cái)政不平衡系數(shù),對1994-2003年我國中央與地方財(cái)政縱向不平衡度進(jìn)行了測量,結(jié)果顯示分稅制后我國縱向財(cái)政不平衡度呈現(xiàn)擴(kuò)大趨勢。通過對各省縱向財(cái)政不平衡的測度發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)有的轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度并沒有縮小省級轄區(qū)之間的縱向財(cái)政不平衡度,反而加大了省際縱向財(cái)政不平衡度。通過對分稅制以來我國三大地區(qū)(東、中、西部)、省際間、縣級間橫向財(cái)政平衡情況的實(shí)證分析發(fā)現(xiàn),從人均財(cái)政收入角度看,我國轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度在縮小地區(qū)間與省際間的財(cái)力差距具有明顯作用,但是從人均財(cái)政支出角度看,轉(zhuǎn)移支付效果不理想;從縣級財(cái)政看,轉(zhuǎn)移支付不僅沒有起到縮小縣級財(cái)政的作用,反而起到相反的作用。由此可知,分稅制改革以來,不論從橫向,還是縱向來看,我國政府間財(cái)政都處于一種不均衡狀態(tài),而現(xiàn)有的轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度并不能有效矯正這種失衡狀態(tài),反而起到相反作用。通過對不均衡政府間財(cái)政的激勵效應(yīng)進(jìn)行理論分析,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)行政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系下的財(cái)政分權(quán)具有地區(qū)差別效應(yīng)和城鄉(xiāng)差別效應(yīng)。財(cái)政分權(quán)對東部沿海等經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)的激勵作用大,對中西部等落后地區(qū)的作用要小,甚至有負(fù)面作用;除此以外,在目前的不合理的城鄉(xiāng)財(cái)政關(guān)系下,城市對農(nóng)村存在非常大的擠壓效應(yīng),城市汲取了來源于農(nóng)村的大量稅收收入,但農(nóng)村卻沒有獲得相應(yīng)的公共產(chǎn)品。通過對財(cái)政分權(quán)對基本公共產(chǎn)品的供給的關(guān)系的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),財(cái)政分權(quán)下的地區(qū)競爭使地方政府公共支出結(jié)構(gòu)出現(xiàn)了“偏差”,地方政府在公共支出上更傾向投資在與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長相關(guān)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施領(lǐng)域里,從而擠壓福利性基本公共支出資金,導(dǎo)致基本公共服務(wù)供給不足。分稅制改革以來我國實(shí)行的“收入集權(quán)、支出分權(quán)”的這種不對稱的政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系模式,其本身需要政府間轉(zhuǎn)移支付來矯正,但由于現(xiàn)行轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度的不合理,使得我國政府間財(cái)政呈現(xiàn)出一種失衡狀態(tài),為消除這種失衡狀態(tài),需要建立一種均衡的的政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系,但在目前我國政經(jīng)約束體制下,只能是均衡的“收入集權(quán)、支出分權(quán)”模式。為此,一要對我國政府間財(cái)政收入做適當(dāng)調(diào)整,構(gòu)建一種多元多層的稅收體系;二要將基本公共服務(wù)支出職責(zé)劃分給中央政府承擔(dān),構(gòu)建以基層財(cái)政為平臺的支出體制;三要取消我國目前稅收返還制度,清理整合現(xiàn)行的專項(xiàng)轉(zhuǎn)移支付,建立起以公共服務(wù)均等化為目的的一般性轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度。

    The Chinese government revised intergovernmental fiscal relations after the 1994 tax sharing system reform. The recentralization of tax revenues of central government in 1994 was not accompanied by revisions to expenditure responsibilities which remained as the pre-1994 fiscal system. The tax sharing fiscal system succeeded in raising the two ratios, and strengthening macroeconomic control ability. In the meanwhile, many problems arose from the current fiscal system, such as the proliferation of arbitrary charges, farmers’ burden tax & fee, Prefecture and village financial difficulties, the disparity among regions, urban-rural disparity, and so on. It is very important to recognize clearly the whole impacts of the 1994 tax sharing system reform and key weakness in current system, not only does it correlate to resolve above-mentioned problems, but also conducive to the further deepening the reform of the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the future.Based on above-mentioned objective this dissertation investigates the whole effects of the 1994 tax sharing system reform. We find that both central government and province government centralized the tax revenues which belong to sub-province government under the pre-1994 fiscal system through the analysis and comparison of intergovernmental financial revenue and expenditure structure.This dissertation explores the traditional definition of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) and new development of the theory of VFI, and then presents a framework to analyze the VFI in China from 1978 to 2005 based on the traditional definition. We find that fiscal relations between central and sub-national government was imbalanced in the period 1994 to 2005. We construct three coefficients of VFI based on Hunter’s method to measure the degree of VFI between central and sub-national public finance in China from 1994 to 2003. We find that the degree of VFI in China was widening after tax sharing reform based on the measured values of three coefficients. Current intergovernmental fiscal system cannot reduce the degree of VFI effectively; on the contrary, contribute to widening vertical fiscal imbalances. Furthermore, through investigating the disparities among three regions, provincial jurisdiction, and county level jurisdiction, we find that the current intergovernmental transfer system can reduce horizontal fiscal disparities effectively from per-capita fiscal revenue angle, but the effect of equalization is insignificant from per-capita fiscal expenditure. At the county level public finance, Current intergovernmental fiscal system cannot reduce fiscal disparities; on the contrary, contribute to widening fiscal disparities.Through investigating incentive effects of fiscal decentralization, we find it has different effects in different regions,and also different in urban-rural areas. Eastern coastal areas of China take more advantages from fiscal decentralization than in the middle and western areas of China; and it may be harmful to some areas in the middle and west China. Furthermore, the fiscal squeeze arises from asymmetrical urban-rural fiscal system of China, urban absorbs tax revenues from the rural area, but the rural area does not obtain equivalent public goods from state finance. The Dissertation investigates the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the supply of basic public goods, we find interjurisdictional competition under fiscal decentralization system causes the deviation of the structure of public expenditure, subnational government has more enthusiasm to invest in urban infrastructure projects which can promote economic growth quickly, and has no interesting in investing in basic public services such as education, social security and so on, Which Caused insufficient supplies of basic public services in the whole country, especially in poor areas.Intergovernmental fiscal relations in China is an asymmetrical“revenue centralization, expenditure decentralization”type since the 1994 tax sharing system reform, it needed intergovernmental transfers to balance the imbalanced situation in itself. Owing to the unreasonable intergovernmental transfers system, vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance is widening. In order to eliminate fiscal disparities, we must to construct a balanced system of intergovernmental fiscal relations.

中國多級政府間財(cái)政不均衡性研究

內(nèi)容摘要5-7Abstract7-81 緒論13-24    1.1 概念界定以及選題意義13-14    1.2 本論文的研究目的與結(jié)構(gòu)14-16    1.3 文獻(xiàn)回顧16-22    1.4 本論文的創(chuàng)新和不足22-242 分稅制以來政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系的制度安排24-35    2.1 多級政府間支出責(zé)任的劃分24-26    2.2 多級政府間收入的劃分26-29    2.3 多級政府間轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度29-353 多級政府間財(cái)政收支與轉(zhuǎn)移支付結(jié)構(gòu)分析35-54    3.1 多級政府間財(cái)政收入結(jié)構(gòu)及其比較35-41    3.2 多級政府間財(cái)政支出結(jié)構(gòu)及其比較41-48    3.3 政府間轉(zhuǎn)移支付結(jié)構(gòu)及其存在的問題48-544 分稅制、轉(zhuǎn)移支付與財(cái)政不均衡54-94    4.1 分稅制、轉(zhuǎn)移支付與縱向財(cái)政不平衡54-82    4.2 分稅制、轉(zhuǎn)移支付與橫向財(cái)政不均衡82-945 不均衡財(cái)政的經(jīng)濟(jì)效應(yīng)—基于財(cái)政分權(quán)角度的分析94-113    5.1 財(cái)政分權(quán)與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長94-106    5.2 財(cái)政分權(quán)與基本公共產(chǎn)品供給短缺106-109    5.3 財(cái)政分權(quán)、居民流動與消費(fèi)者效率109-1136 構(gòu)建均衡的政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系113-137    6.1 政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系的目標(biāo)模式113-120    6.2 政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系國際經(jīng)驗(yàn)：以美國和日本為例120-125    6.3 構(gòu)建以基層財(cái)政為平臺的支出體制125-128    6.4 構(gòu)建多元多層的分稅制體系128-131    6.5 構(gòu)建以公共服務(wù)均等化為目的轉(zhuǎn)移支付制度131-133    6.6 政府間財(cái)政關(guān)系改革的其他方面133-1377 基本結(jié)論137-139[參考文獻(xiàn)]139-148

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國多級政府間財(cái)政不均衡性研究，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。