【摘要】：審計合謀嚴重影響了審計的獨立性,具有嚴重的經(jīng)濟后果。審計合謀在對資本市場產(chǎn)生深重危害的同時,也對整個審計行業(yè)的生存和發(fā)展提出了嚴峻挑戰(zhàn)。因此,對防范審計合謀進行研究十分必要。 本文以經(jīng)濟人假說、信息不對稱理論為基礎,根據(jù)逆向選擇原理建立委托—代理模型,對審計合謀現(xiàn)象進行邏輯推理和數(shù)理論證,分析獎、懲審計師以防范審計合謀的有效性,并把研究的結論應用于我國審計行業(yè)的具體監(jiān)管。 在委托——代理關系中,為防止代理人偷懶,委托人聘請審計師對代理人的工作進行監(jiān)督和審查。由于代理人的偷懶行為具有隨機性,因此委托人理想的策略是實施隨機審計。為了自己的偷懶行為不被審計師報告給委托人,代理人采取賄賂審計師的辦法以達成合謀。針對代理人的策略,委托人對審計師進行獎勵以誘使其不參與合謀。然而,委托人獎勵審計師的策略,會被有信息優(yōu)勢的代理人加以利用,代理人高額賄賂審計師,委托人給予審計師的獎金將隨代理人的賄賂數(shù)值的增加而同益看漲,博弈均衡的結果是代理人的偷懶概率與委托人支付的獎金不斷增加,使得獎勵審計師不能有效防范審計合謀。為此,委托人轉(zhuǎn)而尋求懲罰措施,聘請監(jiān)管者對審計師進行審查。由于代理人和審計師之間的合謀是隨機的,委托人的最優(yōu)策略是實施隨機監(jiān)管。面對合謀事發(fā)將遭受高額罰款,審計師參與合謀的可能性大大降低,因此,和獎勵措施相比,懲罰能有效地防范審計合謀。我國在對審計行業(yè)實施監(jiān)管政策時,必須注意把懲罰的額度、監(jiān)管的力度和監(jiān)管的投入結合起來考慮。
[Abstract]:Audit collusion seriously affects the independence of audit and has serious economic consequences. Audit collusion not only does great harm to the capital market, but also poses a severe challenge to the survival and development of the whole audit industry. Therefore, it is necessary to study the prevention of audit collusion. Based on the hypothesis of economic man and the theory of information asymmetry, this paper establishes the principal-agent model according to the principle of adverse selection, makes logical reasoning and mathematical demonstration on the phenomenon of audit collusion, analyzes the award, and punishes auditors in order to prevent the effectiveness of audit collusion. And the conclusions of the study are applied to the specific supervision of the audit industry in China. In the principal-agent relationship, in order to prevent the agent from being lazy, the principal employs an auditor to supervise and examine the work of the agent. Because the lazy behavior of the agent is random, the ideal strategy of the principal is to carry out random audit. In order not to be reported to the principal by the auditor, the agent bribed the auditor to achieve collusion. In view of the agent's strategy, the principal rewards the auditor to induce him not to participate in collusion. However, the principal's strategy of reward auditors will be taken advantage of by agents who have the advantage of information. Agents bribe auditors in large quantities. The bonus given to auditors by the principal will be bullish with the increase of the bribe value of the agent. The result of game equilibrium is that the probability of laziness of the agent and the bonus paid by the principal are increasing, which makes the reward auditor unable to prevent the audit collusion effectively. To this end, clients instead seek penalties and hire regulators to review auditors. Because the collusion between agent and auditor is random, the optimal strategy of principal is to implement random supervision. In the face of high fines for collusion, auditors are greatly less likely to participate in collusion. Therefore, compared with incentives, punishment can effectively prevent audit collusion. When carrying out the supervision policy to the audit industry in our country, we must pay attention to the amount of punishment, the intensity of supervision and the investment of supervision.
【學位授予單位】：湖南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2005
【分類號】：F239.4

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