【摘要】：企業(yè)生態(tài)系統(tǒng)理論認為，企業(yè)存在于一定的生存環(huán)境之中，并不是孤立的，即企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展不僅要面對競爭激烈的市場環(huán)境，更需要應對錯綜復雜的非市場環(huán)境。其中，市場環(huán)境是包括競爭對手、供應商、顧客等因素的企業(yè)外部環(huán)境系統(tǒng)；而企業(yè)賴以成功的另一重要環(huán)境—非市場環(huán)境，相對于市場環(huán)境而言，是由社會、政治、法律制度等因素所組成的系統(tǒng)，其特點為企業(yè)與政府組織、非政府組織、公眾等之間相互作用和影響的關系。 我國是從中央高度集中的計劃經(jīng)濟體制轉(zhuǎn)型到市場經(jīng)濟的國家，改革開放以來經(jīng)過多年的探索和發(fā)展，市場經(jīng)濟已經(jīng)成為我國經(jīng)濟體制的主導趨勢，政府這只“有形的手”逐漸由臺前退到了幕后，但是我國經(jīng)濟市場化不可避免地帶有計劃經(jīng)濟的痕跡，各個領域中政府的影響仍繼續(xù)發(fā)揮作用。事實上，即便不考慮市場經(jīng)濟體制是否發(fā)達這個因素，公司在制定發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略和開展經(jīng)營活動時都必須考慮外部宏觀環(huán)境中政治因素，政府的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策等都是與企業(yè)生存發(fā)展息息相關的。目前，，政府依然掌握諸多資源與權利，政治聯(lián)系網(wǎng)絡不僅能幫助企業(yè)提前掌握政策動態(tài)，創(chuàng)造商業(yè)信息優(yōu)勢，而且能透過政治網(wǎng)絡中的人際信任來為企業(yè)帶來發(fā)展所需的各種重要條件與資源。大量的研究也表明，民營企業(yè)領導人的政治身份可以使企業(yè)獲得融資便利性、更多的政府補助以及進入政府管制行業(yè)等利益，對企業(yè)的經(jīng)營活動和經(jīng)濟后果產(chǎn)生重要影響，同樣也可能影響到審計師選擇的決策。 本文以2008年—2010年在深圳、上海證券交易所上市的民營企業(yè)為樣本，實證檢驗民營上市公司的政治聯(lián)系對審計師選擇和審計意見的影響。研究結(jié)果表明，關鍵高管（董事長或總經(jīng)理）具有政治聯(lián)系的民營上市公司更傾向于選擇非“十大”會計師事務所進行審計，并且政治聯(lián)系的強度越大，這種結(jié)果越顯著。同時，在既定的盈余質(zhì)量下，政治聯(lián)系會降低上市公司被出具“非標”審計意見的概率。
[Abstract]:According to the theory of enterprise ecosystem, enterprises exist in a certain living environment and are not isolated, that is, the economic development of enterprises not only faces the fierce competition market environment, but also needs to deal with the complicated non-market environment. Among them, the market environment is the external environment system which includes the competition, the supplier, the customer and so on. The non-market environment, another important environment on which enterprises are successful, is a system composed of social, political, legal and other factors, which is characterized by enterprises and government organizations, non-governmental organizations, etc. The relationship between public interaction and influence. China is a country that has transformed from a centrally centralized planned economy to a market economy. After many years of exploration and development since the reform and opening up, the market economy has become the dominant trend of our economic system. The "visible hand" of the government has gradually retreated from the front of the stage to the behind-the-scenes, but the marketization of China's economy inevitably bears the trace of planned economy, and the influence of the government in all fields continues to play a role. In fact, even if a market economy system is not considered, companies must take into account the political aspects of the external macro environment when formulating development strategies and conducting business activities. The government's industrial policies are closely related to the survival and development of enterprises. At present, the government still has a lot of resources and rights. The network of political contacts can not only help enterprises grasp the policy dynamics ahead of time, but also create the advantages of business information. Moreover, it can bring all kinds of important conditions and resources for the development of enterprises through the interpersonal trust in the political network. A large number of studies also show that the political identity of private enterprise leaders can enable enterprises to obtain financing convenience, more government subsidies and access to government regulatory industries and other interests, which have an important impact on business activities and economic consequences. It may also affect the auditor's choice of decision. Based on the sample of private enterprises listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2010, this paper empirically examines the influence of the political connections of private listed companies on the choice of auditors and audit opinions. The results show that private listed companies with political connections with key executives (chairman or general manager) tend to choose non-" 10 "accounting firms for audit, and the stronger the political ties are, the more significant the results are. At the same time, under the established earnings quality, political ties will reduce the probability of non-standard audit opinions issued by listed companies.
【學位授予單位】：吉林大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F239.4;F224

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