【摘要】：良好的公司治理結構往往是具有高價值企業(yè)的核心特征之一，但是高價值的企業(yè)并不一定擁有較好的公司治理結構。這是因為現(xiàn)代企業(yè)的特征之一就是所有權和經營權分離，由此產生的代理成本問題使得公司治理成為阻礙公司價值提升的因素之一。為了有效降低由于信息不對稱和虛假信息而產生的管理和企業(yè)績效問題，審計機制被引入到企業(yè)運營和管理框架中。審計機制作為降低上市公司管理層與股東層之間的信息不對稱，平滑代理成本的有效制度設計，其在本質上是管理層與股東層原有代理關系在外的另一層代理關系。顯然獨立且具有高度客觀性的審計結果往往向市場和投資者提供更加準確的信息，然而也正是有審計本身是另一層面的代理關系，那么上市公司股權結構以及管理層結構等相關公司治理結構將決定上市公司的審計選擇，進而影響上市公司的審計質量，并最終影響上市公司的價值。 本文立足于中國上市公司審計行為的特征，嘗試挖掘上市公司治理結構對審計選擇的影響關系，以此確定上市公司治理結構在影響外部監(jiān)督代理關系的基本機制。本文將提供中國上市公司內部治理結構對相關審計行為的具體影響，如對審計機構數(shù)目的選擇、境內境外審計機構的選擇、審計意見的選擇以及審計資費的選擇等，，進而判斷上市公司治理結構影響審計效率的方式。通過研究，本文所得結論將有助于分析何種公司治理結構更能維持穩(wěn)健的審計環(huán)境，進而為投資者評價和判定上市公司審計行為奠定基礎。 在充分考慮中國審計市場開放和數(shù)據(jù)完整性的前提下，本文選取了2010年滬深所有上市公司的審計記錄，并以此為樣本運用一般線性回歸方法和二元選擇模型對上市公司治理結構影響審計行為的機制進行了全面的剖析。實證過程中本文從管理層結構和股權結構兩個層面對上市公司治理結構影響審計行為的機制進行計量檢驗和分析，并按照指標所反映出的基本特征進行分類回歸，以識別和確定上市公司結果影響審計行為的具體機制。 本文結論表明上市公司治理結構真實影響審計行為選擇，其中管理層能夠更為直接的影響審計機構的相關活動，進而影響審計質量和審計市場的效率。當然實證結果還表明我國審計市場的獨立性正逐步加強，同時隨著資本市場的逐步完善，資本市場改善上市公司治理環(huán)境的能力也不斷提高，有理由相信審計市場所反映的資本信息會不斷增多，其可信賴性也會不斷提高。
[Abstract]:Good corporate governance structure is often one of the core characteristics of high-value enterprises, but high-value enterprises do not necessarily have better corporate governance structure. This is because one of the characteristics of modern enterprises is the separation of ownership and management right, which makes corporate governance one of the factors hindering the promotion of corporate value. In order to effectively reduce the management and enterprise performance problems caused by asymmetric and false information, the audit mechanism is introduced into the enterprise operation and management framework. As an effective system to reduce information asymmetry and smooth agency cost between management and shareholders in listed companies, audit mechanism is in essence another level of agency relationship between management and shareholders. Obviously independent and highly objective audit results often provide more accurate information to the market and investors. However, it is the audit itself that is another level of agency relationship. Then the ownership structure and management structure of listed companies will determine the audit choice of listed companies, and then affect the audit quality of listed companies, and ultimately affect the value of listed companies. Based on the characteristics of the audit behavior of listed companies in China, this paper tries to explore the relationship between the governance structure of listed companies and the audit choice, so as to determine the basic mechanism of the governance structure of listed companies affecting the external supervision and agency relationship. This paper will provide the specific impact of the internal governance structure of Chinese listed companies on the relevant audit behavior, such as the selection of the number of audit institutions, the selection of domestic and foreign audit institutions, the selection of audit opinions and the selection of audit fees, etc. Then judge the way that the listed company's governance structure affects the audit efficiency. Through the research, the conclusion of this paper will be helpful to analyze which corporate governance structure can maintain a stable audit environment, and then lay the foundation for investors to evaluate and judge the audit behavior of listed companies. On the premise of fully considering the opening of China's audit market and the integrity of data, this paper selects the audit records of all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2010. Based on this model, the author makes a comprehensive analysis of the mechanism of the influence of corporate governance structure on audit behavior by using the general linear regression method and the binary selection model. In the process of demonstration, this paper makes econometric examination and analysis on the mechanism of governance structure influencing audit behavior from two aspects of management structure and equity structure, and classifies and regresses according to the basic characteristics reflected by the indicators. In order to identify and determine the results of listed companies affect the audit behavior of the specific mechanism. The conclusion of this paper shows that the governance structure of listed companies has a real impact on the choice of audit behavior, in which the management can directly affect the activities of the audit institutions, and then affect the audit quality and the efficiency of the audit market. Of course, the empirical results also show that the independence of the audit market in China is gradually strengthened, and with the gradual improvement of the capital market, the ability of the capital market to improve the governance environment of listed companies is also continuously improved. There is reason to believe that the capital information reflected in the audit market will continue to increase and its reliability will continue to increase.
【學位授予單位】：吉林大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F239.4;F276.6;F224

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 蔡春,楊麟,陳曉媛,陳鈺泓;上市公司審計意見類型影響因素的實證分析——基于滬深股市2003年A股年報資料的研究[J];財經科學;2005年01期

2 唐躍軍,左晶晶;上市公司年報非標準審計意見的比較研究——基于2000—2003年數(shù)據(jù)的經驗分析[J];財經問題研究;2005年07期

3 劉明輝;胡波;;公司治理、代理成本與審計定價——基于2001—2003年我國A股上市公司的實證研究[J];財經問題研究;2006年02期

4 李明輝;;代理成本與審計師選擇——基于中國IPO公司的研究[J];財經研究;2006年04期

5 杜興強;溫日光;;公司治理與會計信息質量:一項經驗研究[J];財經研究;2007年01期

6 蔡寧,梁麗珍;公司治理與財務舞弊關系的經驗分析[J];財經理論與實踐;2003年06期

7 韓洪靈;陳漢文;;公司治理機制與高質量外部審計需求——來自中國審計市場的經驗證據(jù)[J];財貿經濟;2008年01期

8 劉斌,孫回回,李嘉明;自愿性會計政策變更與非標審計意見的相關性研究——來自1998～2002年深滬上市公司的經驗證據(jù)[J];財貿研究;2004年03期

9 張俊瑞;董南雁;;公司治理與審計意見:來自中國上市公司的證據(jù)[J];當代財經;2006年11期

10 白憲生;高月娥;;關于上市公司財務指標對非標準審計意見影響的研究[J];工業(yè)技術經濟;2009年06期

相關碩士學位論文 前1條

1 杜菲;公司治理結構與審計意見的相關性研究[D];暨南大學;2008年

本文編號：2390642