【摘要】：良好的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)往往是具有高價(jià)值企業(yè)的核心特征之一，但是高價(jià)值的企業(yè)并不一定擁有較好的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)。這是因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)代企業(yè)的特征之一就是所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分離，由此產(chǎn)生的代理成本問題使得公司治理成為阻礙公司價(jià)值提升的因素之一。為了有效降低由于信息不對(duì)稱和虛假信息而產(chǎn)生的管理和企業(yè)績(jī)效問題，審計(jì)機(jī)制被引入到企業(yè)運(yùn)營(yíng)和管理框架中。審計(jì)機(jī)制作為降低上市公司管理層與股東層之間的信息不對(duì)稱，平滑代理成本的有效制度設(shè)計(jì)，其在本質(zhì)上是管理層與股東層原有代理關(guān)系在外的另一層代理關(guān)系。顯然獨(dú)立且具有高度客觀性的審計(jì)結(jié)果往往向市場(chǎng)和投資者提供更加準(zhǔn)確的信息，然而也正是有審計(jì)本身是另一層面的代理關(guān)系，那么上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)以及管理層結(jié)構(gòu)等相關(guān)公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)將決定上市公司的審計(jì)選擇，進(jìn)而影響上市公司的審計(jì)質(zhì)量，并最終影響上市公司的價(jià)值。 本文立足于中國(guó)上市公司審計(jì)行為的特征，嘗試挖掘上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)審計(jì)選擇的影響關(guān)系，以此確定上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)在影響外部監(jiān)督代理關(guān)系的基本機(jī)制。本文將提供中國(guó)上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)相關(guān)審計(jì)行為的具體影響，如對(duì)審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)數(shù)目的選擇、境內(nèi)境外審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)的選擇、審計(jì)意見的選擇以及審計(jì)資費(fèi)的選擇等，，進(jìn)而判斷上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)影響審計(jì)效率的方式。通過研究，本文所得結(jié)論將有助于分析何種公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)更能維持穩(wěn)健的審計(jì)環(huán)境，進(jìn)而為投資者評(píng)價(jià)和判定上市公司審計(jì)行為奠定基礎(chǔ)。 在充分考慮中國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)開放和數(shù)據(jù)完整性的前提下，本文選取了2010年滬深所有上市公司的審計(jì)記錄，并以此為樣本運(yùn)用一般線性回歸方法和二元選擇模型對(duì)上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)影響審計(jì)行為的機(jī)制進(jìn)行了全面的剖析。實(shí)證過程中本文從管理層結(jié)構(gòu)和股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)兩個(gè)層面對(duì)上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)影響審計(jì)行為的機(jī)制進(jìn)行計(jì)量檢驗(yàn)和分析，并按照指標(biāo)所反映出的基本特征進(jìn)行分類回歸，以識(shí)別和確定上市公司結(jié)果影響審計(jì)行為的具體機(jī)制。 本文結(jié)論表明上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)真實(shí)影響審計(jì)行為選擇，其中管理層能夠更為直接的影響審計(jì)機(jī)構(gòu)的相關(guān)活動(dòng)，進(jìn)而影響審計(jì)質(zhì)量和審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的效率。當(dāng)然實(shí)證結(jié)果還表明我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的獨(dú)立性正逐步加強(qiáng)，同時(shí)隨著資本市場(chǎng)的逐步完善，資本市場(chǎng)改善上市公司治理環(huán)境的能力也不斷提高，有理由相信審計(jì)市場(chǎng)所反映的資本信息會(huì)不斷增多，其可信賴性也會(huì)不斷提高。
[Abstract]:Good corporate governance structure is often one of the core characteristics of high-value enterprises, but high-value enterprises do not necessarily have better corporate governance structure. This is because one of the characteristics of modern enterprises is the separation of ownership and management right, which makes corporate governance one of the factors hindering the promotion of corporate value. In order to effectively reduce the management and enterprise performance problems caused by asymmetric and false information, the audit mechanism is introduced into the enterprise operation and management framework. As an effective system to reduce information asymmetry and smooth agency cost between management and shareholders in listed companies, audit mechanism is in essence another level of agency relationship between management and shareholders. Obviously independent and highly objective audit results often provide more accurate information to the market and investors. However, it is the audit itself that is another level of agency relationship. Then the ownership structure and management structure of listed companies will determine the audit choice of listed companies, and then affect the audit quality of listed companies, and ultimately affect the value of listed companies. Based on the characteristics of the audit behavior of listed companies in China, this paper tries to explore the relationship between the governance structure of listed companies and the audit choice, so as to determine the basic mechanism of the governance structure of listed companies affecting the external supervision and agency relationship. This paper will provide the specific impact of the internal governance structure of Chinese listed companies on the relevant audit behavior, such as the selection of the number of audit institutions, the selection of domestic and foreign audit institutions, the selection of audit opinions and the selection of audit fees, etc. Then judge the way that the listed company's governance structure affects the audit efficiency. Through the research, the conclusion of this paper will be helpful to analyze which corporate governance structure can maintain a stable audit environment, and then lay the foundation for investors to evaluate and judge the audit behavior of listed companies. On the premise of fully considering the opening of China's audit market and the integrity of data, this paper selects the audit records of all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2010. Based on this model, the author makes a comprehensive analysis of the mechanism of the influence of corporate governance structure on audit behavior by using the general linear regression method and the binary selection model. In the process of demonstration, this paper makes econometric examination and analysis on the mechanism of governance structure influencing audit behavior from two aspects of management structure and equity structure, and classifies and regresses according to the basic characteristics reflected by the indicators. In order to identify and determine the results of listed companies affect the audit behavior of the specific mechanism. The conclusion of this paper shows that the governance structure of listed companies has a real impact on the choice of audit behavior, in which the management can directly affect the activities of the audit institutions, and then affect the audit quality and the efficiency of the audit market. Of course, the empirical results also show that the independence of the audit market in China is gradually strengthened, and with the gradual improvement of the capital market, the ability of the capital market to improve the governance environment of listed companies is also continuously improved. There is reason to believe that the capital information reflected in the audit market will continue to increase and its reliability will continue to increase.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4;F276.6;F224

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