【摘要】： 在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度下,企業(yè)所有者與其他利益相關(guān)者對(duì)企業(yè)的監(jiān)控更多采取的是間接監(jiān)控的手段,會(huì)計(jì)信息也越發(fā)成為這些信息的使用者對(duì)企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的受托經(jīng)營(yíng)責(zé)任的履行情況進(jìn)行監(jiān)督和評(píng)價(jià),進(jìn)而作出相關(guān)決策的重要證據(jù),這顯然離不開(kāi)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師所提供的鑒證服務(wù)——受托對(duì)企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息的合法性、公允性和一貫性進(jìn)行鑒證,合理保證會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表使用人確認(rèn)已審會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表的可靠程度。 本文運(yùn)用博弈論的方法,從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)質(zhì)量與管理當(dāng)局和監(jiān)管方的行為進(jìn)行分析,指出我國(guó)的會(huì)計(jì)信息披露過(guò)程中博弈各方的行為戰(zhàn)略選擇的原因、存在的問(wèn)題,并因此得到啟示:提高會(huì)計(jì)信息的質(zhì)量需要提高注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的審計(jì)效率、降低審計(jì)成本;加大對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的懲罰力度;減少管理當(dāng)局對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的影響程度;增強(qiáng)監(jiān)管當(dāng)局的監(jiān)管能力。
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, business owners and other stakeholders are more likely to take indirect monitoring of the enterprise. Accounting information has increasingly become an important evidence for users of these information to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the fiduciary business responsibilities of business operators, and then make relevant decisions. This is obviously inseparable from the certification service provided by the CPA, which is entrusted with authenticating the legality, fairness and consistency of the accounting information of the enterprise, so as to ensure reasonably the reliability of the accounting statements to be confirmed by the users of the accounting statements. By using the method of game theory, this paper analyzes the audit quality of CPA and the behavior of management authorities and regulators from the angle of economics, and points out the reasons for the behavior strategy choice of the game parties in the process of accounting information disclosure in China. In order to improve the quality of accounting information, it is necessary to improve the audit efficiency of CPA, reduce the audit cost, increase the punishment of CPAs, reduce the influence of management on CPAs. Strengthening the regulatory capacity of regulatory authorities.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2006
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F239.43

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 唐文杰;謝新鳳;;財(cái)務(wù)重述與審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的博弈模型分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)之友;2012年19期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 謝新鳳;上市公司財(cái)務(wù)重述與審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)關(guān)系研究[D];貴州財(cái)經(jīng)學(xué)院;2011年

2 蘇哲;注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)失敗探究[D];河北大學(xué);2008年

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本文編號(hào)：2286468