【摘要】： 在現代企業(yè)制度下,企業(yè)所有者與其他利益相關者對企業(yè)的監(jiān)控更多采取的是間接監(jiān)控的手段,會計信息也越發(fā)成為這些信息的使用者對企業(yè)經營者的受托經營責任的履行情況進行監(jiān)督和評價,進而作出相關決策的重要證據,這顯然離不開注冊會計師所提供的鑒證服務——受托對企業(yè)會計信息的合法性、公允性和一貫性進行鑒證,合理保證會計報表使用人確認已審會計報表的可靠程度。 本文運用博弈論的方法,從經濟學的角度對注冊會計師審計質量與管理當局和監(jiān)管方的行為進行分析,指出我國的會計信息披露過程中博弈各方的行為戰(zhàn)略選擇的原因、存在的問題,并因此得到啟示:提高會計信息的質量需要提高注冊會計師的審計效率、降低審計成本;加大對注冊會計師的懲罰力度;減少管理當局對注冊會計師的影響程度;增強監(jiān)管當局的監(jiān)管能力。
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, business owners and other stakeholders are more likely to take indirect monitoring of the enterprise. Accounting information has increasingly become an important evidence for users of these information to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the fiduciary business responsibilities of business operators, and then make relevant decisions. This is obviously inseparable from the certification service provided by the CPA, which is entrusted with authenticating the legality, fairness and consistency of the accounting information of the enterprise, so as to ensure reasonably the reliability of the accounting statements to be confirmed by the users of the accounting statements. By using the method of game theory, this paper analyzes the audit quality of CPA and the behavior of management authorities and regulators from the angle of economics, and points out the reasons for the behavior strategy choice of the game parties in the process of accounting information disclosure in China. In order to improve the quality of accounting information, it is necessary to improve the audit efficiency of CPA, reduce the audit cost, increase the punishment of CPAs, reduce the influence of management on CPAs. Strengthening the regulatory capacity of regulatory authorities.
【學位授予單位】：吉林大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2006
【分類號】：F239.43

【引證文獻】

相關期刊論文 前1條

1 唐文杰;謝新鳳;;財務重述與審計風險的博弈模型分析[J];會計之友;2012年19期

相關碩士學位論文 前2條

1 謝新鳳;上市公司財務重述與審計風險關系研究[D];貴州財經學院;2011年

2 蘇哲;注冊會計師審計失敗探究[D];河北大學;2008年

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本文編號：2286468