上市公司注冊會計師審計委托模式探討
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-21 14:06
【摘要】：近年來,不論國際還是國內,上市公司會計造假丑聞此起彼伏,廣大投資者遭受了巨大損失,嚴重損害了資本市場的聲譽和上市公司的公信力。對于會計造假財務舞弊事件,人們可以從現存制度和公司治理結構出發(fā)分析財務舞弊的成因,也可以從上市公司注冊會計師審計監(jiān)督這一方面分析財務舞弊的原因,并提出相關對策。對于上市公司注冊會計師審計監(jiān)督的研究主要集中在注冊會計師審計的獨立性方面。大量的研究表明,導致注冊會計師審計獨立性喪失的原因是多方面的,‘注冊會計師審計委托模式存在缺陷則是其中一個重要的制度原因。因此,對我國上市公司現行注冊會計師審計委托模式的內在問題進行深入研究,并提出相應的改進建議,對于增強我國上市公司注冊會計師審計的獨立性,維護我國會計師事務所的健康發(fā)展以及促進我國證券市場持續(xù)有序發(fā)展有著重要意義。 目前,理論界對注冊會計師審計委托模式的選擇持有不同的見解,但在實踐中做得比較好、可行性比較高的注冊會計師審計委托模式是審計委員會模式。本.文在對注冊會計師審計委托模式的基本理論進行闡述與分析的前提下找出我國注冊會計師審計委托模式存在的問題并進行了深層次的成因分析,而后提出具有針對性的改進建議。具體而言,全文共分為五個部分： 第一部分為引言,首先闡述本文研究的背景及意義,列舉相關重要的國內外研究文獻并進行綜合的述評,闡述寫作的主要思路及研究方法,并列示出論文的基本寫作框架。 第二部分包括兩大方面內容,一是闡述注冊會計師審計委托模式的基本概念,二是闡述注冊會計師審計委托模式的理論基礎。在基本概念中,主要解釋注冊會計師審計的涵義以及注冊會計師審計委托模式的涵義。在注冊會計師審計委托模式的理論基礎中主要從委托代理理論、產權經濟學理論以及供需理論三個方面進行闡述,并分析其與注冊會計師審計委托模式之間的關系。 第三部分主要是分析我國上市公司注冊會計師審計委托模式存在的問題,并對其進行成因分析。我國上市公司注冊會計師審計委托模式存在的主要問題是注冊會計師審計委托主體不明確；注冊會計師審計費用的確定及支付方式不科學；注冊會計師審計的監(jiān)督與評價體系不完善；注冊會計師相對被審計單位不夠獨立。產生這些問題的原因主要有上市公司治理缺陷和委托權的移位；審計的買方市場特征與會計師事務所獨立性的缺失；注冊會計師審計相關法律法規(guī)不完善。 第四部分主要圍繞理論與實務界提出的三種比較具有代表性的上市公司注冊會計師審計委托模式進行討論,分別是證監(jiān)會模式、財務報表保險模式、審計委員會模式。在分別對這三種審計委托模式的構建思路及其優(yōu)越性進行概述的基礎上,對其各自的缺陷進行了分析。證監(jiān)會模式的缺陷在于：我們無法確定證監(jiān)會是真實會計信息的需求者；另外,由于證監(jiān)會權利較大,如果將上市公司注冊會計師審計的委托監(jiān)管權賦予證監(jiān)會,勢必會導致證監(jiān)會權力膨脹。財務報表保險模式的缺陷在于：首先,這一理論是以股票交易市場半強式有效為前提的,但我國股票市場遠并未達到半強式有效,因此我國采用財務報表保險模式在本質上并不能發(fā)揮該模式的顯著優(yōu)點；其次,在實務中,財務報表保險模式缺乏強制性；最后,是目前我國保險行業(yè)可能沒有能力也沒有膽量承擔上市公司注冊會計師審計代理委托人這一重要職責。審計委員會模式的缺陷在于：首先,上市公司審計委員會中的獨立董事與公司之間的利益關聯不是很強,獨立董事自身并不是真實會計信息的需求者,因此,審計委員會中的獨立董事在履行其職能時并不具有很強的積極性和主動性；其次是學者們懷疑獨立董事有可能受到上市公司內部執(zhí)行董事的利益驅使,使獨立董事與內部董事合謀成為可能。在對三種注冊會計師審計委托模式進行分析比較的基礎上,本文認為最優(yōu)選擇是審計委員會模式。 第五部分是對我國上市公司注冊會計師審計委托模式選擇審計委員會模式進行探討。該部分針對我國上市公司注冊會計師審計委托模式存在的問題及其成因,借鑒美國《薩班斯-奧克斯利法案》中規(guī)定的一些做法,提出構建我國以審計委員會為委托主體的審計委托模式的構建思路,并通過提高審計委員會的獨立性、健全相關法律法規(guī)使我國上市公司注冊會計師審計委托模式得到完善。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the accounting fraud scandals of listed companies have arisen one after another, which have caused huge losses to investors and seriously damaged the reputation of the capital market and the credibility of listed companies. We can also analyze the causes of financial fraud from the aspect of CPA audit supervision of listed companies and put forward relevant countermeasures. In many ways,'the defects of the CPA audit entrustment mode are one of the important institutional reasons. Therefore, this paper makes a thorough study of the internal problems of the current CPA audit entrustment mode of Listed Companies in China, and puts forward corresponding suggestions for improvement in order to enhance the independence of the CPA audit of Listed Companies in China. It is of great significance to maintain the healthy development of Chinese accounting firms and to promote the sustainable and orderly development of China's securities market.
At present, the theoretical circles hold different opinions on the choice of the CPA audit entrustment mode, but in practice, the CPA audit entrustment mode with higher feasibility is the audit committee mode. The problems existing in the audit entrustment model of CPA are analyzed in depth and some suggestions for improvement are put forward.
The first part is the introduction. First of all, it expounds the background and significance of this study, lists relevant important domestic and foreign research literature and makes a comprehensive review, expounds the main ideas and research methods of writing, and lists the basic writing framework of the paper.
The second part consists of two parts, one is to expound the basic concept of the CPA audit entrustment model, the other is to expound the theoretical basis of the CPA audit entrustment model. The theoretical basis of the model is mainly from three aspects: principal-agent theory, property rights economics theory and supply-demand theory, and analyzes the relationship between the model and CPA audit principal-agent model.
The third part mainly analyzes the problems existing in the auditing entrustment mode of the listed companies in China, and analyzes the causes. The main reasons for these problems are the defect of listed companies'governance and the shift of entrustment right; the lack of buyer's market characteristics of audit and the independence of accounting firms; the related laws of CPA audit. The legislation is not perfect.
The fourth part mainly discusses three representative auditing entrustment modes of listed companies put forward by the theoretical and practical circles, namely, the SFC mode, the financial statement insurance mode and the audit committee mode. On the basis of the above analysis, the shortcomings of the SFC model are as follows: we can not confirm that the SFC is the demander of true accounting information; in addition, because the SFC has a large power, if the authorized supervision power of the CPA audit of listed companies is entrusted to the SFC, it will inevitably lead to the expansion of the SFC's power. The drawbacks of the statement insurance model lie in: firstly, the theory is based on the semi-strong form of the stock exchange market, but the stock market in China is far from semi-strong form of efficiency, so the financial statement insurance model in China can not play a significant advantage in essence; secondly, in practice, the financial statement insurance model is lacking. Finally, China's insurance industry may not have the ability or the courage to assume the important responsibility of the CPA audit agent of listed companies. As the matter itself is not the demander of true accounting information, the independent directors in the audit committee do not have strong enthusiasm and initiative in performing their functions; secondly, scholars suspect that the independent directors may be driven by the interests of the internal executive directors of listed companies, making the collusion between independent directors and internal directors possible. On the basis of analyzing and comparing the three models of CPA audit entrustment, this paper argues that the best choice is the audit committee model.
The fifth part is to discuss the mode of CPA audit entrustment in listed companies of our country and the mode of audit committee.This part aims at the problems and causes of the mode of CPA audit entrustment in listed companies of our country, and refers to some practices stipulated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States, and proposes to construct our country to audit. By improving the independence of the audit committee and perfecting relevant laws and regulations, the CPA audit entrustment model of Listed Companies in China has been perfected.
【學位授予單位】：江西財經大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：F233;F239.4
本文編號：2195979
[Abstract]:In recent years, the accounting fraud scandals of listed companies have arisen one after another, which have caused huge losses to investors and seriously damaged the reputation of the capital market and the credibility of listed companies. We can also analyze the causes of financial fraud from the aspect of CPA audit supervision of listed companies and put forward relevant countermeasures. In many ways,'the defects of the CPA audit entrustment mode are one of the important institutional reasons. Therefore, this paper makes a thorough study of the internal problems of the current CPA audit entrustment mode of Listed Companies in China, and puts forward corresponding suggestions for improvement in order to enhance the independence of the CPA audit of Listed Companies in China. It is of great significance to maintain the healthy development of Chinese accounting firms and to promote the sustainable and orderly development of China's securities market.
At present, the theoretical circles hold different opinions on the choice of the CPA audit entrustment mode, but in practice, the CPA audit entrustment mode with higher feasibility is the audit committee mode. The problems existing in the audit entrustment model of CPA are analyzed in depth and some suggestions for improvement are put forward.
The first part is the introduction. First of all, it expounds the background and significance of this study, lists relevant important domestic and foreign research literature and makes a comprehensive review, expounds the main ideas and research methods of writing, and lists the basic writing framework of the paper.
The second part consists of two parts, one is to expound the basic concept of the CPA audit entrustment model, the other is to expound the theoretical basis of the CPA audit entrustment model. The theoretical basis of the model is mainly from three aspects: principal-agent theory, property rights economics theory and supply-demand theory, and analyzes the relationship between the model and CPA audit principal-agent model.
The third part mainly analyzes the problems existing in the auditing entrustment mode of the listed companies in China, and analyzes the causes. The main reasons for these problems are the defect of listed companies'governance and the shift of entrustment right; the lack of buyer's market characteristics of audit and the independence of accounting firms; the related laws of CPA audit. The legislation is not perfect.
The fourth part mainly discusses three representative auditing entrustment modes of listed companies put forward by the theoretical and practical circles, namely, the SFC mode, the financial statement insurance mode and the audit committee mode. On the basis of the above analysis, the shortcomings of the SFC model are as follows: we can not confirm that the SFC is the demander of true accounting information; in addition, because the SFC has a large power, if the authorized supervision power of the CPA audit of listed companies is entrusted to the SFC, it will inevitably lead to the expansion of the SFC's power. The drawbacks of the statement insurance model lie in: firstly, the theory is based on the semi-strong form of the stock exchange market, but the stock market in China is far from semi-strong form of efficiency, so the financial statement insurance model in China can not play a significant advantage in essence; secondly, in practice, the financial statement insurance model is lacking. Finally, China's insurance industry may not have the ability or the courage to assume the important responsibility of the CPA audit agent of listed companies. As the matter itself is not the demander of true accounting information, the independent directors in the audit committee do not have strong enthusiasm and initiative in performing their functions; secondly, scholars suspect that the independent directors may be driven by the interests of the internal executive directors of listed companies, making the collusion between independent directors and internal directors possible. On the basis of analyzing and comparing the three models of CPA audit entrustment, this paper argues that the best choice is the audit committee model.
The fifth part is to discuss the mode of CPA audit entrustment in listed companies of our country and the mode of audit committee.This part aims at the problems and causes of the mode of CPA audit entrustment in listed companies of our country, and refers to some practices stipulated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States, and proposes to construct our country to audit. By improving the independence of the audit committee and perfecting relevant laws and regulations, the CPA audit entrustment model of Listed Companies in China has been perfected.
【學位授予單位】：江西財經大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：F233;F239.4
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前10條
1 蔣堯明,鄭佳軍;改革現行審計委托模式的思考——兼論證券交易所招投標制度的設計[J];財經問題研究;2005年07期
2 夏文賢;陳漢文;;審計師變更、審計收費與審計委員會效率[J];財會通訊(學術版);2006年02期
3 郝樹芹;王建瓊;;“政府招標”審計委托模式的博弈分析[J];財會通訊(學術版);2007年01期
4 呂先锫;李明明;;財務報表保險制度下的博弈分析[J];財會通訊(學術版);2007年03期
5 蔣堯明;謝周勇;;上市公司審計代位委托:提高審計獨立性的途徑[J];財會通訊(學術版);2008年05期
6 陳漢文,夏文賢,陳秋金;上市公司審計委員會:案例分析與模式改進——公司治理、受托責任與審計委員會制度(下)[J];財會通訊;2004年01期
7 劉小麗;高軍;王艷;;基于利益相關者的上市公司審計委托模式的重構[J];財會通訊;2009年24期
8 黃益雄;董育軍;;會計師事務所內部治理機制研究[J];財會通訊;2009年36期
9 連宏彬;財務報表保險制度——提高審計獨立性的新思路[J];財會月刊;2004年07期
10 裘宗舜,鄭佳軍;我國注冊會計師審計委托模式的探討[J];財會月刊;2005年03期
，本文編號：2195979
本文鏈接：http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/shenjigli/2195979.html
教材專著
