【摘要】：作為一種外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制,審計(jì)旨在克服所有者和管理者之間的信息不對(duì)稱、提高財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的可信度和保障各相關(guān)方面的利益。伴隨著我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的日益完善,審計(jì)已成為了資本市場(chǎng)中的一項(xiàng)必不可少的內(nèi)容。在審計(jì)部門(mén)的社會(huì)地位不斷得到提高的同時(shí),社會(huì)公眾對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量也提出了更高的期望。但進(jìn)入21世紀(jì),國(guó)際和國(guó)內(nèi)的資本市場(chǎng)陸續(xù)出現(xiàn)了審計(jì)造假和出錯(cuò)的情況,負(fù)責(zé)審計(jì)的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所(審計(jì)人員)由于審計(jì)工作都沒(méi)有起到有效的判斷評(píng)價(jià)作用而經(jīng)常被卷入其中。目前,審計(jì)判斷工作遇到了不可避免的挑戰(zhàn),審計(jì)人員面臨的審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不斷加大,審計(jì)判斷的質(zhì)量也總體表現(xiàn)出不高的趨勢(shì)。盡管我國(guó)的審計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和規(guī)范不斷完善,但是也表現(xiàn)出明顯的不足,對(duì)于審計(jì)過(guò)程中發(fā)生的違規(guī)行為卻缺乏有效的監(jiān)管和處罰機(jī)制,這在一定程度上加劇了審計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的發(fā)生和審計(jì)判斷質(zhì)量的下降。導(dǎo)致存在上述問(wèn)題的原因有多種,可能由于審計(jì)人員違反職業(yè)道德,發(fā)現(xiàn)造假卻沒(méi)有報(bào)告出來(lái),甚至與被審計(jì)單位合謀造假,如安達(dá)信公司；也可能是由于審計(jì)人員的專業(yè)勝任能力有限,雖然努力工作卻沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)造假；或者排除道德和業(yè)務(wù)水平因素,單純地是因?yàn)閷徲?jì)師的審計(jì)工作比較匆忙,審計(jì)時(shí)間比較有限,即沒(méi)有付出應(yīng)有的努力程度而沒(méi)能發(fā)現(xiàn)造假。在經(jīng)濟(jì)快速發(fā)展的情況下,會(huì)計(jì)、審計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和規(guī)范呈現(xiàn)出一定的滯后性,對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)、審計(jì)事項(xiàng)的約束力明顯不足。另外,社會(huì)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)違規(guī)行為的處罰也缺乏力度�？梢�(jiàn),被審計(jì)單位管理者為了個(gè)人或者集體利益有造假的動(dòng)機(jī),考驗(yàn)著審計(jì)師的道德水平和執(zhí)業(yè)技能,審計(jì)人員與被審計(jì)單位潛在的“友好合作”考驗(yàn)著審計(jì)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的能力和力度,那么兩者之間的博弈關(guān)系就非常值得學(xué)者們進(jìn)行深入地研究。 本文的寫(xiě)作主線采用以理論分析為基礎(chǔ),結(jié)合國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者研究的具體情況進(jìn)行分析論證,總結(jié)了審計(jì)職業(yè)判斷目前存在的問(wèn)題,然后通過(guò)引用不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,分析博弈雙方的具體博弈過(guò)程,得出產(chǎn)生以上問(wèn)題的原因及怎樣進(jìn)行改善的幾點(diǎn)思考。本文在借鑒學(xué)者研究的基礎(chǔ)上,簡(jiǎn)要介紹了將博弈論引入審計(jì)職業(yè)判斷的合理性及博弈論在經(jīng)管學(xué)的廣泛應(yīng)用。在過(guò)去文獻(xiàn)建立諸多博弈模型中,本文認(rèn)為審計(jì)判斷過(guò)程準(zhǔn)確地說(shuō)屬于不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈。原因有二：首先,博弈活動(dòng)的參與者分別處于不同的執(zhí)業(yè)環(huán)境、掌握不同的信息,當(dāng)融入到整個(gè)博弈中去時(shí),對(duì)博弈對(duì)手信息并不能完全準(zhǔn)確地掌握,即所謂的“信息不對(duì)稱”,因此存在博弈信息不完全性；其次,審計(jì)判斷的參與者之間的行動(dòng)是有先后順序的,在審計(jì)人員與被審計(jì)單位博弈時(shí),先是被審計(jì)單位管理者選擇一定的概率對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告造假,然后由審計(jì)人員在不清楚被審計(jì)單位管理者的行為選擇情況下決定是否合謀或合規(guī),所以審計(jì)判斷是一種動(dòng)態(tài)博弈。關(guān)于外部審計(jì)的不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈,以前的研究也出現(xiàn)了不少。由于我國(guó)是比較注重法治的國(guó)家,外部監(jiān)管大都是國(guó)家權(quán)力機(jī)構(gòu)(如國(guó)家審計(jì)署)或者社會(huì)組織(如注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì)),相信外部監(jiān)管在法治社會(huì)下對(duì)審計(jì)的博弈參與者決策有更強(qiáng)的影響力,故文章分別建立了審計(jì)人員與被審計(jì)單位、審計(jì)人員與監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的不完全信息動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,根據(jù)對(duì)博弈均衡結(jié)果的分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)審計(jì)判斷在博弈環(huán)境、博弈技能和博弈規(guī)則等方面存在的不足,進(jìn)而提出減少財(cái)務(wù)造假和審計(jì)舞弊發(fā)生的建議,更加強(qiáng)調(diào)對(duì)審計(jì)外部監(jiān)管工作的注重,希望可以對(duì)目前存在的審計(jì)判斷問(wèn)題有所幫助,對(duì)以后的審計(jì)判斷研究工作起到一定的積極作用。
[Abstract]:As an external supervision mechanism, the audit aims to overcome the information asymmetry between the owner and the manager, improve the credibility of the financial report and protect the interests of all related aspects. With the increasing perfection of the market economic system in China, the audit has become an essential part of the capital market. At the same time, the public has also raised higher expectations for the quality of the audit, but in twenty-first Century, the international and domestic capital markets have appeared in the case of audit fraud and error. The auditors who are in charge of auditing have not played an effective judgment and evaluation because of the audit work. At present, the audit judgment has met the inevitable challenge. The audit risk is increasing and the quality of the audit judgment is not high. Although the auditing standards and standards are constantly improved in China, there are also obvious deficiencies in the auditing process. The lack of effective supervision and punishment mechanism has aggravated the occurrence of audit risk and the decline of the quality of audit judgment to some extent. There are many reasons for the above problems, which may be due to the auditors' violation of professional ethics, which have not been reported or even conspire with the audited units, such as Andersen. It may also be due to the limited professional competence of the auditors, although hard work has not been found to be fraudulent; or to exclude moral and business level factors simply because the auditor's audit work is in a hurry and the audit time is limited, that is, it does not pay due diligently and fails to find counterfeit. Under the circumstances, accounting, auditing standards and norms have shown a certain lag, and the binding force on accounting and audit is obviously insufficient. In addition, the social regulatory agency is also lack of punishment for the violation of the rules. It is clear that the auditor's moral level and the moral level are tested for individual or collective interests. The skills of practice, the potential "friendly cooperation" between the auditors and the audited units test the ability and strength of the audit supervision institutions, so the game relationship between the two is well worth the in-depth study of the scholars.
In this paper, the main line of writing is based on theoretical analysis, combined with the specific situation of scholars at home and abroad to analyze and demonstrate the problems existing in the audit career judgment, and then by citing the dynamic game model of incomplete information, the specific game process of the two parties is analyzed, and the reasons for the above problems and how to get into it are obtained. On the basis of the study of scholars, this paper briefly introduces the rationality of game theory and the wide application of game theory in the economics of economics and economics. In the past literature, this paper holds that the audit judgment process is exactly the dynamic game of incomplete information. There are two reasons. First, the participants in the game activities are in different practice environment and master different information. When they are integrated into the game, the information of the game can not be fully grasps, that is, the so-called "information asymmetry", so there is incomplete information of the game. Secondly, the action among the auditors is the action of the participants. In order, when the auditor and the audited unit game, the auditor chooses a certain probability to falsification of the financial report first, and then the auditor decides whether to conspire or comply with the behavior choice of the auditor, and the audit judgment is a dynamic game. Considering the dynamic game of incomplete information, there have been a lot of previous studies. Because China is a country that pays more attention to the rule of law, the external supervision is mostly the state authority (such as the State Audit Office) or the social organization (such as the CPA). It is believed that external supervision has a stronger effect on the decision-making of audit players under the rule of law. The paper establishes a dynamic game model of incomplete information between auditors and auditors, auditors and regulators. According to the analysis of game equilibrium results, it is found that audit judgment is not sufficient in game environment, game skills and game rules, and then puts forward to reduce financial fraud and audit fraud. The suggestion of birth emphasizes more emphasis on external audit supervision, and hopes to help the existing audit judgment problems, and play a positive role in the future research work of audit judgment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4;F224.32

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