【摘要】： 由于我國基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施建設(shè)的投資規(guī)模巨大,工程領(lǐng)域出現(xiàn)了很多的違法違規(guī)問題,諸如管理分散,監(jiān)督和制約機制不健全、招投標(biāo)階段存在大量違法違紀(jì)問題、合同管理舞弊、行賄受賄等,由此引發(fā)了一系列的社會問題,有的地區(qū)已嚴(yán)重影響了經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展與社會的安定。本文通過收集、分析“長江重要堤防隱蔽工程”、“中國體育博物館工程”、“粵海鐵路工程”等國家工程項目舞弊案例資料,說明國家工程項目在各環(huán)節(jié)都有可能出現(xiàn)舞弊行為。為了保證國家工程項目順利進(jìn)行,確保有關(guān)財政財務(wù)信息的透明度和真實性,保證政府職能的實現(xiàn)和公眾利益不受損害,以杜絕欺詐、濫用職權(quán)、權(quán)錢交易等舞弊行為,及時發(fā)現(xiàn)圍標(biāo)舞弊行為,實施國家工程項目舞弊審計勢在必行。本文闡述了國家工程項目舞弊及國家工程項目舞弊審計的必要性,對國家工程項目舞弊審計存在審計監(jiān)督體制缺乏透明性和有效性、審計的獨立性易受到人為因素的干擾、審計經(jīng)費和審計力量相對不足、審計執(zhí)行處理的難度較大等問題進(jìn)行了揭示;采用尋租理論、不對稱信息、成本效益等理論、委托代理理論對國家工程項目的被審計人的“經(jīng)濟(jì)人”行為凸顯、舞弊審計違規(guī)的懲罰成本小于預(yù)期收益、國家工程項目建設(shè)方及施工方與審計方相互尋租、審計機構(gòu)與被審計單位的博弈失衡、圍標(biāo)行為及圍標(biāo)行為發(fā)現(xiàn)存在時間差異等成因進(jìn)行了較深入的分析;并針對國家工程項目舞弊審計存在的問題提出應(yīng)完善國家工程項目舞弊審計機制、增加國家工程項目舞弊審計腐敗行為的懲罰成本、建立健全激勵和約束機制以約束審計雙方尋租行為、提升國家工程項目審計的透明度及有效性、加大被審單位圍標(biāo)行為的查處及處罰力度等相關(guān)對策。
[Abstract]:Due to the huge scale of investment in infrastructure construction in our country, there are many illegal and illegal problems in the engineering field, such as decentralized management, imperfect supervision and restriction mechanism, a large number of illegal and disciplinary problems in the bidding stage, and fraud in contract management. Bribery and bribery have caused a series of social problems, some regions have seriously affected the economic development and social stability. Through collecting and analyzing the cases of fraud in national engineering projects, such as "concealment project of important embankment of the Yangtze River", "China Sports Museum Project" and "Guangdong Railway Project", etc. State engineering projects in all links are likely to appear fraud. In order to ensure the smooth progress of state engineering projects, ensure the transparency and authenticity of relevant financial and financial information, and ensure that the functions of the government and the public interests are not harmed, so as to put an end to fraud, abuse of power, trading of power and money, etc., Timely detection of fraud, the implementation of national engineering project fraud audit imperative. This paper expounds the necessity of the national project fraud and the national engineering project fraud audit, and the lack of transparency and effectiveness of the audit supervision system for the national engineering project fraud audit, the independence of the audit is easily disturbed by human factors. The relative shortage of audit funds and audit power, the difficulty of audit execution and other problems are revealed, and the theory of rent-seeking, asymmetric information, cost benefit and so on is adopted. The principal-agent theory highlights the "economic person" behavior of the auditees of national engineering projects, the penalty cost of fraud and auditing irregularities is less than the expected income, and the construction and construction parties and auditors of national engineering projects seek rent from each other. The game imbalance between the audit institution and the auditee is analyzed deeply, and the cause of the difference between the behavior of the audit institution and the auditee is analyzed deeply. Aiming at the problems existing in the fraud audit of national engineering projects, the author puts forward that the mechanism of fraud audit of national engineering projects should be perfected, and the penalty cost of corrupt practices of national engineering projects should be increased. To establish and perfect the incentive and restraint mechanism to restrain the rent-seeking behavior of both sides of the audit, to enhance the transparency and effectiveness of the national project audit, and to increase the investigation and punishment of the bidding behavior of the units under review and other relevant countermeasures.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：長沙理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號】：F239.4

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