【摘要】： 1.主要內(nèi)容及觀點(diǎn) 獨(dú)立性一直是審計(jì)的本質(zhì)特征和靈魂所在。圍繞審計(jì)任期的長短是否影響審計(jì)獨(dú)立性,以及實(shí)行強(qiáng)制輪換制度是否能提高審計(jì)獨(dú)立性這個(gè)中心,本文分為五章加以論證,主要內(nèi)容與觀點(diǎn)如下: 第一章導(dǎo)論 本章首先闡述了本文的研究動(dòng)機(jī)。美國安然公司及世通公司相繼發(fā)生的驚天財(cái)務(wù)丑聞,擔(dān)任其審計(jì)業(yè)務(wù)多年的安達(dá)信也轟然倒塌。盡管關(guān)于長審計(jì)任期是否有利于提高審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的討論引起了廣泛的關(guān)注,美國國會(huì)為了提高審計(jì)的獨(dú)立性和社會(huì)公眾對審計(jì)執(zhí)業(yè)的信任,于2002年頒布了《薩班斯-奧克斯利法案》,提出實(shí)行審計(jì)合伙人輪換制度,并授權(quán)美國審計(jì)總署(GAO)對會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所強(qiáng)制輪換制度進(jìn)行研究。隨后,中國證監(jiān)會(huì)、財(cái)政部頒布了《關(guān)于證券期貨審計(jì)業(yè)務(wù)簽字注冊會(huì)計(jì)師定期輪換的規(guī)定》,也要求簽字注冊會(huì)計(jì)師連續(xù)為某一相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)提供審計(jì)服務(wù),不得超過五年。 其次,筆者界定了強(qiáng)制輪換的概念,認(rèn)為強(qiáng)制輪換是對一家會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所、審計(jì)合伙人或復(fù)核合伙人可以審計(jì)某特定公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的任期做出的限制,包括會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所強(qiáng)制輪換、審計(jì)合伙人或復(fù)核合伙人強(qiáng)制輪換兩種形式。 最后,闡述了審計(jì)獨(dú)立性的概念及經(jīng)濟(jì)性質(zhì)。 第二章公司治理與審計(jì)變更相關(guān)理論 這是全文的基礎(chǔ)部份,分二部份加以論述。第一部份闡述了公司治理的概念,以及獨(dú)立審計(jì)與公司治理的關(guān)系,并認(rèn)為審計(jì)是作為保持受托經(jīng)濟(jì)責(zé)任之全面有效履行而存在的一種特殊的經(jīng)濟(jì)控制手段或機(jī)制。 第二部份借鑒Wallac博士的審計(jì)動(dòng)因的理論(代理人理論、信
[Abstract]:1. The main content and viewpoint independence is the essential characteristic and soul of audit all the time. This paper is divided into five chapters to demonstrate whether the length of the audit term affects the audit independence and whether the mandatory rotation system can improve the audit independence. The main contents and viewpoints are as follows: the first chapter introduces the motivation of this paper. Andersen, which has been auditing Enron and WorldCom for many years, also collapsed after the financial scandal. Despite the widespread concern over whether the tenure of the long-run audit is conducive to enhancing audit independence, the United States Congress has sought to enhance the independence of the audit and the public's confidence in the practice of auditing. In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley Act was promulgated, which proposed the implementation of audit partner rotation system, and authorized (GAO) to study the mandatory rotation system of accounting firms. Subsequently, the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance promulgated the regulations on the regular rotation of signed Certified Public Accountants for Securities and Futures auditing, and also required the signed Certified Public Accountants to continue to provide audit services to a relevant institution for no more than five years. Secondly, the author defines the concept of mandatory rotation, and considers that mandatory rotation is the limitation of the term of office of an accounting firm, an audit partner or a reviewing partner who can audit the financial statements of a particular company. Including the mandatory rotation of accounting firms, audit partners or review partners mandatory rotation of two forms. Finally, the concept and economic nature of audit independence are expounded. The second chapter is the theory of corporate governance and audit change, which is the basic part of this paper, which is discussed in two parts. The first part expounds the concept of corporate governance and the relationship between independent audit and corporate governance, and considers that audit is a special economic control means or mechanism to maintain the overall and effective performance of entrusted economic responsibility. The second part draws on Dr Wallac's theory of audit motivation (agent theory, lette
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2006
【分類號】：F239.4

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 沈玉清;審計(jì)任期、公司治理與盈余質(zhì)量[D];電子科技大學(xué);2009年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 田桂凡;強(qiáng)制輪換對審計(jì)質(zhì)量影響的實(shí)證研究[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2007年

2 陳鈺星;會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所定期輪換制有效性研究[D];長沙理工大學(xué);2008年

3 劉鑫;簽字注冊會(huì)計(jì)師輪換制度對審計(jì)質(zhì)量影響的實(shí)證研究[D];南京財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2008年

4 湯夢宇;強(qiáng)制輪換會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所制度的有效性研究[D];北京交通大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號：2157295