本文選題：獨(dú)立董事經(jīng)理人 + 審計(jì)委員會(huì)�。� 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2005年碩士論文

【摘要】：作為一篇規(guī)范性的論文,本文意在從美國(guó)審計(jì)委員會(huì)失效出發(fā),探究審計(jì)委員會(huì)失效的原因并提出改進(jìn)的方案。通過分析,本文得出審計(jì)委員會(huì)的失效在于公眾對(duì)其組成成員即獨(dú)立董事的理解上出現(xiàn)了問題�；谖写砝碚�、經(jīng)濟(jì)人假設(shè)和管理學(xué)的基本理論,本文得出獨(dú)立董事的身份應(yīng)該是經(jīng)理人。 本文認(rèn)為,將獨(dú)立董事視為經(jīng)理人身份為我們理解審計(jì)委員會(huì)提供了一個(gè)新的視野,這具體體現(xiàn)在它突破了以往對(duì)獨(dú)立董事形式化的認(rèn)識(shí),徹底將獨(dú)立董事視為社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)人,要求獨(dú)立董事實(shí)實(shí)在在對(duì)公司價(jià)值做出貢獻(xiàn),而不僅僅充當(dāng)董事會(huì)“正名”的工具,成為花瓶或者裝飾品。獨(dú)立董事本身就是委托代理問題的一部分,要像其他經(jīng)理人一樣接受股東為主的利益相關(guān)者的選擇、激勵(lì)和監(jiān)督。同時(shí)本文認(rèn)為獨(dú)立董事的經(jīng)理人身份,不會(huì)導(dǎo)致獨(dú)立董事獨(dú)立性的削弱,反而會(huì)加強(qiáng)它。以往我們對(duì)獨(dú)立性的要求僅僅停留在準(zhǔn)入的門檻階段,現(xiàn)在將獨(dú)立董事像其他經(jīng)理人那樣加以激勵(lì)和監(jiān)督,可以將獨(dú)立性的維護(hù)推入一個(gè)過程,從而切實(shí)落實(shí)對(duì)獨(dú)立性的維護(hù)。本文進(jìn)一步以獨(dú)立董事經(jīng)理人身份為基礎(chǔ),并結(jié)合審計(jì)委員會(huì)的工作特點(diǎn),對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)的選擇、激勵(lì)和約束機(jī)制進(jìn)行設(shè)計(jì)。在選擇機(jī)制中,本文探討了審計(jì)委員會(huì)成員應(yīng)具備的素質(zhì)和選擇形式;在激勵(lì)機(jī)制中,本文認(rèn)為單純的聲譽(yù)激勵(lì)不能生效,需要與經(jīng)濟(jì)激勵(lì)相配合,并運(yùn)用組合激勵(lì)模型做出了分析;在約束機(jī)制中,本文在自我約束、他方約束、機(jī)制約束上對(duì)審計(jì)委員會(huì)的約束進(jìn)行了探討。文章最后,根據(jù)中國(guó)現(xiàn)階段的特征,分析了審計(jì)委員會(huì)在中國(guó)的發(fā)展,認(rèn)為要使審計(jì)委員會(huì)在中國(guó)生效,要漸進(jìn)的方式協(xié)調(diào)好審計(jì)委員會(huì)與監(jiān)事會(huì)的關(guān)系,并且在規(guī)則的制定過程中要以規(guī)則為導(dǎo)向。
[Abstract]:As a normative paper, this paper aims to explore the causes of the audit committee's invalidation from the failure of the American audit committee and put forward the improvement scheme. Through analysis, this paper concludes that the failure of audit committee lies in the public understanding of its constituent members, that is, independent directors. Based on the principal-agent theory, the hypothesis of economic man and the basic theory of management, this paper concludes that the identity of independent director should be manager. This paper holds that treating independent directors as managers provides us with a new vision to understand the audit committee, which is embodied in the fact that it breaks through the previous understanding of the formalization of independent directors and completely regards independent directors as social economic persons. Require independent directors to actually contribute to the value of the company, not just as a board's "name" tool, as a vase or ornament. Independent director itself is a part of the principal-agent problem, like other managers, they should accept the choice, incentive and supervision of stakeholders. At the same time, this paper argues that the independent director's executive identity will not lead to the weakening of the independent director's independence, but will strengthen it. In the past, our demand for independence was only at the threshold of entry. Now we can encourage and supervise independent directors as other managers do, which can push the maintenance of independence into a process, so as to effectively implement the maintenance of independence. Based on the identity of independent director manager and the working characteristics of audit committee, this paper designs the selection, incentive and restraint mechanism of audit committee. In the selection mechanism, this paper discusses the quality and selection form of the members of the audit committee. In the incentive mechanism, the author thinks that the pure reputation incentive is not effective, and needs to be coordinated with the economic incentive. In the constraint mechanism, this paper discusses the constraints of the audit committee in terms of self-constraint, other constraints and mechanism constraints. Finally, according to the characteristics of China at the present stage, this paper analyzes the development of audit committee in China, and thinks that in order to make the audit committee effective in China, it is necessary to coordinate the relationship between audit committee and supervisory committee in a gradual manner. And in the process of making the rules, we should be guided by the rules.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2005
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

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