本文選題：獨(dú)立審計 + 制度安排�。� 參考：《廈門大學(xué)》2003年博士論文

【摘要】： 本文以新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)為主要理論基礎(chǔ)，詳細(xì)分析了美國和我國獨(dú)立審計制度變遷與注冊會計師行為之間的互動關(guān)系。本文共分六章，第一章力圖構(gòu)建本文的分析框架，第二至第五章以美國為背景闡述獨(dú)立審計制度變遷與注冊會計師行為之間的互動關(guān)系，第六章則結(jié)合我國實(shí)際情況探討這一互動關(guān)系，各章分析思路和主要內(nèi)容如下： 第一章 本章力圖構(gòu)建全文分析的理論框架。在簡述新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)發(fā)展之后，本章通過對人類行為基本假設(shè)、制度起源與制度構(gòu)成、博弈論與新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、制度安排與制度變遷、制度與組織的關(guān)系這些基本概念的闡述和梳理，給出了制度分析的基本框架。結(jié)合獨(dú)立審計制度安排，筆者認(rèn)為，在制度縱向變遷中，國家與注冊會計師職業(yè)之間圍繞著獨(dú)立審計制度的成本效益不斷進(jìn)行的博弈是推動獨(dú)立審計制度變遷的最主要原因，博弈各方力量對比是獨(dú)立審計制度變遷成敗的最關(guān)鍵因素；在橫向制度安排中，有限理性經(jīng)濟(jì)人與機(jī)會主義行為傾向是注冊會計師行為選擇的基本價值標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，博弈和制度的成本效益衡量則是分析注冊會計師行為的基本方法，制度安排的意圖是否與注冊會計師行為選擇一致是判斷獨(dú)立審計制度績效的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。 第二章 本章主要闡述美國獨(dú)立審計制度安排的起源。獨(dú)立審計制度出臺的過程經(jīng)歷了自愿安排和強(qiáng)制安排兩個階段的博弈。股份公司的出現(xiàn)是第一階段博弈的基礎(chǔ)，隨著股份公司大規(guī)模出現(xiàn)，針對如何降低股份公司所有者與管理者之間的代理成本，所有者與管理者開始展開博弈，通過不斷博弈發(fā)現(xiàn)，獨(dú)立審計能夠降低所有者與管理者之間的代理成本，這樣，獨(dú)立審計作為一種有效的制度安排首先在一些公司自愿形成；在第二階段的博弈中，會計信息使用者集團(tuán)、會計信息提供者集團(tuán)、會計職業(yè)界和政府基于各自利益進(jìn)行博弈，在社會意識形態(tài)和博弈各方力量對比不斷發(fā)生變化的情況下，這種博弈過程一波三折，及至1929至1933年經(jīng)濟(jì)大危機(jī)的爆發(fā)才使得會計信息的價值被社會充分認(rèn)可，獨(dú)立審計終于成為美國證券市場法定制度安排。 第三章 本章主要闡述美國獨(dú)立審計監(jiān)管制度安排與變遷。國家提供的基本服務(wù)是博弈的基本規(guī)則，政府監(jiān)管部門對會計職業(yè)的監(jiān)管構(gòu)成獨(dú)立審計制度的最基本制度安排。美國獨(dú)立審計監(jiān)管制度的縱向變遷過程就是政府監(jiān)管部門與會計職業(yè)圍繞著各自成本效益不斷博弈的過程，20世紀(jì)30年代《證券法》出臺之后，美國獨(dú)立審計一直奉行“行業(yè)自律為主、政府監(jiān)管為輔”的監(jiān)管模式；20世紀(jì)70年代和90年代，隨著審計質(zhì)量的下降，政府兩度干預(yù)會計職業(yè)，但終未引起監(jiān)管模式的變化；2001年安然事件及其系列財務(wù)丑聞爆發(fā)后，政府再度干預(yù)會計職業(yè)，會計職業(yè)的監(jiān)管模式從行業(yè)自律為主轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楠?dú)立監(jiān)管為主。對美國行業(yè) 容摘 H內(nèi)餐摘登 一~~~~-~~~~~-~~-~ 自律為主的監(jiān)管制度橫向分析表明，行業(yè)自律的成功導(dǎo)致了會計職業(yè)勢力日益增 強(qiáng)，政府監(jiān)管勢力越來越弱，二者力量對比發(fā)生嚴(yán)重失衡是導(dǎo)致美國行業(yè)自律為 主的監(jiān)管模式失敗的主要原因。 第四章本章主要闡述美國獨(dú)立審計的獨(dú)立性制度安排與變遷。獨(dú)立性是會 計職業(yè)與政府監(jiān)管部門博弈的焦點(diǎn)，是獨(dú)立審計制度安排中最重要的制度安排。 本章首先回顧獨(dú)立性的學(xué)術(shù)研究成果，希冀通過獨(dú)立性的學(xué)術(shù)探討為下文分析提 供理論基礎(chǔ)，接著筆者開始描述獨(dú)立性安排的變遷，獨(dú)立性安排的縱向變遷就是 政府監(jiān)管部門與會計職業(yè)圍繞著對獨(dú)立性的不同認(rèn)識所展開的博弈過程。在此基 礎(chǔ)上，筆者轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)Κ?dú)立性的橫向分析，在橫向分析中，筆者提出，獨(dú)立性程度是 由注冊會計師通過對獨(dú)立性機(jī)制的利益取舍來決定，在分析中，筆者也發(fā)現(xiàn)目前 獨(dú)立性機(jī)制存在重大缺陷，為了解決這一缺陷，必須把獨(dú)立性置于更廣泛的范圍 加以分析和思考，重新構(gòu)建獨(dú)立性模式，獨(dú)立性棋式的更新也要求對現(xiàn)行獨(dú)立性 安排進(jìn)行改進(jìn)。只有重新認(rèn)識獨(dú)立性，并以此為基礎(chǔ)對現(xiàn)行獨(dú)立性安排進(jìn)行改進(jìn)， 才能從根本上解決獨(dú)立性問題。 第五章本章主要闡述美國獨(dú)立審計的法律責(zé)任和會計師事務(wù)所組織形式 制度安排與變遷。美國獨(dú)立審計法律責(zé)任制度安排是攀響審計獨(dú)立性重要的制度 安排，而會計師事務(wù)所的組織形式則是獨(dú)立審幾計的法律責(zé)任制度安排在會計師事 務(wù)所層次的重要體現(xiàn)。美國獨(dú)立審計的法律責(zé)任變遷經(jīng)歷了復(fù)雜的變遷過程，習(xí) 慣法下的民事責(zé)任呈現(xiàn)出逐漸擴(kuò)大的趨勢，成文法下的法律責(zé)任變遷則較為曲 折，總體經(jīng)歷了“三起兩落”的變遷過程，會計師事務(wù)所姐織形式的變遷是會計 職業(yè)經(jīng)營管理和法律責(zé)任這兩種因素共同作用的結(jié)果.通過對這兩種制度安排的 分析表明，合理的法律貴任和組織形式安排旗圈熱頗會計取業(yè)與會計報表使用者 的利益，單純考慮會計職業(yè)的利益或者會計娘表使用者的利益都是不可取的。 第六章本章主要闡述我國獨(dú)立審計制度安排與變遷。本章通過回顧我國獨(dú) 立審計制度安排的縱向變遷后認(rèn)為，作為轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟(jì)國家，我國獨(dú)立審計制度變遷 具有深深的行政烙印和特殊的路徑依賴.之后，筆者緒合我國實(shí)際情況，從獨(dú)立 審計監(jiān)管模式、獨(dú)立性制度安排、獨(dú)立審計的法律責(zé)任和會計師事務(wù)所組織形式 三個方
[Abstract]:This paper, taking the new institutional economics as the main theoretical basis, analyzes the interactive relationship between the changes of independent audit system and the behavior of Certified Public Accountants in the United States and China. This article is divided into six chapters. The first chapter tries to construct the analysis framework of this article, and the second to the fifth chapter describes the change of independent audit system and the CPA bank in the United States. For the interactive relationship, the sixth chapter discusses the interactive relationship in light of China's actual situation. The main ideas and main contents of each chapter are as follows:
In the first chapter, this chapter tries to build a theoretical framework for the full text analysis. After a brief introduction to the development of new institutional economics, this chapter describes and combs the basic concepts of the basic assumptions of human behavior, the origin and system of the system, the game theory and the new institutional economics, the institutional arrangement and the institutional change, the system and the organization. Based on the basic framework of the degree analysis, in combination with the independent audit system, the author holds that in the longitudinal change of the system, the game between the state and the certified public accountants around the cost and benefit of the independent audit system is the most important reason to promote the change of the independent audit system, and the force contrast between the parties of the game is the change of the independent audit system. The most important factor of defeat is that in the horizontal institutional arrangement, the limited rational economic person and opportunist behavior tendency are the basic values of the CPA behavior choice, and the cost benefit measurement of game and system is the basic method of analyzing CPA Behavior, whether the intention of the system arrangement is consistent with the choice of CPA behavior. It is the standard to judge the performance of an independent audit system.
The second chapter mainly expounds the origin of the independent audit system in the United States. The process of the introduction of the independent audit system has experienced the game of two stages of voluntary arrangement and compulsory arrangement. The emergence of the joint stock company is the basis of the first stage game. With the large-scale emergence of the joint stock companies, how to reduce the owners and managers of the joint-stock companies Between the agent cost, the owner and the manager start to start the game. Through the continuous game, the independent audit can reduce the agency cost between the owner and the manager. In this way, the independent audit, as an effective institutional arrangement, is first formed in some companies. In the game of the second stage, the accounting information user group, The accounting information provider group, the accounting profession and the government game based on their respective interests. In the case of the constant change in the social ideology and the strength of the game, the game process has been broken, and the value of the accounting information is fully recognized by the society and independent trial after the outbreak of the great economic crisis from 1929 to 1933. Finally, it became the legal system arrangement in the US stock market.
The third chapter mainly expounds the arrangements and changes of the independent audit supervision system in the United States. The basic services provided by the state are the basic rules of the game, and the supervision of the government to the accounting profession constitutes the most basic institutional arrangement of the independent audit system. The longitudinal change process of the independent audit supervision system in the United States is the participation of the government supervision department. After the introduction of the securities law in 1930s, the independent audit of the United States has been pursuing a regulatory model of "industry self-discipline mainly and government regulation supplemented". In 1970s and 90s, the government intervened in accounting profession with the decrease of audit quality in 1970s and 90s, but it did not cause supervision. After the outbreak of Enron and its series of financial scandals in 2001, the government intervened in the accounting profession again. The supervision mode of the accounting profession changed from the industry self-discipline to the independent supervision.
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H meal excerpts
From - ~ ~ - ~ - ~ - ~ ~ ~
Horizontal analysis of self regulatory system shows that the success of industry self-regulation has led to an increasing number of Accountants' professional power.
Strong, the government regulatory power is becoming weaker and weaker. The serious imbalance between the two forces is the result of the industry self-discipline in the United States.
The main reason for the failure of the main regulatory model.
The fourth chapter mainly expounds the institutional arrangements and changes of independent audit in the United States.
The focus of game between occupation and government supervision department is the most important institutional arrangement in the arrangement of independent auditing system.
This chapter first reviews the academic achievements of independence, hoping to make an analysis through the independent academic discussion.
On the basis of theory, the author begins to describe the change of independence arrangement, and the longitudinal change of independence arrangement is
The game between government regulation department and accounting profession revolves around the different understanding of independence.
On the basis of this, I turn to the horizontal analysis of independence. In horizontal analysis, the author suggests that the degree of independence is
It is decided by the CPA's interest in the independence mechanism. In the analysis, the author also finds that
There are major defects in the independence mechanism. In order to solve this problem, independence must be placed in a wider range.
After analyzing and thinking, the independent mode is rebuilt. The updating of independence chess style also requires the current independence.
Arrangements for improvement. Only by re recognizing the independence and improving the existing independence arrangements based on this.
The problem of independence can be fundamentally solved.
The fifth chapter mainly states the legal responsibility of independent audit in the United States and the organization form of accounting firms.
Institutional arrangements and changes. The arrangement of the legal liability system of independent audit in the United States is an important system for auditing independence.
The organization of accounting firms is arranged by the independent legal system.
The change of legal responsibility of independent audit in the United States has gone through a complex process of change.
The civil liability under the customary law shows a trend of gradual expansion, and the change of legal liability under statute law is more complicated.
As a whole, it has gone through the process of "three ups and two falls". The change of the form of accounting firms is accounting.
The two factors of professional management and legal liability are the result of the joint action of these two systems.
The analysis shows that a reasonable legal responsibility and organizational form can be used to arrange the flag business.
It is not desirable to consider the interests of accounting profession or the interests of users of accounting mothers.
The sixth chapter mainly expounds the arrangement and change of independent auditing system in our country.
After the vertical change of the audit system arrangement, we believe that as a transitional country, the independent auditing system changes in China.
It has deep administrative branding and special path dependence. After that, the author combines the actual situation of China from independence.
Audit supervision mode, independence system arrangement, legal responsibility of independent audit and organization form of accounting firms.
Three parties
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2003
【分類號】：F239.2

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前3條

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本文編號：2029552