本文選題：獨(dú)立審計(jì)誠信 + 制度安排��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2003年碩士論文

【摘要】： 2001年，隨著銀廣夏等一系列財(cái)務(wù)造假案件的曝光,注冊會(huì)計(jì)師一時(shí)間備受質(zhì)疑，中國注冊會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)遭遇了前所未有的誠信危機(jī)，重樹審計(jì)誠信成為全行業(yè)面臨的首要任務(wù)。 但是，我們應(yīng)該看到，誠信缺失并不是注冊會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)特有的問題。整個(gè)社會(huì)普遍存在信用觀念淡薄，不講誠信的現(xiàn)象比比皆是。如果撇開現(xiàn)實(shí)環(huán)境談?wù)\信原則，孤立地討論誠信缺失事件是缺乏現(xiàn)實(shí)意義的。在我國轉(zhuǎn)軌經(jīng)濟(jì)的背景下，誠信并不是一個(gè)抽象的道德問題，而有其十分復(fù)雜的社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)文化甚至政治背景。僅僅靠倡導(dǎo)和教育注冊會(huì)計(jì)師講誠信是不夠的，，必須從道義的批判和制度的匡正兩方面對審計(jì)失信行為進(jìn)行治理。 基于上述考慮，本文以制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的基本觀點(diǎn)為分析的理論起點(diǎn)，對獨(dú)立審計(jì)誠信建設(shè)問題進(jìn)行了研究。本文按照提出問題－分析問題－解決問題的步驟來組織和構(gòu)建，全文共分為四部分。 文章的第一部分，對我國傳統(tǒng)文化中的誠信和市場經(jīng)濟(jì)所要求的誠信進(jìn)行分析，得出誠信建設(shè)應(yīng)該以一定的制度安排為基礎(chǔ)的結(jié)論。作為我國傳統(tǒng)文化中重要的道德規(guī)范，誠信的影響是深遠(yuǎn)的，審計(jì)誠信建設(shè)有著深厚的思想基礎(chǔ)。但是傳統(tǒng)文化中的誠信僅僅強(qiáng)調(diào)個(gè)人道德上的修養(yǎng)，強(qiáng)調(diào)單方實(shí)踐誠信，對于失信者缺乏普遍的制度約束。而市場經(jīng)濟(jì)下不僅要求當(dāng)事人講誠信，更重要的是，使誠信行為得到補(bǔ)償和鼓勵(lì)，使不誠信行為受到懲罰，迫使當(dāng)事人講誠信。 制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)認(rèn)為制度（即各種正式的和非正式的規(guī)則或規(guī)章）是通過利益誘導(dǎo)或禁例的方式來影響個(gè)體行為的。市場經(jīng)濟(jì)下經(jīng)濟(jì)個(gè)體決定采取或不采取某項(xiàng)行為主要考慮的就是經(jīng)濟(jì)上是否有效，他們的行為離不開相應(yīng)制度安排的誘導(dǎo)。因此，注冊會(huì)計(jì)師作為“逐利的理性經(jīng)濟(jì)人”，誠信是長期利益和短期利益權(quán)衡的結(jié)果，其行為在相當(dāng)程度上受制度安排的有效性和可預(yù)期的穩(wěn)定性所決定。 文章的第二部分，從三個(gè)方面分析了我國審計(jì)誠信嚴(yán)重缺失的制度背景。 WP=3 第一，由于在現(xiàn)有的制度安排下沒有對高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的需求，審計(jì)人員就沒有講誠信的積極性。我國股票市場受政府政策影響較大,企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)信息與股票價(jià)格相關(guān)性不高，以散戶為主的投資者對企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)信息也不重視。在政府行政干預(yù)下的資本市場中，尋求上市的公司或已上市公司只需要滿足取得政府管制機(jī)構(gòu)認(rèn)可的審計(jì)意見即可。同時(shí)，上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)不合理及由此產(chǎn)生的審計(jì)關(guān)系失衡，也嚴(yán)重制約了注冊會(huì)計(jì)師誠信水準(zhǔn)。由于企業(yè)需要的是能夠“配合”的事務(wù)所，對高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的需求不足甚至排斥，使得“規(guī)范執(zhí)業(yè)找死”成為注冊會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)所面臨的市場寫照。屈從于壓力，甚至與各方合謀，成為注冊會(huì)計(jì)師的理性選擇。 其次，我國的事務(wù)所的組建、脫鉤改制、兼并、整合，無不是以行政命令進(jìn)行的強(qiáng)制性制度變遷。頻繁的產(chǎn)權(quán)變動(dòng)，使得合伙人對自己在事務(wù)所中的產(chǎn)權(quán)份額沒有安全感，對未來難以形成穩(wěn)定的預(yù)期，合伙人沒有講誠信的積極性。 第二，現(xiàn)有的制度安排下審計(jì)誠信缺乏外在的壓力。本文以《1.9規(guī)定》公布前的情況為分析背景，具體對訴訟資格、訴訟成本與訴訟收益進(jìn)行分析，說明我國審計(jì)人員失信的法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)不大。此外，我國事務(wù)所目前大多是有限責(zé)任制，幾十萬元的注冊資本承擔(dān)了涉及幾個(gè)億、數(shù)十億金額的業(yè)務(wù)，使得事務(wù)所的敗德成本很低，潛在收益卻很高。在法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)低，敗德成本小的制度安排下，審計(jì)人員沒有壓力講誠信。 第三，注冊會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)的監(jiān)管尚未理順，不利于審計(jì)誠信的建設(shè)。 我國基本上是半政府半民間的行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)監(jiān)管與自律機(jī)制。政府監(jiān)督的弊端主要表現(xiàn)為多頭管理、多頭監(jiān)管。既容易出現(xiàn)監(jiān)督空白，又人為加大了監(jiān)督成本。如果政府進(jìn)行不當(dāng)管制，權(quán)力機(jī)構(gòu)過多地涉及職業(yè)管理，反而會(huì)造成注冊會(huì)計(jì)師職業(yè)服務(wù)質(zhì)量低劣，公眾利益得不到保護(hù)，容易造成部門分割。同時(shí)，中注協(xié)定位模糊，協(xié)會(huì)的職能定位為"服務(wù)、監(jiān)督、管理、協(xié)調(diào)"，在政府利益與行業(yè)利益不一致時(shí)，協(xié)會(huì)的作用難以發(fā)揮。協(xié)會(huì)自律作用不到位，使得對失信的審計(jì)行為難以及時(shí)發(fā)現(xiàn)。 WP=4 文章的第三部分，以制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中信譽(yù)機(jī)制的實(shí)現(xiàn)條件為理論起點(diǎn)，以獨(dú)立審計(jì)誠信機(jī)制的作用條件為指導(dǎo)，嘗試著構(gòu)建獨(dú)立審計(jì)誠信建設(shè)的制度體系框架。三者關(guān)系如下圖所示： 文章的第四部分，是在構(gòu)建的制度體系框架下對獨(dú)立審計(jì)誠信建設(shè)作出具體的政策建議。 第一，完善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)是解決審計(jì)誠信問題的治本之策，有利于抑制企業(yè)造假和培育對高質(zhì)量審計(jì)的需求。本文以建立健全獨(dú)立董事制度為切入點(diǎn)，探討公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)問題。獨(dú)立董事制度在我國已經(jīng)初步建立，目前制度建設(shè)的重點(diǎn)是如何讓其真正發(fā)揮作用�？梢钥紤]通過對獨(dú)立董事的報(bào)酬制度進(jìn)行改革，建立有效的激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制，充分調(diào)動(dòng)積極性；通過各項(xiàng)資格規(guī)定保證獨(dú)立董事的質(zhì)量和獨(dú)立性，建立獨(dú)立董事的生成、評(píng)價(jià)、退出制度，運(yùn)用退出機(jī)制淘汰那些不稱職的獨(dú)立董事，使獨(dú)立董事的選擇走上市場化的軌道；通過對表決權(quán)比例的規(guī)定，使獨(dú)立董事的投票真正具有含金量，建立獨(dú)立董事作用的保障制度。 WP=5 第二，事務(wù)所采取合伙制或有限合伙制是建立審計(jì)誠信的體制基礎(chǔ)?
[Abstract]:In 2001, with the exposure of a series of financial fraud cases such as silver and Guangxia, CPA has been questioned for a time. The Chinese certified public accountant industry has encountered an unprecedented credit crisis. It has become the primary task facing the whole industry.
However, we should see that lack of good faith is not a special problem in the CPA industry. There is a common phenomenon of weak credit in the whole society, and the phenomenon of honesty is abound. It is not an abstract moral problem, but it has its very complicated social, economic, cultural and even political background. It is not enough only to advocate and educate CPA to speak good faith. It must be dealt with in the face of the two sides of the moral criticism and the rectification of the system.
Based on the above considerations, this paper, taking the basic point of view of institutional economics as the theoretical starting point, studies the problem of the construction of independent audit integrity. This paper is organized and constructed in accordance with the steps of putting forward questions - analysis problems - solving problems. The full text is divided into four parts.
The first part of the article is to analyze the honesty and credibility required by the market economy in Chinese traditional culture, and draw the conclusion that the construction of honesty and credit should be based on a certain institutional arrangement. As an important moral norm in our traditional culture, the influence of honesty is profound, but the construction of audit integrity has a profound ideological basis. The integrity of the traditional culture only emphasizes the moral cultivation of the individual, emphasizes the practice of honesty and integrity, and lacks universal institutional constraints for the dishonest person. In the market economy, the parties not only require the parties to speak good faith, but also, more importantly, make the integrity behavior be compensated and encouraged, and the dishonesty is punished, and the parties are forced to speak good faith.
Institutional economics believes that institutions (i.e. various formal and informal rules or regulations) affect individual behavior by means of benefit induction or prohibition. In the market economy, economic individuals decide whether to take or not take a certain act mainly in terms of whether they are economically effective, and their behavior is inseparable from the induction of the corresponding institutional arrangements. As a result, CPA is the result of the balance between long-term interests and short-term interests, and its behavior is determined by the effectiveness and expected stability of institutional arrangements to a certain extent.
The second part of the article analyzes the institutional background of the serious lack of audit credibility from three aspects.
WP=3
First, because there is no demand for high quality audit under the existing institutional arrangements, the auditors have no enthusiasm for honesty. China's stock market is greatly influenced by the government policy, the financial information of the enterprise is not highly correlated with the stock price, and the investors based on the retail account do not pay much attention to the financial information of the enterprise. In the pre capital market, the listed companies or listed companies only need to meet the audit opinions approved by the government regulatory agencies. At the same time, the irrational governance structure of the listed companies and the resulting imbalance in the audit relationship also seriously restrict the quality of certified public accountants. Because the enterprises need to be able to "cooperate" The firm's demand for high quality audit is insufficient or even excluded, which makes "standardized practice finding death" as a market portrayal for CPA industry.
Secondly, the establishment of China's firms, decoupling and restructuring, merger and integration, is not a mandatory system change with administrative orders. Frequent changes in property rights make the partners have no sense of security for their share in the firm's property rights. It is difficult to form a stable expectation for the future, and the partners do not speak the enthusiasm of good faith.
Second, under the existing system arrangement, the audit honesty is lack of external pressure. In this paper, the situation of the <1.9 regulation before the publication is analyzed, and the litigation eligibility, the cost of litigation and the benefit of litigation are analyzed, which shows that the legal risk of the auditors in our country is not very risky. In addition, most of our firms are currently limited liability system and hundreds of thousands of yuan. The registered capital has undertaken a business involving billions of dollars and billions of dollars. The cost of the firm's failure is very low and the potential income is very high. Under the system of low legal risk and low cost, the auditors have no pressure to speak good faith.
Third, the regulation of the CPA industry has not yet been straightened out, which is not conducive to the construction of audit integrity.
Our country is basically the supervision and self-discipline mechanism of the semi government and half folk Industry Association. The malpractice of the government supervision is mainly the multi head management and the multi head supervision. It is easy to appear the supervision blank and increase the supervision cost. If the government conducts the improper control, the authority is too much involved in the occupation management, but will cause the CPA job instead. The quality of the service is low, the public interest is not protected and the Department is easily divided. At the same time, the location of the association is ambiguous. The function of the association is "service, supervision, management and coordination". The function of the association is difficult to play when the interests of the government are not consistent with the interests of the industry. Find out.
WP=4
The third part of the article, taking the conditions of the realization of credit mechanism in institutional economics as the theoretical starting point and guided by the conditions of the independent audit credit mechanism, tries to build a system framework for the construction of independent audit integrity. The relationship between the three is as shown in the following chart.
The fourth part of the article is to make specific policy recommendations for the construction of independent auditing Credibility under the framework of the institutional framework.
First, improving the corporate governance structure is the basic policy to solve the problem of audit honesty and credibility. It is beneficial to restrain the counterfeiting of enterprises and cultivate the demand for high quality audit. This paper, based on the establishment and improvement of the independent director system, discusses the problem of corporate governance. The independent director system has been initially established in China and the focus of the present system construction is How to let it really play its role, we can consider the reform of the remuneration system of independent directors, establish effective incentive and restraint mechanisms, fully mobilize the enthusiasm, guarantee the quality and independence of independent directors through various qualifications, establish the generation of independent directors, evaluate, withdraw system, and use exit mechanism to eliminate those who do not. Competent independent directors make the choice of independent directors on the track of marketization; through the regulation of the proportion of voting rights, the vote of independent directors really has gold content and establishes the guarantee system of the role of independent directors.
WP=5
Second, partnership or limited partnership is the institutional foundation for establishing audit integrity.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2003
【分類號(hào)】：F239

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 陳曉亮;;注冊會(huì)計(jì)師失信問題研究[J];金融理論與教學(xué);2013年01期

本文編號(hào)：1990420