本文選題：政府審計 + 信息不對稱��； 參考：《四川大學(xué)》2005年碩士論文

【摘要】：信息經(jīng)濟時代,信息作為一種重要生產(chǎn)力資源影響著社會生活的方方面面。充分占有信息的優(yōu)勢方,在競爭日趨激烈的今天,往往能把握全局,規(guī)避風(fēng)險,最終獲得成功;而處于信息弱勢的一方,在市場經(jīng)濟中舉步為艱,隨時面臨著遭遇損失和失敗的風(fēng)險。因此,研究在信息不對稱條件下,采用何種手段,運用何種方法將由于信息不對稱帶來的風(fēng)險降到承受范圍之內(nèi),對增強市場經(jīng)濟參與者把握全局和參與市場競爭的能力,有著重要而深遠的意義。 政府審計作為受托經(jīng)濟的產(chǎn)物,代表政府行使監(jiān)督審查職能,在保障社會主義市場經(jīng)濟健康有序地運行上發(fā)揮著越來越重要的作用。由于審計是受托經(jīng)濟的產(chǎn)物,所以審計與被審計之間天然存在著信息不對稱,這種不對稱直接影響審計監(jiān)督的質(zhì)量,引發(fā)審計風(fēng)險。要樹立政府審計的權(quán)威,做好社會主義市場經(jīng)濟的“守夜人”,政府審計必須研究和掌握信息不對稱狀況下,審計風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生的機制,并有針對性地研究和制定緩解審計風(fēng)險的方法、措施和手段。 本文試圖在信息不對稱的大前提下,結(jié)合作者在政府審計部門多年的工作經(jīng)驗,運用喬治·阿克洛夫和邁克爾·斯彭斯的信息不對稱理論,分析闡述審計風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生機制,并從實用的角度提出緩解審計風(fēng)險的對策和建議。本文的第一部分首先介紹政府審計的基本概念;其次介紹政府審計風(fēng)險的概念、特征和具體表現(xiàn)以及傳統(tǒng)審計風(fēng)險模型和現(xiàn)代審計風(fēng)險模型的區(qū)別和影響;最后介紹目前審計風(fēng)險的一些控制機制。第二部分首先介紹了“逆向選擇”、“混同均衡”和“信號”等相關(guān)的信息不對稱概念,再闡述了信息不對稱條件下政府審計風(fēng)險產(chǎn)生的機理。第三部分引入兩個案例,詳細的講述信息不對稱條件下的政府
[Abstract]:In the age of information economy, information, as an important productive resource, affects all aspects of social life. Today, when the competition is becoming increasingly fierce, the party that fully occupies the advantage of information is often able to grasp the overall situation, avoid risks, and finally achieve success, while the party in the information weak position is struggling in the market economy. Risk of loss and failure at any time. Therefore, under the condition of asymmetric information, what means and methods should be used to reduce the risk brought by asymmetric information to the range to enhance the ability of market economy participants to grasp the overall situation and to participate in market competition, so as to improve the ability of market economy participants to grasp the overall situation and participate in market competition. As the product of entrusted economy, government audit, acting on behalf of the government, plays a more and more important role in ensuring the healthy and orderly operation of socialist market economy. Because audit is the product of entrusted economy, there is a natural information asymmetry between audit and audit, which directly affects the quality of audit supervision and leads to audit risk. In order to establish the authority of the government audit and be the "night-watchman" of the socialist market economy, the government audit must study and master the mechanism of audit risk under the condition of asymmetric information. This paper attempts to combine the author's many years of experience in the government audit department under the premise of asymmetric information, and formulate the methods, measures and means to mitigate the audit risk. Based on the information asymmetry theory of George 路Akerlof and Michael Spence, this paper analyzes the mechanism of audit risk, and puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to mitigate audit risk from a practical point of view. The first part of this paper first introduces the basic concept of government audit, then introduces the concept of government audit risk, characteristics and specific performance, as well as the traditional audit risk model and modern audit risk model difference and influence. At last, some control mechanisms of audit risk are introduced. The second part first introduces the concepts of "reverse selection", "mixed equilibrium" and "signal", and then expounds the mechanism of government audit risk under the condition of asymmetric information. The third part introduces two cases about the government under the condition of asymmetric information.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2005
【分類號】：F239.6

【引證文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 張賀玲;;政府審計腐敗之經(jīng)濟學(xué)分析[J];商場現(xiàn)代化;2010年21期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 劉小琴;環(huán)境審計風(fēng)險的識別、評估和控制研究[D];廣西大學(xué);2011年

2 楊卉;內(nèi)部控制流程錯弊敏感性對內(nèi)部控制評估影響研究[D];新疆財經(jīng)大學(xué);2012年

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本文編號：1987709