本文選題：獨(dú)立審計(jì) + 獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為�。� 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2003年碩士論文

【摘要】： 市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的最大優(yōu)點(diǎn)就是通過(guò)資源的自由流動(dòng)，實(shí)現(xiàn)合理、高效的資源配置。證券市場(chǎng)是市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展到一定階段的產(chǎn)物，它是優(yōu)化資源配置，推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的重要力量。影響證券市場(chǎng)規(guī)范運(yùn)作及其作用有效發(fā)揮的核心是證券市場(chǎng)上普遍存在的信息不對(duì)稱問(wèn)題。在解決信息不對(duì)稱的問(wèn)題上，獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為起著至關(guān)重要的作用。合理、高效的獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為成為維護(hù)廣大中小投資者利益的重要措施，為社會(huì)稀缺資源實(shí)現(xiàn)有效配置提供了重要的制度保證。 然而，我國(guó)目前的獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為存在的主要問(wèn)題是審計(jì)主體沒(méi)能保持客觀、公正的獨(dú)立地位，導(dǎo)致審計(jì)質(zhì)量降低，社會(huì)公信力下降，這一問(wèn)題已經(jīng)嚴(yán)重威脅到了整個(gè)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)的生存與發(fā)展。因此，消除不良獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為，提高注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的獨(dú)立性和執(zhí)業(yè)質(zhì)量，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為的優(yōu)化是當(dāng)前審計(jì)理論和實(shí)務(wù)都迫切需要解決的難題，也是一個(gè)重要的課題。 本文的研究重點(diǎn)是：1、對(duì)于獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為主體在執(zhí)業(yè)過(guò)程中出現(xiàn)的單純追求經(jīng)濟(jì)利益而忽視社會(huì)效益的行為，目前相應(yīng)的激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制存在哪些不足之處。2、為了使得審計(jì)主體將追求經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的動(dòng)機(jī)與實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)效益的動(dòng)機(jī)在執(zhí)業(yè)過(guò)程中相互統(tǒng)一起來(lái)，目前應(yīng)該怎樣強(qiáng)化對(duì)審計(jì)主體因單純追求經(jīng)濟(jì)利益而出現(xiàn)的違法行為的約束，同時(shí)有效激勵(lì)審計(jì)主體的規(guī)范執(zhí)業(yè)行為，，最終達(dá)到治理和優(yōu)化不良獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為的目的，促進(jìn)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)的健康發(fā)展。以上兩個(gè)問(wèn)題的邏輯關(guān)系是：?jiǎn)栴}1是不良獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為產(chǎn)生的原因分析，只有較好的解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，才能使得下文提出的政策建議做到有的放矢。問(wèn)題2是治理不良獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為的對(duì)策研究，剖析了強(qiáng)化激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制的重點(diǎn)與難點(diǎn)。 本文的研究思路是：首先通過(guò)對(duì)我國(guó)目前獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為現(xiàn)狀的分析，指出目前不良的獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為必須進(jìn)行治理和優(yōu)化。然后從獨(dú)立審計(jì)主體的需求和動(dòng)機(jī)，以及相應(yīng)的激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制這個(gè)角度，分析 WP=3 了不良獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為產(chǎn)生的原因。最后在此基礎(chǔ)上，嘗試著探索并提出了一些優(yōu)化我國(guó)獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為的可行性建議。 本文的主要內(nèi)容和觀點(diǎn)如下：從動(dòng)態(tài)的角度看，獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為作為一項(xiàng)社會(huì)活動(dòng)，是在外部環(huán)境和內(nèi)部機(jī)制共同作用下產(chǎn)生的，其行為過(guò)程是一個(gè)“需求——?jiǎng)訖C(jī)——目標(biāo)”循環(huán)。從靜態(tài)的角度看，獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為由審計(jì)主體、審計(jì)客體和審計(jì)環(huán)境三要素構(gòu)成。審計(jì)主體是指審計(jì)人員和組織，主要是注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師以及由注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師組成的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所。審計(jì)客體是被審計(jì)人，即客戶管理層或管理當(dāng)局。審計(jì)環(huán)境不僅包括政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)、文化和法律等宏觀環(huán)境因素，還包括審計(jì)委托人這一要素。審計(jì)主體的行為動(dòng)機(jī)分為兩個(gè)層次，一是謀求自身經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的動(dòng)機(jī)，一是實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)效益的動(dòng)機(jī)，二者是個(gè)有機(jī)統(tǒng)一的整體。我們既不能要求審計(jì)主體在“餓肚子”的情況下來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)效益，也不能讓審計(jì)主體一味地追求經(jīng)濟(jì)利益而放棄實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)效益。審計(jì)主體必須將實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)效益的行為統(tǒng)一于謀求自身經(jīng)濟(jì)利益的行為之中。實(shí)現(xiàn)兩個(gè)層次的動(dòng)機(jī)相互協(xié)調(diào)有賴于有效的激勵(lì)和約束機(jī)制的建立，激勵(lì)與約束的弱化必然導(dǎo)致審計(jì)主體只顧追求經(jīng)濟(jì)利益而忽視社會(huì)效益。 現(xiàn)階段我國(guó)獨(dú)立審計(jì)行為主要存在的問(wèn)題是：審計(jì)主體沒(méi)有協(xié)調(diào)好追求經(jīng)濟(jì)利益動(dòng)機(jī)與實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)效益動(dòng)機(jī)之間的關(guān)系，為了追求自身經(jīng)濟(jì)利益而沒(méi)能保持客觀、公正的獨(dú)立地位，造成審計(jì)質(zhì)量降低、社會(huì)公信力下降。其主要原因包括兩個(gè)方面： 1、注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的違法行為缺乏約束。由于外部約束的弱化，注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師在利益的驅(qū)動(dòng)下，很容易出現(xiàn)喪失獨(dú)立性的違法行為。導(dǎo)致外部約束弱化的主要原因有（1）我國(guó)法律制度弱化對(duì)出現(xiàn)審計(jì)失敗的注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的事后追究。首先是法律允許會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所采用有限責(zé)任的組織形式，弱化了注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師在審計(jì)失敗中的個(gè)人責(zé)任，再加上追究注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的民事責(zé)任的相關(guān)法律規(guī)定不完善，使得注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師一旦出現(xiàn)審計(jì)失敗，所遭受的經(jīng)濟(jì)損失與所獲得的收益嚴(yán)重的不對(duì)稱。（2）審計(jì)的“實(shí)際委托人”虛位，實(shí)際由被審計(jì)單位管理當(dāng)局擔(dān)任審計(jì)委托人，這種審計(jì)委托關(guān)系破壞了注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師在審計(jì)三方關(guān)系 WP=4 中的獨(dú)立性，給被審單位管理當(dāng)局干預(yù)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行為以及與注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師“合謀”損害社會(huì)公眾利益提供了可能。（3）廣大中小投資者的自我保護(hù)意識(shí)薄弱，讓不規(guī)范執(zhí)業(yè)的注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師心存“違法也不究”的僥幸心理。（4）中國(guó)傳統(tǒng)的“人治”觀念和中庸思想導(dǎo)致社會(huì)降低對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師執(zhí)業(yè)行為的要求，只要可以滿足領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的需要，只要有關(guān)系，不管執(zhí)業(yè)質(zhì)量高低，注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師都可以生存下去。 2、注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的規(guī)范執(zhí)業(yè)行為缺乏激勵(lì)。由于目前的審計(jì)收費(fèi)嚴(yán)重不足，審計(jì)收費(fèi)與注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的職業(yè)道德、聲譽(yù)沒(méi)有相應(yīng)配比，所以缺乏注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師執(zhí)業(yè)質(zhì)量與收益掛鉤的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。導(dǎo)致激勵(lì)弱化的原因主要有：（1）會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所不能自主定價(jià)，不利于激勵(lì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師通過(guò)提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量來(lái)提高審計(jì)收費(fèi)。（2）現(xiàn)行的審計(jì)收費(fèi)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)沒(méi)有考慮預(yù)期風(fēng)險(xiǎn)損失準(zhǔn)備，不能滿足注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師抗御職業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的需要。（3）會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所之間的低價(jià)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、以及市場(chǎng)需求者壓低價(jià)格的行為都造成審計(jì)收費(fèi)嚴(yán)重不足，進(jìn)而影響到注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的獨(dú)立性和審計(jì)質(zhì)量。 為了治理和優(yōu)化我國(guó)
[Abstract]:The biggest advantage of the market economy is to realize the rational and efficient allocation of resources through the free flow of resources. The securities market is the product of the development of the market economy to a certain stage. It is an important force to optimize the allocation of resources and promote the economic development. The core of the securities market regulation operation and its effective play is the general stock market. In order to solve the problem of information asymmetry, independent audit behavior plays an important role in solving the problem of information asymmetry. Reasonable and efficient independent audit behavior has become an important measure to safeguard the interests of small and medium investors. It provides an important system guarantee for the effective allocation of social scarce resources.
However, the main problem in our current independent audit behavior is that the audit subject has not been able to maintain an objective and impartial status, which leads to the decrease of audit quality and the decline of social credibility. This problem has seriously threatened the survival and development of the whole CPA industry. Therefore, to eliminate the bad independent audit behavior and improve the registration society. It is an urgent problem that the current audit theory and practice need to be solved, as well as an important subject, to optimize the independence and practice quality of the planner, thus realizing the optimization of the independent audit behavior.
The main points of this study are as follows: 1, in order to make the auditing body pursue the motive of economic benefit and the motive of realizing the social benefit, there are some inadequacies in the corresponding incentive and restraint mechanism for the behavior of the independent audit actor in the process of pursuing economic benefits and ignoring social benefits in the process of practice. 1 In the process of unification, how should we strengthen the restriction on the illegal behavior of the audit subject because of the simple pursuit of economic interests, at the same time, effectively motivate the audit subject to standardize the practice behavior, finally achieve the purpose of controlling and optimizing the bad independent audit behavior, and promote the healthy development of the CPA industry. The above two questions are discussed. The logical relationship of the question is: Question 1 is the cause analysis of the bad independent audit behavior. Only a better solution to this problem can make the policy proposals put forward in the following way. Problem 2 is the countermeasure study of the bad independent audit behavior, and the key and difficult points of strengthening the incentive and restraint mechanism are analyzed.
The research ideas of this paper are as follows: first, through the analysis of the current status of independent audit behavior in China, it is pointed out that the present bad independent audit behavior must be governed and optimized. Then, from the perspective of the demand and motivation of the independent audit subject, and the corresponding incentive and constraint mechanism, it is analyzed.
WP=3
Finally, on the basis of this, we try to explore and put forward some feasible suggestions to optimize our independent auditing behavior.
The main contents and views of this paper are as follows: from a dynamic point of view, independent audit behavior, as a social activity, is produced under the joint action of the external environment and internal mechanism. Its behavior process is a "demand motivation - target" cycle. From a static point of view, the independent audit behavior is the subject of audit and the object of audit. The audit subject refers to the three elements of the audit environment. The audit subject refers to the auditors and organizations, mainly certified public accountants and accounting firms composed of certified public accountants. The audit object is the auditor, that is, the customer management or management. The audit environment includes not only macro environmental factors, such as political, economic, cultural and legal, but also the audit. The behavior motivation of the principal is divided into two levels, one is to seek the motive of its own economic benefit, the other is to realize the motive of social benefit, and the two is an organic unity. To seek economic benefits and give up social benefits. The audit subject must unite the behavior of realizing social benefits in the pursuit of their own economic interests. The coordination of two levels of motivation depends on the establishment of effective incentive and restraint mechanisms. The weakening of incentives and constraints will inevitably lead to the audit subject to pursue economic benefits only. It is beneficial to ignore social benefits.
At the present stage, the main problems of independent audit behavior in China are: the audit subject does not harmonize the relationship between the pursuit of economic interest motivation and the realization of social benefit motivation. In order to pursue its own economic interests, the audit quality can not maintain objective and impartial status, resulting in the lower quality of audit and the decline of social credibility. The main reasons include two. On the other hand:
1, the illegal acts of CPA are lack of restraint. Due to the weakening of the external constraints, the CPA is prone to the loss of independence. The main reasons for the weakening of the external constraints are (1) the weakening of the legal system in our country is the hindsight of the certified public accountants who have lost the audit. The first is the legal consent. By adopting the limited liability organization form, the accounting firm weakens the personal responsibility of the certified public accountant in the audit failure, and the relevant legal provisions on the civil liability of the certified public accountants are not perfect, which makes the economic loss and the income obtained when the certified public accountant fails. (2) the false position of the "actual client" of the audit is actually the audit client of the audited unit management authority, which destroys the three party relations of the certified public accountant in the audit.
WP=4
The independence of the government provides the possibility of interfering with the behavior of CPA and conspiring with CPA to damage the public interests. (3) the lack of self-protection consciousness of the majority of small and medium-sized investors, and the fluke psychology of the certified public accountants who are not in standard practice. (4) Chinese traditional " The concept of "rule of man" and the mean thought lead to the demand of the society to reduce the practice of certified public accountants, as long as it can meet the needs of the leadership, as long as it is related, no matter the quality of the practice, the CPA can survive.
2, the standard practice behavior of CPA lacks incentive. Due to the shortage of current audit fees, there is no corresponding ratio of audit fees to certified public accountants' professional ethics and reputation, so there is a lack of incentive mechanism linked to the quality of certified public accountants. The main reasons are as follows: (1) the accounting firms can not. Independent pricing is not conducive to encouraging CPA to raise the audit fees by improving the audit quality. (2) the current audit fee standards do not take into account the expected risk loss preparation, and can not meet the needs of the certified public accountants to resist the occupational risk. (3) the low price competition among the accounting firms and the behavior of the market demand holders to lower the price. Resulting in serious shortage of audit fees, thereby affecting the independence and audit quality of certified public accountants.
In order to govern and optimize our country
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2003
【分類號(hào)】：F239

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7 杜鴻s

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