本文選題：審計(jì)質(zhì)量 + 自愿需求�。� 參考：《西南農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)》2003年碩士論文

【摘要】： 完善信息披露制度是解決證券市場(chǎng)信息不對(duì)稱的主要途徑之一。獨(dú)立、客觀、公正的審計(jì)服務(wù)為財(cái)務(wù)信息的相關(guān)性、可靠性提供了合理保證。但隨著國(guó)內(nèi)新老三案及銀廣廈事件等特大財(cái)務(wù)舞弊案件的曝光，注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師執(zhí)業(yè)質(zhì)量受到社會(huì)各界前所未有的關(guān)注。審計(jì)職業(yè)界陷入了訴訟爆炸時(shí)代，聲譽(yù)受到嚴(yán)重置疑，審計(jì)所起到的作用與社會(huì)公眾期望的差距越來(lái)越大。 本研究運(yùn)用經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)原理和新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論，分別從證券市場(chǎng)對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的需求和供給關(guān)系進(jìn)行分析，從而提出改善我國(guó)現(xiàn)有審計(jì)制度環(huán)境，創(chuàng)造對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)自愿性需求和主動(dòng)供給的制度環(huán)境，并提出相關(guān)的宏觀和微觀層面的政策建議。 本論文研究結(jié)構(gòu)如下：第一章總論。簡(jiǎn)述研究動(dòng)機(jī)、方法結(jié)構(gòu)；第二章理論基礎(chǔ)，明晰了本文涉及的基礎(chǔ)理念，特別是對(duì)審計(jì)本質(zhì)及經(jīng)濟(jì)作用的探討，為進(jìn)一步分析奠定了理論基礎(chǔ)。第三章對(duì)我國(guó)證券審計(jì)市場(chǎng)現(xiàn)狀考察，分析我國(guó)在經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)軌時(shí)期新興的證券市場(chǎng)與西方成熟證券市場(chǎng)的區(qū)別，明確了我國(guó)獨(dú)特的審計(jì)環(huán)境研究背景。第四章分別就IPO市場(chǎng)和二級(jí)市場(chǎng)對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的需求情況，詳細(xì)分析了對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)自愿性需求不足的原因；就影響事務(wù)所主動(dòng)提供高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的因素進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)分析。從供需關(guān)系論述了現(xiàn)階段我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)缺乏高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的原因。第五章初步運(yùn)用博弈論原理對(duì)監(jiān)管層與注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師的關(guān)系進(jìn)行分析，為監(jiān)管層正確制定政策提供經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)基礎(chǔ)。第六章，分別立足于需求方與監(jiān)管方、供給方與監(jiān)管方，有針對(duì)性地提出我國(guó)建立高審計(jì)質(zhì)量供求的制度環(huán)境和微觀層面的具體政策建議。第七章 研究結(jié)論及局限性。 本論文采用規(guī)范分析和實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合的研究方法，以規(guī)范分析為主，在對(duì)具體問(wèn)題研究時(shí)，邏輯演繹的基礎(chǔ)上，輔之以試驗(yàn)室研究方法，逐層展開(kāi)論述。研究結(jié)論如下： 1．分別就IPO市場(chǎng)(initial public offerings，股票首次公開(kāi)發(fā)行)和二級(jí)市場(chǎng)對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的需求分析。研究表明IPO市場(chǎng)的“標(biāo)準(zhǔn)控制”和新股發(fā)行定價(jià)模式導(dǎo)致企業(yè)許多行為是面向政府管制而非市場(chǎng)。我國(guó)獨(dú)立審計(jì)并不是市場(chǎng)自發(fā)行為，而是為了迎合政府管制的需要而模仿國(guó)際慣例的產(chǎn)物。IPO市場(chǎng)的“低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、高收益”特點(diǎn)決定只要爭(zhēng)取到政府額度就能成功發(fā)行并獲得高額報(bào)酬，為了提高發(fā)行價(jià)格，企業(yè)管理當(dāng)局往往有進(jìn)行盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)，傾向于聘請(qǐng)獨(dú)立性低、較配合的事務(wù)所擔(dān)任其主審會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所。再加上證券市場(chǎng)對(duì)新股存在“投資饑渴”，社會(huì)公眾根本不關(guān)心擬上市公司主審會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的執(zhí)業(yè)質(zhì)量高低。在二級(jí)市場(chǎng)上，非流通股一股獨(dú)大，國(guó)有持股主體嚴(yán)重缺位，公司治理機(jī)制失效，導(dǎo)致嚴(yán)重內(nèi)部人控制問(wèn)題；又由于增資配股、避免摘牌或特別處理的壓力，內(nèi)幕交易的需要而產(chǎn)生的強(qiáng)烈的“盈余管理”動(dòng)機(jī)，管理當(dāng)局并不需要高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)。由此可見(jiàn)，在我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)上，缺乏迫使管理當(dāng)局自愿對(duì)高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)產(chǎn)生需求的制度環(huán)境。 Study OO thC pfobleth OflOW BUdlt qll8llty Off SCCIfltICS iarklt 二、對(duì)影響會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所供給高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的因素分析表明事務(wù)所不會(huì)主動(dòng)提供 高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的原因如下：由于需求不足導(dǎo)致缺乏內(nèi)在經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)機(jī)；法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)低使違規(guī) 退出成本不高；惡性竟?fàn)幰l(fā)的低價(jià)攬客行為對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的直接損害；掛靠體制遺留問(wèn) 題和許可證管理導(dǎo)致低執(zhí)業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)意識(shí)；再加上從行業(yè)自身來(lái)講，隊(duì)伍建設(shè)和職業(yè)道德的 缺乏。研究表明會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所很難通過(guò)自身調(diào)節(jié)和市場(chǎng)調(diào)節(jié)主動(dòng)提供高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)。 三、在現(xiàn)階段，經(jīng)濟(jì)動(dòng)機(jī)和法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對(duì)提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量促進(jìn)作用并不明顯，加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管 就成為提升審計(jì)質(zhì)量的決定力量。博奕研究表明，監(jiān)管力度加大即加大對(duì)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師不 公正執(zhí)業(yè)的處罰力度，減少注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師不公正執(zhí)業(yè)的邊際收益及政府監(jiān)管成本的降低， 都能顯著提高注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師最優(yōu)戰(zhàn)略（公正執(zhí)業(yè)）的概率。在一定程度上為政府監(jiān)管的必 要性及尺度提供了理論支持，進(jìn)行了成本效益分析，指明了監(jiān)管政策實(shí)施方向。 通過(guò)對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量在證券市場(chǎng)供求關(guān)系分析可見(jiàn)，，現(xiàn)階段，我國(guó)審計(jì)市場(chǎng)基本是按買 方市場(chǎng)運(yùn)行的，政府介入是推動(dòng)市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程的主要力量。針對(duì)我國(guó)獨(dú)特的審計(jì)執(zhí)業(yè)環(huán)境。 要從根本上解抉審計(jì)質(zhì)量低下的現(xiàn)狀，本研究提出以下政策建議： 一、立足于需求方和監(jiān)管方的分析，建立需要高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的社會(huì)制度環(huán)境，讓 注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所具有自愿保持并提高執(zhí)業(yè)質(zhì)量的審計(jì)環(huán)境。具體為：1．完善公司治 理機(jī)制，解決國(guó)有股一股獨(dú)大和流通性問(wèn)題。2．進(jìn)一步改革股票發(fā)行審核制度和新股 定價(jià)模式，培育成熟投資者。3．建立獨(dú)立于董事會(huì)的審計(jì)委員會(huì)切實(shí)保障事務(wù)所利益。 二、立足于供給方和監(jiān)管方的分析，建立能提供高質(zhì)量審計(jì)服務(wù)的制度環(huán)境。應(yīng)從 以下入手：1．改革事務(wù)所現(xiàn)有組織形式，推行有限責(zé)任合伙制。2．建立注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師懲 戒委員會(huì)和公眾公司會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)督委員會(huì)，加強(qiáng)行業(yè)監(jiān)督。3．啟動(dòng)民事賠償機(jī)制，加大法律 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，提高違規(guī)退出成本。4．提升現(xiàn)有的市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入制度，完善許可證管理，建立退出機(jī) 制。5．建立合理的星級(jí)經(jīng)營(yíng)制
[Abstract]:Improving the information disclosure system is one of the main ways to solve the information asymmetry in the securities market. Independent, objective and impartial audit services provide a reasonable guarantee for the relevance of financial information and the reliability of the information. However, with the exposure of the cases of large financial frauds such as the new three cases and the events of the silver Guangxia, the quality of Certified Public Accountants is subject to society. The audit profession has fallen into the era of litigation explosion, and the reputation has been seriously doubted. The gap between the role of audit and the expectations of the public is increasing.
Based on the theory of economics and the theory of new institutional economics, this study analyzes the demand and supply relationship of high quality audit services in the securities market, and proposes to improve the existing audit system environment in China, create a system environment for the voluntary demand and active supply of high quality audit services, and put forward relevant macro and micro aspects. Level of policy recommendations.
The research structure of this paper is as follows: Chapter 1 general theory. Brief introduction of research motivation, method structure; the second chapter theoretical basis, clarified the basic concept of this article, especially the discussion on the essence of audit and economic function, and laid a theoretical foundation for further analysis. The third chapter examines the current situation of China's Securities Audit Market and analyzes China's economy. The difference between the emerging securities market and the western mature securities market in the transition period clearly defines the background of the unique audit environment in China. The fourth chapter analyzes the reasons for the lack of voluntary demand for high quality audit services in detail on the demand for high quality audit services in the IPO market and the two level market, and affects the initiative of the firm. The factors that provide high quality audit service are systematically analyzed. The reasons for the lack of high quality audit service in the present stage of audit market in China are discussed from the relationship between supply and demand. The fifth chapter analyzes the relationship between the supervision layer and the CPA by the principle of game theory, and provides the economic basis for the correct formulation of the policy by the regulatory layer. The sixth chapter is divided into two chapters. Not based on the demand side and the regulators, the suppliers and the regulators, the specific policy proposals for establishing the institutional environment and micro level of the high audit quality supply and demand are put forward in China. The seventh chapter is the conclusion and limitations of the research.
In this paper, the method of combining normative analysis and empirical analysis is adopted, which is based on normative analysis. On the basis of the study of specific problems and logical deduction, the research method of laboratory is supplemented by the method of test room. The conclusions are as follows:
1. the analysis of the demand for high quality audit services in the IPO market (initial public offerings, the first public stock issue) and the level two market. The research shows that the "standard control" of the IPO market and the IPO pricing model lead to the government regulation rather than the market. Our independent audit is not a self issuing of the market. In order to cater to the needs of government regulation, the "low risk, high yield" characteristic of the product of.IPO market, which imitates international practice, determines that as long as the government quota can be successfully issued and received high remuneration, in order to increase the price of the issue, the enterprise management authorities often have the motivation to enter the earnings management and tend to employ low independence. In addition, the public is not concerned with the quality of the certified public accounting firms of the listed companies. In the two level market, the non circulation shares are unique, the state-owned shares are seriously absent, and the corporate governance mechanism is invalid. It leads to serious insider control problems, and the strong "earnings management" motivation produced by the need for insider trading, because of increasing capital and allotment, avoiding the pressure of delisting or special treatment, and the management authorities do not need high quality audit services. A system environment that produces demand.
Study OO thC pfobleth OflOW BUdlt qll8llty Off SCCIfltICS iarklt
Two, the analysis of the factors that affect the quality audit service provided by accounting firms shows that firms will not provide them voluntarily.
The reasons for high quality audit services are as follows: lack of demand leads to lack of intrinsic economic motivation; low legal risk violating regulations.
The cost of exit is not high; the direct act of low price soliciting behavior caused by vicious competition leads to the audit quality.
Questions and licensing management lead to low professional risk awareness, and from the industry itself, team building and professional ethics.
Research shows that it is difficult for accounting firms to provide high quality audit services through self regulation and market regulation.
Three, at this stage, economic motives and legal risks do not promote the improvement of audit quality, and strengthen supervision.
It has become the decisive force to enhance the quality of audit. Game research shows that the increase of supervision means that the CPA should not be increased.
The penalties for fair practice reduce the marginal revenue of the unfair practice of CPAs and the reduction of government regulatory costs.
It can significantly improve the probability of CPA's best strategy (fair practice). To a certain extent, it is necessary to supervise the government.
We have provided theoretical support for sex and scale, and conducted cost-benefit analysis, pointing out the direction of regulatory policy.
By analyzing the relationship between audit quality and supply and demand in the stock market, we can see that the audit market in China is basically buying at the present stage.
The government intervention is the main force to promote the marketization process in the local market.
To fundamentally solve the problem of low audit quality, this study proposes the following policy recommendations:
First, based on the analysis of the demand side and the regulators, we need to establish a social institutional environment that requires high quality audit services.
The CPA firm has the auditing environment to voluntarily maintain and improve the quality of practice. Specifically, 1..
Rationale to solve the problem of dominance and liquidity of state-owned shares,.2. further reform the stock issuing audit system and new shares.
Pricing mode, nurturing mature investor.3., establishing independent board of audit committee to effectively protect the interests of the firm.
Two, based on the analysis of suppliers and regulators, we should establish a system environment that can provide high quality audit services.
The following are the following: 1.. Reform the existing organizational form of the firm, implement the limited liability partnership.2., and establish the CPA's punishment.
The Committee and the public company's accounting oversight board have stepped up industry supervision,.3., started the civil compensation mechanism, and increased the law.
Risk, improve the exit cost.4., improve the existing market access system, improve license management, and establish exit machines.
Setting up a reasonable star star management system by making.5.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2003
【分類號(hào)】：F239.6

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 王旭青;;利用信息技術(shù)完善證券審計(jì)監(jiān)管[J];商場(chǎng)現(xiàn)代化;2010年20期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 張麗君;注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì)質(zhì)量存在的問(wèn)題及對(duì)策研究[D];首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2013年

本文編號(hào)：1871406