本文選題：公司治理 + 獨(dú)立審計(jì)　； 參考：《武漢大學(xué)》2011年博士論文

【摘要】：自2001年以來(lái),世界各國(guó)不斷爆發(fā)的上市公司財(cái)務(wù)丑聞,和受此牽連的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所破產(chǎn),引起了全球?qū)局卫韱?wèn)題的關(guān)注和審計(jì)質(zhì)量的擔(dān)心。在我國(guó),隨著資本市場(chǎng)的不斷擴(kuò)大,上市公司的群體隊(duì)伍不斷壯大,其在經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中的地位和影響力逐漸增強(qiáng),作為社會(huì)信用體系一部分的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所所出具的審計(jì)報(bào)告也擔(dān)負(fù)起越來(lái)越重要的社會(huì)監(jiān)督和鑒證責(zé)任。同時(shí),我國(guó)與世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的融合度日益提高,無(wú)論公司治理還是審計(jì)服務(wù)都面臨著眾多共同的難題,因此,公司治理和獨(dú)立審計(jì)一直是我國(guó)和其他國(guó)家理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界研究的重點(diǎn)和熱點(diǎn),人們已經(jīng)認(rèn)識(shí)到獨(dú)立審計(jì)面臨著復(fù)雜環(huán)境變化,公司治理對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)有著重要影響。 目前我們正在經(jīng)歷由2008年從美國(guó)開(kāi)始蔓延的世界性經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī),雖然此次危機(jī)是由金融資產(chǎn)泡沫的破滅引起,但社會(huì)普遍對(duì)公司高管薪酬的不滿和企業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制的不利仍然給公司治理問(wèn)題敲響了警鐘。而在如此動(dòng)蕩的市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展格局中,作為中介機(jī)構(gòu)的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所應(yīng)如何發(fā)揮他在公司治理中的監(jiān)督和鑒證作用,并且控制好自身所面臨的風(fēng)險(xiǎn),成為我們當(dāng)前需要深入研究和思考的問(wèn)題。 在公司治理和審計(jì)服務(wù)的相關(guān)研究中,大多數(shù)學(xué)者是從被審計(jì)單位的公司治理問(wèn)題展開(kāi)的,得出了提高審計(jì)質(zhì)量要從加強(qiáng)公司治理水平開(kāi)始的結(jié)論。另一部分學(xué)者則從會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的規(guī)模、組織形式、人員結(jié)構(gòu)等方面,研究了其與審計(jì)質(zhì)量的關(guān)系和我國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師行業(yè)的發(fā)展道路。本文以前者的研究思路為主線,辨證地提出了公司治理與獨(dú)立審計(jì)服務(wù)之間存在的相互依賴、相互影響的互動(dòng)關(guān)系。首先在兩權(quán)分離狀態(tài)下,為解決委托代理問(wèn)題、降低交易成本和減少信息不對(duì)稱的公司治理需求產(chǎn)生了獨(dú)立審計(jì)服務(wù)；獨(dú)立審計(jì)在公司治理中發(fā)揮了契約治理的本質(zhì)效應(yīng),獨(dú)立審計(jì)的存在使公司治理各方的組織行為和預(yù)期發(fā)生改變。同時(shí)獨(dú)立審計(jì)必須基于公司經(jīng)營(yíng)、財(cái)務(wù)、人員及制度方面的基礎(chǔ)數(shù)據(jù)展開(kāi)工作,在執(zhí)行過(guò)程中不斷受到來(lái)自公司治理要素的直接或間接影響。在總體上,公司治理水平對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)起到基礎(chǔ)制約作用,獨(dú)立審計(jì)必須在現(xiàn)有公司治理水平下做出職業(yè)判斷,在具體影響要素上,本文通過(guò)對(duì)我國(guó)2010年的上市公司數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)管理層和董事會(huì)對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)的影響較為明顯,監(jiān)事會(huì)沒(méi)有發(fā)揮應(yīng)有治理效用。另外,由于我國(guó)提供獨(dú)立審計(jì)服務(wù)的會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所80%以上均采用了公司制的組織形式,事務(wù)所自身的內(nèi)部治理問(wèn)題也在時(shí)刻影響著獨(dú)立審計(jì)服務(wù)的開(kāi)展,因此本文在公司治理問(wèn)題的討論上,少量涉及了事務(wù)所治理對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)的影響。 在研究方法上,本文采用規(guī)范研究與實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合,并以規(guī)范研究為主的研究方法,對(duì)更加廣泛的公司治理和獨(dú)立審計(jì)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了研究和探索,試圖對(duì)公司治理和獨(dú)立審計(jì)服務(wù)所涉及到的多層次、多方面的相互影響給出一個(gè)更全面的立體透視。論文以獨(dú)立審計(jì)的契約關(guān)系為本質(zhì)線索,從公司治理實(shí)踐中審計(jì)功能異化的實(shí)際問(wèn)題出發(fā),分別對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)的公司治理效用和公司治理水平對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)的促進(jìn)進(jìn)行了分析總結(jié)。通過(guò)借鑒國(guó)外的公司治理經(jīng)驗(yàn)和獨(dú)立審計(jì)特點(diǎn),提出被審計(jì)單位應(yīng)以理順審計(jì)聘任權(quán)為突破口,改善董事會(huì)的專業(yè)決策效率,完善內(nèi)部制度安排,同時(shí)增加相關(guān)利益者的監(jiān)督作用,建立相關(guān)利益者與董事會(huì)和審計(jì)師的穩(wěn)定溝通渠道；為提高獨(dú)立審計(jì)質(zhì)量,增強(qiáng)獨(dú)立審計(jì)的公司治理功能,會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所也應(yīng)以二次合并為契機(jī),完善內(nèi)部治理中的制度及程序建設(shè),落實(shí)相應(yīng)責(zé)任與權(quán)利的統(tǒng)一,將人力資源管理和事務(wù)所文化建設(shè)放在重要位置；政府及行業(yè)自律組織應(yīng)嚴(yán)格監(jiān)管制度,加大懲戒力度,促進(jìn)健康穩(wěn)定的資本市場(chǎng)和獨(dú)立審計(jì)市場(chǎng)的建立和發(fā)展。 本文分六個(gè)部分展開(kāi)論述：第一章交代了論文的選題動(dòng)機(jī)和意義,介紹了整個(gè)論文的寫作思路和研究方法,并對(duì)論文中關(guān)鍵的概念和范圍進(jìn)行了界定。同時(shí)回顧了國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)公司治理和獨(dú)立審計(jì)的研究文獻(xiàn),第二章主要總結(jié)了公司治理研究的若干基礎(chǔ)理論,其中重點(diǎn)介紹了委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論、交易成本理論和契約理論。第三章分析了公司治理水平對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)的深入影響,分別從本質(zhì)性的基礎(chǔ)制約和表象上的影響媒介兩個(gè)方面進(jìn)行研究。第四章從被審計(jì)單位的角度出發(fā),研究了獨(dú)立審計(jì)在被審計(jì)單位的公司治理中發(fā)揮的主要作用機(jī)理,分別從契約治理效應(yīng)和組織行為傳遞兩個(gè)方面進(jìn)行了分析,同時(shí)提出了獨(dú)立審計(jì)在公司治理中發(fā)揮作用的前提條件是對(duì)審計(jì)質(zhì)量的保證和公司治理系統(tǒng)對(duì)獨(dú)立審計(jì)效用的認(rèn)可。第五章在前述章節(jié)分析的基礎(chǔ)上,從我國(guó)實(shí)際情況出發(fā),總結(jié)了我國(guó)公司治理實(shí)踐中的主要問(wèn)題,通過(guò)對(duì)2010年我國(guó)部分上市公司的公司治理要素和獨(dú)立審計(jì)意見(jiàn)、審計(jì)費(fèi)用等數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分類統(tǒng)計(jì)和分析,從實(shí)證研究的角度檢驗(yàn)了公司治理與獨(dú)立審計(jì)互動(dòng)關(guān)系的規(guī)范研究結(jié)論。第六章對(duì)全文進(jìn)行了整體性的總結(jié),對(duì)論文的關(guān)鍵結(jié)論進(jìn)行全面的梳理,對(duì)論文的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)和不足進(jìn)行了評(píng)述,并對(duì)我國(guó)未來(lái)的公司治理和獨(dú)立審計(jì)發(fā)展提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since 2001, the financial scandals of Listed Companies in the world and the bankruptcy of the certified public accountants have caused concern about the problem of corporate governance and the concern of the quality of audit. In China, as the capital market continues to expand, the group of listed companies is growing, and its position in the economic life and As a part of the social credit system, the audit report, which is part of the social credit system, also takes on more and more important responsibility for social supervision and authentication. At the same time, the degree of integration between China and the world economy is increasing. Both corporate governance and audit services are faced with many common problems, therefore, corporate governance. Rational and independent audit has always been the focus and hot spot in the theoretical and practical circles of China and other countries. People have realized that independent audit is facing complex environmental changes, and corporate governance has an important impact on independent audit.
At present, we are experiencing a world economic crisis that began to spread from the United States in the 2008. Although the crisis was caused by the disillusionment of the financial asset bubble, the public dissatisfaction with corporate executives' compensation and the risk of corporate risk control still rounded the alarm of corporate governance. In the Bureau, how should the accounting firm, as an intermediary, play his role in supervision and authentication in corporate governance and control the risks that they face, which we need to study and think deeply at present.
In the related research of corporate governance and audit service, most scholars start from the problem of corporate governance by the audited units, and get the conclusion that the quality of audit should start from strengthening the level of corporate governance. The other scholars have studied the audit and audit from the scale, organization form and personnel structure of the accounting firms. The relationship of quality and the development road of Chinese certified public accountants industry. The main line of the former research ideas of this article is that the interdependence and interaction relationship between corporate governance and independent audit services are dialectically proposed. First, in the state of separation of two rights, to solve the principal-agent problem, reduce the transaction cost and reduce the letter. The unsymmetrical corporate governance demand produces an independent audit service, and the independent audit plays the essential effect of the contract governance in the corporate governance. The existence of the independent audit changes the organizational behavior and expectation of the corporate governance. At the same time, the independent audit must be based on the basic data exhibition of the company management, finance, personnel and system. On the whole, the level of corporate governance plays a basic role in the independent audit, and the independent audit must make a professional judgment under the existing corporate governance level. In the specific influence, the number of Listed Companies in China in 2010 is the number of listed companies. According to the analysis, it is found that the influence of the management and the board of directors on the independent audit is more obvious, and the board of supervisors has not played the role of governance. In addition, more than 80% of the accounting firms that provide independent audit services in our country have adopted the organizational form of the company system, and the internal governance of the firm itself also affects the independent audit at all times. Therefore, in the discussion of corporate governance, a small amount of the impact of firm governance on independent auditing is discussed in this paper.
In the method of research, this paper combines normative research and empirical research, and studies and explores more extensive corporate governance and independent audit, trying to give a more comprehensive and multi-dimensional interaction of corporate governance and independent audit services. The paper takes the contractual relationship of independent audit as the essential clue. From the practical problems of the alienation of audit function in the corporate governance practice, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of the corporate governance of independent audit and the promotion of the level of corporate governance to the independent audit. By drawing on the experience of foreign corporate governance and the characteristics of independent audit, It is proposed that the audited units should straighten out the right of audit appointment as a breakthrough, improve the efficiency of the decision of the board of directors, improve the internal system arrangement, increase the supervisory role of the relevant stakeholders, and establish a stable communication channel for the relevant stakeholders and the board of directors and auditors; to improve the quality of the independent audit and enhance the corporate governance work of the independent audit. The accounting firm should also take the two times as an opportunity to perfect the system and procedure construction in internal governance, implement the unification of the corresponding responsibilities and rights, put the human resources management and the construction of the firm culture in an important position, and the government and the self-discipline organizations of the industry should strictly supervise the system, increase the punishment and promote the healthy and stable capital. The establishment and development of market and independent audit market.
This article is divided into six parts: the first chapter explains the motivation and significance of the thesis, introduces the writing ideas and research methods of the whole paper, and defines the key concepts and scope of the paper. At the same time, it reviews the research literature on corporate governance and independent audit at home and abroad, and the second chapter mainly summarizes the corporate governance. The basic theory of the study is to introduce the principal agent theory, the information asymmetry theory, the transaction cost theory and the contract theory. The third chapter analyzes the deep influence of the corporate governance level on the independent audit, and the two aspects are the essential basic constraints and the image response media respectively. The fourth chapter is from the trial. From the point of view of the unit, the main mechanism of independent audit in the corporate governance of the audited units is studied, and the two aspects are analyzed from the effect of contract governance and the transfer of organizational behavior. At the same time, the pre conditions for the independent audit to play its role in the corporate governance are the guarantee of the audit quality and the corporate governance. The fifth chapter, on the basis of the analysis of the preceding chapters, summarizes the main problems in the practice of corporate governance in our country on the basis of the analysis of the previous chapters, and classifies and analyses the data of the corporate governance elements, independent audit opinions and audit expenses in 2010. The angle of empirical study examines the normative research conclusions of the interactive relationship between corporate governance and independent audit. The sixth chapter summarizes the whole text, reviews the key conclusions of the paper comprehensively, reviews the innovation points and shortcomings of the paper, and puts forward the corresponding development of our future Corporate Governance and independent audit. Policy recommendations.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前2條

1 劉熠倩;股東知情權(quán)研究[D];揚(yáng)州大學(xué);2013年

2 曾弘霖;管理層權(quán)力、異常高管薪酬與審計(jì)意見(jiàn)[D];廈門大學(xué);2014年

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本文編號(hào)：1849545