本文選題：股權(quán)性質(zhì) + 審計(jì)質(zhì)量�。� 參考：《新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2009年碩士論文

【摘要】： 我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的突出特征是存在非流通股與流通股的區(qū)別。30%的上市公司第一大股東為非流通的社會(huì)法人股和發(fā)起人法人股、流通股以及其他小股東,處于分散狀態(tài)。而70%的上市公司第一大股東為非流通的國(guó)家股股東和國(guó)有法人股股東,顯現(xiàn)出高度的集中性;在這樣一種股權(quán)分散與集中并存、各持股主體目標(biāo)各異的狀態(tài)下,中國(guó)上市公司面臨著復(fù)雜的代理問(wèn)題。審計(jì)的產(chǎn)生就是這種委托代理關(guān)系的結(jié)果。 隨著我國(guó)股權(quán)改革的進(jìn)行,我國(guó)上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)發(fā)生了很大變化,其中很重要的一點(diǎn)就是從國(guó)有控股向民營(yíng)控股的轉(zhuǎn)變,因此非國(guó)有控股的公司逐漸增多。已有研究表明,國(guó)有股控股會(huì)導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)權(quán)主體缺位、內(nèi)部人控制等一系列問(wèn)題,從而降低公司盈余質(zhì)量。所以國(guó)有控股上市公司可能會(huì)選擇較低的審計(jì)質(zhì)量。但另一些學(xué)者卻提出,我國(guó)股票市場(chǎng)正處于轉(zhuǎn)軌時(shí)期,市場(chǎng)機(jī)制還不完善,在這種特殊時(shí)期國(guó)有股控股是一種次優(yōu)選擇,有利于盈余質(zhì)量的提高,從而會(huì)促使公司選擇較高的審計(jì)質(zhì)量。此外,股權(quán)分置改革一波三折的經(jīng)歷,也值得我們深思。鑒于此,本文把上市公司劃分為國(guó)家控股上市公司、國(guó)有法人控股上市公司、非國(guó)有控股上市公司,利用2005-2007年的有關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)滬深兩市A股上市公司控股權(quán)性質(zhì)與審計(jì)質(zhì)量的關(guān)系進(jìn)行實(shí)證考察,檢驗(yàn)股權(quán)性質(zhì)與審計(jì)質(zhì)量之間的關(guān)系。研究結(jié)果表明:在其他條件相同的情況下,國(guó)家及國(guó)有法人控股上市公司易選擇較高的審計(jì)質(zhì)量;而在其他條件相同的情況下,非國(guó)有股控股上市公司易選擇較低的審計(jì)質(zhì)量;另外,“一股獨(dú)大”不是盈余質(zhì)量低劣的根源。因此,本文認(rèn)為提高上市公司盈余信息質(zhì)量并促使其選擇較高審計(jì)質(zhì)量的關(guān)鍵,應(yīng)該是完善市場(chǎng)秩序、法律體系與管制制度而不應(yīng)是減持國(guó)有股和盲目的股權(quán)分置。
[Abstract]:The outstanding characteristics of the equity structure of listed companies in China are that there are differences between non-tradable shares and tradable shares .30% of the largest shareholders of listed companies are non-circulating social legal person shares, sponsors' legal person shares, circulating shares and other minority shareholders, and are in a decentralized state. However, 70% of the largest shareholders of listed companies are non-circulating state shareholders and state-owned corporate shareholders, showing a high degree of centralization. Chinese listed companies are faced with complex agency problems. Audit is the result of this kind of principal-agent relationship. With the development of stock right reform in China, the ownership structure of listed companies in our country has undergone great changes, among which the important point is the transformation from state-owned holding to private holding, so the number of non-state-owned holding companies is gradually increasing. It has been shown that the holding of state-owned shares will lead to a series of problems, such as the absence of property rights subject, the control of insiders, and so on, thus reducing the quality of the company's earnings. So state-controlled listed companies may choose a lower audit quality. However, some other scholars put forward that the stock market in China is in a transitional period, and the market mechanism is not perfect. In this special period, the holding of state-owned shares is a sub-optimal choice, which is conducive to the improvement of earnings quality. As a result, the company will choose a higher audit quality. In addition, the split-share structure reform of the experience of three-fold, it is also worth our reflection. In view of this, this paper divides the listed companies into state-controlled listed companies, state-owned legal person holding listed companies, non-state-owned holding listed companies. Based on the data from 2005 to 2007, this paper makes an empirical study on the relationship between controlling ownership and audit quality of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, and examines the relationship between ownership nature and audit quality. The results show that under the same conditions, the state and the state-owned legal person holding listed companies are easy to choose higher audit quality, while the non-state-owned holding companies are easy to choose the lower audit quality under the same conditions. In addition, the "one share alone" is not the root cause of the poor quality of earnings. Therefore, this paper holds that the key to improve the quality of earnings information of listed companies and promote their choice of higher audit quality should be to perfect the market order, legal system and control system, rather than to reduce their holdings of state-owned shares and blind split share structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：新疆財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號(hào)】：F276.6;F239.4

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本文編號(hào)：1839910